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Abstract
Ideology is a political and a sociological term. Thinking about ’system’ makes the 
results of sociological thought appear relevant. The understanding of information 
systems (IS) as social systems or as phenomena in a social context justifies, 
therefore, the use of the concept of ideology in the context of IS. As a 
consequence of this application a series of hypotheses can be formulated about IS 
and the study of IS. Some of these are taken up in a thought experiment. This 
experiment is presented in a dialectical mould, consisting of thesis, antithesis and 
synthesis. In the thesis, the application of the concept of ideology is advocated 
because it is seen as contributing relevant knowledge to the study of IS. In the 
antithesis, the above hypothesis is opposed, and consequently the application of 
the concept of ideology is not advocated. In the synthesis, the application of the 
concept of ideology is put into a different perspective, where the importance of 
knowledge is substituted by an emphasis on thinking. Thinking is introduced as the 
touchstone of relevant knowledge, Its elusive nature is responsible for the 
elusiveness of claims in systems-thinking and -practice.
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Preface
The ‘Intellectual Journey’
The ‘intellectual journey’ of this research was prepared in its content long ago, 
and the fact that it was more or less expected that I would embark on writing a 
Ph.D. made its realisation almost a matter of course. I developed, however, a real 
interest in the study of information systems as a consequence of the ensemble of 
three factors. Firstly, starting in 1983 I embarked on a Diplom-course in the 
faculty of Wirtschaftsingenieurwesen. This is a sandwich-course of university 
tuition and internships that integrates various disciplines that are relevant for the 
running of a business, in order to equip graduates with an understanding of the 
systemic nature of organizations. Secondly, I studied the theoretical aspects of 
information systems in an M.Sc.-course and a Ph.D.-programme. Thirdly, I sought 
employment relevant to my research during the Ph.D.-programme in order to 
complement the theoretical aspect of the research enterprise with a practical 
aspect of field work.
My education in Germany at the University of Karlsruhe in the faculty of 
Wirtschaftsingenieurwesen was very comprehensive for the kind of career a 
Diplom-Wirtschaftsingenieur is expected to pursue. Engineering (mechanical, 
electrical and chemical), business administration, economics, computing, 
operations research, law and management are the ingredients of this degree. The 
compulsory internships during this degree-course made it apparent that theory and 
practice where somewhat apart. As a consequence, I reflected about the value of 
this education and about the reasons for the discrepancy between theory and 
practice. Moreover, my interest was always very much attracted to philosophical 
and cultural issues, and the combination of these circumstances led me to develop 
a critical disposition toward theory and practice. Quite often I felt that the 
university education was a hindrance to holistic personal development, but I could 
not figure out particular obstacles. From a multitude of motives I chose to go to
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England. I decided that my horizon was still too limited to come to terms with 
these problems. In a way going to England was a "Flucht nach vom'\
More by luck than by design I managed to get a place on the M.Sc.-course in 
analysis, design and management of information systems at the London School of 
Economics and Pohtical Science. For the first time during my educational ‘career’ 
the subject matter took over a substantial part of my interest, and consequently of 
my working time. Two topics were mainly responsible for this change. On the one 
hand, there were the lectures in Organizational Theory and Behaviour and in 
Information that opened up new fields of interest to me. On the other hand, the 
subject of ‘system’ and ‘information system’ became a marvellous catalyst for my 
earlier thinking, developed in Karlsruhe.
The influence of the LSE on my thinking was nothing if not profound. 
Organizational Theory and Behaviour opened the perspectives which I needed, at 
least from a theoretical point of view, to comprehend the apparent clash between 
theory and practice as I had experienced it during my first degree. Besides, I also 
started to understand this lecture course as itself subject to a similar dilemma as 
my previous degree; that is an incongruence of theory and practice. The lecture on 
Information, on the other hand, was an entirely different animal. It encouraged 
the application of sociological theory; a field which I had previously looked upon 
with prejudicial contempt. At the end of the master-course I consequently felt that 
my academic education had after all given me the required techniques as well as 
academic freedom to find my way of thinking in order to make my way in 
business.
That I did not go to business at the end of 1988 had three reasons. Firstly, I still 
thought about doing the ‘big’ thing; that is writing a Ph.D. I still had this idea of 
the Ph.D. being the real academic touchstone, rather than my Diplom-course and 
the master-course. Everybody counselled me to do it then rather than to wait, for
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various probably correct reasons. Secondly, I did not want to leave my girlfriend 
behind. Thirdly, I had developed ideas about information systems that seemed to 
lead in a meaningful direction as far as my understanding of the complexity of 
information systems was concerned, and I wanted to express them. I felt very 
flattered when my inquiry about a Ph.D. at the LSE was received positively, and I 
think that settled the matter.
For obvious (embarrassing) reasons I will not say what my proposal for carrying 
out the Ph.D. was. Let it suffice to say that it was half-baked, with a lot of big 
words about 1992, business and information systems in it. Nevertheless, in 
November 1988 I started reading in the library about various things, some related 
to the proposal, some related to research in general and some unrelated to it 
following some questions the M.Sc.-course had left open. Relatively quickly 
questions of research method, scientific method and epistemology occupied my 
research more than others. At about this time the attendance at the weekly RISA- 
seminars of the LSE information systems department made me think for the first 
time about ideologies that characterised the different stances taken in the 
discussions. The idea of ideology had struck me because of the alacrity of the 
debates. Before I could make a reassessment of my research proposal, I went to 
the Robert Bosch GmbH for the first time, from February to June 1989. This first 
spell of practical work with the Robert Bosch GmbH was intended to clarify issues 
which I had addressed in my research proposal. As it turned out, the field work 
supported the change in direction which my research had undergone in the 
previous months.
The five months at Schwieberdingen were very instructive. My initial work 
assignment was to compile a history of the decisions that led to the launch of the 
Information and Communication System (IK-System) at Schwieberdingen. The 
first eight weeks started like the internships during my Diplom-course. I did 
miscellaneous things and was not assigned to something of major importance to
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operations. During those weeks, though, I had the chance to get to refresh and 
increase my knowledge of IS-practice, and I used it. The department at Bosch in 
which I worked does technical data processing. A wide variety of services are 
rendered to other departments of Bosch. CAD, office automation, scientific 
programs, failure mode and error analysis, etc. are done there. I talked to as many 
people as possible, and my perspective on information systems got updated in a 
very good way. After two months came a big change.
With immediate effect I was assigned to the IK-System as project support. For 
various reasons the project needed a caretaker of some kind. Even though I was 
only assigned temporarily, considerable responsibility was placed upon me. I had 
still too little knowledge of the working of the IK-System to understand it. 
Moreover, I had not been involved in the day to day operation and, thus, was 
neither familiar with the people nor the technicahties involved. I learned an awful 
lot very quickly; well, I had to. The theory of ‘socio-technical systems’ or of the 
four tiered differentiation of ‘pragmatics, semantics, syntactics and empirics’ which 
I had come across during the M.Sc.-course took on an entirely new meaning. I 
also saw the curriculum of my Diplom-course in a new light. It was a time of a 
profound shift of relevance, or as we say in german: "Erstens kommt allés anders, 
and zweitens als man denkt".
Returning to the LSE found me back at square one with my research. During 
conversations predominantly with Professor Ian O. Angell and in brief essays 
which I wrote in short succession I reconditioned what I had done before Bosch 
and what I had experienced at Bosch. As an undercurrent I always thought of 
systems ideologies, as this topic exerted an ever stronger appeal on me. Partly, 
because the concept fascinated me, and partly, because I saw it as a valid scientific 
idea which was worthwhile to investigate. By late autumn I had gone so far 
towards systems ideologies that I felt reasonably firm that this would be my Ph.D. 
topic. What had happened?
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From the early contact with the concept of ideology during 1988 I had kept an 
interest in this area. I had bought some books on the subject, and when I had the 
time to read them in the summer of 1989 my work on other topics was appearing 
less relevant. The concept of ideology seemed to me to explain the events in the 
RISA-seminar as well as other ideas and incidents I had come across during the 
Diplom-course, the internships, the M.Sc.-course and my work at Bosch. My 
contact with and my investigation into the concept of ideology was still too new in 
order to criticise it. This was the time when my mind was occupied by an 
argument as it is demonstrated in the thesis of this dissertation. I recognised 
personal development as an individual process that creates personal realities on 
the basis of processed information. I recognised the study of phenomena as an 
approach that processes information. And I recognised the systemic nature of the 
connection between personal realities, scholarship and the complexity of IS- 
practice.
By the time my second year started I assumed that I would write a dissertation 
with the purpose of showing the power of the concept of ideology for information 
systems. Yet, already before 1990 came, I had developed some doubts. A RISA- 
seminar which I gave in early 1990 did not go all too well, and as a consequence I 
was thinking about how I could concisely say what I felt I had to say. As a result I 
started to write a paper which over time grew and grew until I finally used it in 
June 1990 as an ‘embryo’ for my dissertation. Before that, though, writing the 
paper required me taking an aloof stance in order to formulate a coherent 
understanding of my ideas. This aloof stance allowed me to see some holes in my 
argument as well as in the concept of ideology which I had not seen before. In the 
time between November 1989 and February 1990 I investigated these holes and 
tried to get clear about why they occurred. As a consequence an understanding 
grew that multiple perspectives were appropriate and that none of these could be 
taken without compromising the others. These months were months of intense 
exchange with Professor Ian O. Angell, and his refreshing comments, suggestions
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and incursions made these months a time of intellectual bliss like I had never 
experienced it before.
The consequence of these exchanges was the foundation for the synthesis. By the 
time I went back to Bosch (apparently my performance was satisfying) I had 
written a fairly comprehensive document of the research that led to the idea of 
system ideologies and of the thesis. While at Bosch I enjoyed being back in 
business and doing different things. It was the time when I started thinking about 
the time after the Ph.D. Should I continue doing research in academia or should I 
go into business for real? No decision was made then, and when it finally was 
made it was rather under different circumstances. The importance of this episode 
lies somewhere else. It was the start of ideas that led to the antithesis. Soeffner’s 
book which I had bought in Germany at that time almost by coincidence together 
with my study of the literature of scientific method came to form the background 
of the antithesis. That it also became part of the dissertation is a result of me 
sitting down in June 1990 to think about writing up the dissertation.
When I started writing up the dissertation in June 1990 I had no idea how long , 
in terms of thousands of words, it would become. Nevertheless, I had a rough idea 
of how long it would take. Three months, I thought, should be enough to write 
draft version zero, and another half year should suffice to reedit this version 
several times in order to produce a dissertation. Nine months all in all should be 
enough to deliver my baby.
At the time, I gathered my ideas and thought about the meaning of writing a 
dissertation and its relevance to my development and the research. I came to 
conclude that an argumentative dissertation was the best fit to catch the ‘mood’ of 
the research enterprise. From there to the dialectical structure was but a small 
step. Thesis, antithesis and synthesis almost fell into place as the different 
perspectives I developed and held during the previous months. While writing some
11
Preface
changes in the argument were made, but the overall direction was so clear that 
only minor changes had to be made to the structure during writing up (one of 
which is this preface describing the intellectual journey). Writing the dissertation 
has been an enriching experience. Out of the many possible ways to put an 
argument together and across to the reader, one has evolved and been chosen. 
Even though the ideas of the dissertation were to a large extent ‘there’ only 
waiting to be presented, the argument had to be tailored gradually. This whole 
process, though different from the previous parts of the research, was nevertheless 
very exciting and rewarding as the dissertation could be seen to grow daily.
With submitting the dissertation in February 1991 my work is finished so far. The 
dissertation reflects my experiences which I had with information systems. My 
involvement with computers, computer programs, organizational mechanisms and 
procedures, systems thinking, systems analysis, design and management and a 
general curiosity about the way things are, have all contributed to this text. I feel 
confident that I have built a foundation for my future work and I look forward to 
defending my dissertation in the viva voce and the interesting discussions I am 
going to have.
Bernhard Straub
London, 25th of February 1991
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Part I 1. Prologue
1. PROLOGUE
Why is it that the study of information systems (IS) is still thoroughly connected to 
computers in the public mind, when not even the study of computing is exhausted 
by its occupation with the computer? From within the study of IS this grievance is 
usually attributed to the ignorance of outsiders, whereas we insiders all know that 
the study of IS is concerned with computers plus systems analysis plus 
organizational behaviour plus systems-thinking and -practice, etc. After all, the hall 
of fame of the study of IS is full of creditable acronyms such as AI, MIS, SSADM, 
BIS, KBS, HCI, 4GL, etc. that prove the commitment to a wide range of problems 
beyond a mere concern with machines.
Indeed, I thought for a long time myself that information systems are about 
effective organization of unorganized human interaction. However, the persistent 
misunderstanding of information systems for computers has prompted me to 
imagine that it might be a mind-set which let me see the study of IS in the 
vanguard of societal or at least economic progress. The controversial reception 
information systems get in public might after all not just be a matter of ignorance 
or luddism. Looked at from an ‘ignorant’ perspective, it is quite peculiar to see 
how research programmes in information systems receive a tremendous amount of 
Vorschufl-Lorbeeren. This ex ante credit carries along research programmes like 
decision support systems or executive information systems before they have to 
show their effectiveness. The almost compulsive confidence with which a tidy array 
of computers with happy operators and successful engineers and managers is 
advertised as a world of intelligent information systems prompts questions not only 
of feasibility but also of desirability.
In this scenario, the study of IS plays the part of the expert that takes care of this 
difficult matter of information systems. How many students Uke myself have gone 
through an education that teaches them the methods and methodologies that
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underpin the study of IS. Many, like myself, will have experienced the joy of the 
first successful run of their first own BASIC-program or of the versatility of 
methods of systems analysis. Many will have fallen for the excitement of building 
information systems that are ‘intelligent’ or that run nationwide or even 
internationally. That this excitement is spoilt by set-backs and disasters such as 
accidentally dropped bombs, ghost-trains on monitors and crashing passenger jets 
[Neumann, 1990b] is seen by many only as a challenge to double efforts in the 
study of IS.
However, the study of IS has not shrug off its computer-legacy. The technological 
orientation of the machine-metaphor dominates much of the study of IS. This 
legacy is not just apparent in the razzmatazz of glossy advertisements and in the 
tuition of various issues surrounding the relationship of the computer to 
information systems and its appropriate treatment. This legacy is also a 
cornerstone of a quest for solutions that are brought about through the power of 
the computer. The unrelenting pursuit of the ideal solution to problems leads 
many to the assumption of ‘fighting the last battle’; if only computers were treated 
appropriately, then the obstacles to an organized treatment of information systems 
will be achieved. Yet, that this last battle creates new and unanticipated problems 
indigenous to the current IS-thinking and -practice goes often unnoticed. The 
confidence to be within reach of solutions clouds the recognition of the fallacy of 
‘the last battle’. The conviction to be in possession of the key to solutions creates 
a tunnel vision that prevents reflection. In such a secluded world the messy reality 
of information systems must appear as a nuisance, which would rather be 
eliminated. Peter Neumann, thus, comes to the conclusion that "People are the 
ultimate problem" [1990a].
Something has gone terribly wrong! The rather unreflected support that 
information systems receive, has not prompted a critical investigation of 
information systems, but an establishment that denounces the ‘outsiders’ as the
15
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‘ultimate problem’. It is not surprising that the outsiders are reminded of a brave 
new world where self-appointed experts try to dominate a despised public. Quite 
apart from a professional and scientific debate, feelings are articulated that 
question information systems as the virtuous paradigm it is often portrayed to be. 
Yet, this uneasiness is not met by a staunch defence of well-grounded theory. 
Indeed, within the study of IS a frantic succession of acronyms with corresponding 
research programmes struggles to come to terms with what is called ‘information 
system’. Respectability is preserved by pretending that the newest developments 
are, like ‘the emperor’s new clothes’, indeed magnificent. But, I think they are not. 
I question the way in which information systems are paraded. I question the casual 
treatment of information systems in the study of IS, as if a theory of information 
systems had been established and only further refinements and new areas of 
application had to be found.
Information systems are a recent addition to society. A conscious treatment of 
information systems as such has emerged only within this century, even though 
some theories imply that information systems are a matter of identification and, 
thus, have always been with us. Because of the penetration of the economy by 
computerised information systems, there is a tendency, though, to mistake 
installations, products and services as all there is to ‘information systems’. As a 
consequence, information systems are often seen as something objectively existing. 
They are explained to be computer networks, or computer networks plus a social 
environment, or social systems with technical components, etc. It is not surprising 
that no general consensus about the meaning of ‘information system’ has evolved. 
One of the tasks of the study of IS is to take account of this ambiguity of 
interpretation, to recognise developments, to organise experiences and to 
formulate theories in order to come to terms with a future that reverberates with 
the consequences of today’s thinking and practice.
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The history of mankind is full of examples where transformations of society were 
impending, as with the introduction of fire, stone-tools, iron-melting and also more 
recently the clock, the steam-engine and electricity. The uncertainty about the 
consequences of these transformations invariably led to speculations about 
possible future scenarios. Prophesies of doom as well as glory were aired, as for 
instance when it was believed that travelling on a train makes women pregnant or 
that electrical shocks can increase potency. Yet only with hindsight can an 
assessment be attempted that gives perspective to events. However, even these ex 
post assessments are subject to re-interpretation, and, therefore, just as much 
liable to disproof as those explanations that were given at the time of 
transformation, as for instance in the case of the re-emergence of (interest in) 
cargo ships driven by sails.
The history of the recent rise of information systems is similarly characterised by 
uncertainty about possible consequences and insecurity about choices which can be 
made. What is an information system, how should we deal with it, is it a matter of 
definition, etc. When a lap-top computer is stolen, as happened recently in the 
case of an army officer briefing the British Government about military strategies 
in the Persian Gulf, is this incident to be considered as a part of an information 
system, is it a problem that can be foreseen, are break-downs a necessary property 
of any information system, or is such an incident a human weakness outside the 
scope of the study of IS? When a computerised information system goes down, 
who is accountable: the user, a hacker, the operator, the designer, a virus? When 
it became apparent that the ambition of the Japanese Information Processing 
Developing Center to launch the creation of the Fifth Generation of computers 
did "not come to much" [Manchester, 1991], what light did that shed on 
information systems? Were the goals wrong, did the engineers fail, was co­
ordination mismanaged, did the funds not suffice, was the entire project ill- 
conceived or based on inappropriate assumptions?
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No obvious answers can be given to all these questions. Neither at the time of 
action nor with hindsight can a general explanation be given. However, opinions 
exist concerning these incidents, and they are seen as being dependent on 
assumptions, beliefs, Weltanschauungen, cognitive maps, etc. A whole series of 
social issues is cited whenever the success or failure of information systems are 
concerned. Questions of the social construction of technology as well as systemic 
considerations about the interdependence between equipment and the 
corresponding "working' of its social environment are discussed. By extension 
information systems are seen as social systems where technical components play a 
part, but not necessarily a decisive one. Many methods in the study of IS try to 
acconunodate social issues, making the study of IS appear to be a simple mix of 
hard science with some ad-hoc soft science.
But Liebenau and Backhouse claim that "casual borrowings, cavalier attitudes and 
amateurish eclecticism, resting uneasily on the solid but inappropriate foundation 
of computer science" [1989] are not enough to make the study of IS a discipline in 
its own right. What is needed is a study of "the context of information, problems 
of meaning, appropriate syntax, and information handling and digesting 
capabilities" [ibid.]. They advocate sociology and semiology to tackle those tasks, 
because these disciplines seem to yield the most appropriate results. The claim to 
appropriateness of these disciplines stems from the proposition that information 
systems are social systems, and that social interaction and organisation are the 
hallmarks of the exchange of information. They see the misguided emphasis on 
technological aspects as a reason for a critical failure of the study of IS.
The study of IS, they argue, has to address and analyze issues that are of concern 
to social interaction and organisation in order to make valid statements about 
what happens in information systems. It is claimed that only an analysis by means 
of the sociology of knowledge, which gives insight into what, how and why people 
know, and by means of semiology, which explains what, how and why they
18
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communicate information, can achieve this. This proposition entails that 
explanatory frameworks of technological provenance are to be complemented or 
even replaced by those of sociological and semiological provenance. This shift 
from a technological to a sociological study of IS would amount to a change of 
scientific foundation. The means by which scientific knowledge is derived in the 
study of IS would be changed. The ‘can-do’ attitude of technological optimism 
would be exchanged for a sociological assessment of what can reasonably be 
expected from a social whole. The design of brilliant machines that support 
apparent needs would be subordinated to the analysis of human behaviour, of the 
social construction of meaning and needs, and finally the assessment of how 
technical equipment can support a desired system of human behaviour. With this 
change, the study of IS has the chance to assess its own epistemological basis.
Technological and sociological epistemology have a different tradition. In this 
research, these traditions are relevant rather than particular disciplines that 
evolved from these traditions. Technological theory does neither refer, in this 
dissertation, to mechanical engineering nor to computing, but to an approach that 
stresses the objective nature of the human predicament. Sociological theory, in 
turn, does neither refer to sociology nor to anthropology, but to an approach that 
stresses the social nature of the human predicament. The change in epistemology 
does, therefore, not refer to the difference between an epistemology of mechanical 
engineering versus sociology, but between an epistemology of a technological 
versus a sociological study of IS.
This dissertation will introduce the concept of ideology to the study of IS, because 
it is seen as a meaningful consequence of the proposition that information systems 
are social systems, as well as a means of coming to terms with the notion of 
‘information system’. As mentioned above, many social issues are being 
accommodated into the study of IS as a consequence of the move to account for 
empirical evidence that is relevant, but supposedly intractable by a technological
19
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approach. This development, though, has not led to a coherent re-orientation of 
the study of IS. The concept of ideology could be a tool for such a re-orientation, 
because it is a comprehensive concept that can account for the multitude of social 
issues that are relevant to information systems without ‘borrowing casually’ or 
being ‘eclectic’. Consequently, it can be used to attempt a general assessment of 
the power of the heralded re-orientation of the study of IS. The novelty of this 
attempt lies, therefore, not in pointing out new empirical evidence, but in the 
comprehensiveness with which empirical evidence can be discussed.
Together with the introduction of the concept of ideology to the study of IS comes 
a body of literature that dates back further than the current literature on social 
issues in information systems. This literature is developed professionally in the 
sociology of knowledge, but also in related disciplines such as the philosophy of 
science and anthropology. A result of the application of this comprehensive wealth 
of scientific knowledge is that aspects of the concept of knowledge will be 
discussed that are foreign to technological theory.
The fact that sociological investigation in itself reflects the investigator to some 
extent draws attention to the reflexivity of such scholarly activity. In a sociological 
approach to information systems, knowledge cannot be treated as an object, 
represented as being input or output. Reflection within a social whole has to be 
acknowledged to influence knowledge within as well as about information systems. 
It has to become part of the study of IS, in order to account for the feed-back to 
which the study of IS is subjected in all its attempts to come to terms with 
information systems. The supposedly inappropriate certainty of a technological 
study of IS is replaced by the supposedly appropriate uncertainty of a sociological 
study of IS. As a consequence, it will be argued in this dissertation, that 
knowledge, whether technological or sociological, has to be complemented with 
nihilistic thinking in order for us to come to terms with information systems.
20
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Nihilistic thinking, it has to be said, refers in this dissertation to an established 
body of philosophical thought. Contrary to the british usage of the word which 
conjures up images of bomb-throwing russian radicals, the german usage of the 
word refers to its philosophical meaning. The central position it gives to the idea 
of transvaluation is its most distinguishing feature. As such it addresses a variety of 
arguments that are relevant for the synthesis.
A discussion of the notions of ‘information’, ‘system’, ‘information system’ and 
‘ideology’ will indicate the position taken in this dissertation. The notion of 
‘information’ has a very wide meaning. Independent from conceptualisations which 
try to link up information within an arbitrary hierarchy of data, knowledge, 
wisdom, etc. [e.g. Stonier, 1983], it is understood to be a term that allows 
discourse about the effect of human interaction within social organization. 
Homologously, the notion of ‘system’ is not unnecessarily caged in order to attain 
a meaning which is free from definitive limitations and which can be sustained in 
the face of evidence. ‘System’ is not a mechanistic, organismic or social network of 
structure, but rather an abstract and philosophical term, which enables discourse 
about ill-understood phenomena of a quality beyond human comprehension, that 
are addressed as a ‘whole’ [Straub and Angell, 1990]. The particular case of an 
‘information system’ is, then, not a sub-system, as the motor might be considered 
to be a sub-system of a car, but rather an ill-understood social organization (as 
interpreted by the effects of human interaction, of a quality beyond human 
comprehension), that is to be addressed as a ‘whole’. In this dissertation, ‘system’ 
and ‘information system’ will be used almost synonymously, because the 
differentiation between system and information system borders on the arbitrary 
when considering how discourse about both concepts evolved. The tradition of 
‘system’ is bound up with the explicit treatment of information, and the tradition 
of ‘information system’ is bound up with the explicit treatment of system. They 
share a systemic nature, yet they differ in the way in which an information systems
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will be treated as a manifestation of human interaction, while system will refer 
much more to a theoretical concept.
Finally, the notion of ‘ideology’ renders a vehicle for human comprehension, that 
makes discourse (about information systems) meaningful. As will be argued in 
chapters three and four, the concept of ideology can be taken to account for the 
constitution of knowledge. This is particularly interesting and relevant in the study 
of IS, because of the critical position of knowledge. On the one hand, knowledge 
about information systems is discussed in the study of IS. On the other hand, 
knowledge is a pivotal issue within information systems. The connection of 
ideology with information systems reconciles the difficulty that one does not 
‘really’ know what ‘information’, ‘system’ and ‘information system’ are, with the 
fact that we all have our own implicit ‘working definitions’ of these terms. 
Ideologies allow us to connect notions like information and system, which border 
on the incomprehensible, to an overall understanding that we have of the world. 
As a consequence, a discourse can evolve despite the underlying scepticism about 
limitations of our knowledge.
These are very philosophical considerations. Yet, in order to assess the 
epistemological basis of the study of IS, such an approach is justified. Especially, 
the incorporation of social issues into the predominantly ‘hard’ study of IS, 
highlights the point that these changes are a matter for the philosophy of science. 
Yet, these changes concern very practical common sense problems. The 
recognition of context sensitivity [e.g. Poulymenakou et a l, 1990] stresses that 
there is more to information systems than meets the eye. There are no obvious, 
universal features of information or system, or for that matter any other 
phenomenon within the study of IS. Efforts to come to terms with information 
systems are perpetually challenged by circumstances. It is, therefore, valid to say 
that the notion of system conveys a recognition of vagueness. The above 
description of the ‘notion’ of an information system tries to make a reasonable
22
Part I 1. Prologue
statement about our epistemological limitations when it comes to capture the 
meaning of the term information system in a multi-disciplinary enterprise like this 
dissertation.
Multi-disciplinarity poses generally a challenge to meaning, because of the 
different worlds of discourse that are convened in order to come to terms with a 
topic. In the study of IS additional problems arise because of reproaches of 
eclecticism, unsound evidence and a shift in the approach from a technological to 
a sociological approach. The attribution of meaning becomes, thus, an activity 
which requires attention to profound ambiguity.
The beauty of the concept of ideology, though, is that it renders an explanation 
why, nevertheless, temporarily stable meanings evolve in IS-thinking and -practice. 
This dissertation will demonstrate this and show the implications of such an 
analysis. Such an analysis and explanation, however, cannot be obvious or 
universal, let alone complete. The concept of ideology itself is epistemologically 
limited. The understanding derived from its application to information systems is 
again ideological. Nevertheless, the richness and profundity of insight which the 
connection of ideology and information systems renders is significant, because it 
helps to show that handling knowledge requires nihilistic thinking which is not 
afforded by knowledge. It encourages us to exploit our doubts about trends in the 
study of IS rather than to fear them.
In an attempt to capture the richness and profundity of these insights, a "thought 
experiment" [Kuhn, 1977] will be set up to address the question of the explanatory 
power of a ‘social concept’ in the context of information systems. Not only will the 
concept of ideology be shown to ‘create’ new knowledge, but it will also be 
applied to the study of IS, as if the study of IS was itself an information system of 
some kind. The thought experiment is cast into a dialectical mould (refer to 
chapter two on method), since it is pointless to try to ‘prove’ the establishment of
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the connection between ideology and system in particular by means of an objective 
framework. After all, the thought experiment is set up to argue the case of 
‘ideology and information systems’, rather than to impose a ‘scientific fact’. It is 
recognised that it is impossible to give a complete and universal account of 
ideology and information systems. The thought experiment has, therefore, to be 
understood as a part of an on-going debate about this topic.
Thesis, antithesis and synthesis are the three parts that constitute the dialectical 
method. They represent positions taken in a discourse. All three parts argue 
hypotheses that reflect an understanding of the relevance of ideology for 
information systems from a limited perspective of human comprehension. It will 
become clear in this dissertation that all three hypotheses are ideological; 
therefore, the thought experiment is cast into the dialectical mould, because this 
allows us to acknowledge the ephemeral understanding that a treatise like this 
dissertation can render.
A rudimentary understanding of what constitutes an ideology was the initial 
driving force for this research. A more thorough investigation into the concept of 
ideology was started in order to find out whether it can explain problems of IS- 
thinking and -practice, and perhaps even give hints as to how these could be 
overcome. This investigation resulted in a recognition of the apparent possibility 
to overcome the conflict between, on the one hand, the ambiguity of evidence 
drawn from IS-practice and, on the other, the relatively free use of theoretical 
concepts in spite of it. Consequently, this research is sociological in so far as it 
uses the concept of ideology. Yet, as is apparent from the argument above, this 
research is really an investigation in the field of information systems, because the 
concept of ideology is juxtaposed with the concept of system and especially the 
concept of information systems, as a consequence of common sense IS-thinking 
and -practice.
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This investigation into the consequences of the introduction of the concept of 
ideology to the study of IS requires a close look at three subject areas: science, 
ideology and system (especially information system). The first part of the research 
will attempt to show that these three subject areas are in fact connected. It is 
established in the sociology of knowledge that science and ideology are connected 
[e.g. Barnes, 1985]. It is established that science and system (and information 
system respectively) are connected [e.g. Checkland, 1981]. What is not established, 
though, is that ideology and system are connected. In chapter three the former two 
connections will be presented in a way that will prepare the understanding of how 
the third connection from system to ideology can be constructed. The study of IS 
will be shown to be a study in the scientific tradition as outlined in chapter three. 
The critique of science as an ideology will be extended to the study of IS, and its 
subject matter will be shown to be amenable to ideological analysis. In chapter 
four a summary will be given which will conclude the introductory, descriptive 
part. A "working definition’ of the concept of ideology will be given which allows 
the thought experiment to be carried out.
This working definition singles out four hallmarks to characterise the concept of 
ideology. Firstly, an ideology is conservative, i.e. the experiences of a person are 
conserved into a coherent ideology. Secondly, an ideology propagates itself, i.e. the 
experiences which formed the ideology exert their influence on a person’s future 
behaviour. Thirdly, an ideology appears to be reality, i.e. since all experiences 
form an ideology there is no experience outside this ideology. The totality of a 
person’s experience is, therefore, his ideological reality. Fourthly, an ideology is 
reflexive, i.e. the experience of an ideology is again ideological, because there is 
no single foundation on which ideologies rest. These four points of the working 
definition of the concept of ideology taken together mean that the concept of 
ideology is generally relevant in all circumstances where certain points of view are 
adhered to, where clashes occur, as they so often do in social interaction
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(concerning and surrounding information systems), and where these clashes are 
explainable as a consequence of varying perspectives.
The body of the dissertation, that is part II, is attributed to the thought 
experiment. The thesis in chapter five states that the establishment of the third 
connection between ideology and information systems is possible and meaningful. 
This means that ‘systems ideologies’ exist, which account for the existence of 
different opinions of people and the consequent clashes, and for an ‘IS-ideology’ 
coincides with the existence of the hermetically sealed world of the study of IS. 
Thus, an important differentiation is introduced which will be used throughout the 
dissertation: ‘IS-ideology’ refers to a collective phenomenon of the IS-community, 
whereas ‘systems ideology’ refers to an individual phenomenon. While individual 
‘systems ideologies’ exist within information systems, a collective IS-ideology exists 
about information systems in the study of IS as a coherent enterprise. The 
discussion of the consequences of this thesis in chapter six will draw on some 
examples to clarify the argument of the thesis. The aim is to present the problem 
domain and to enable an assessment of the thesis. The antithesis in chapter seven 
states that the establishment of the third connection is possible and meaningful, 
but only within the study of IS. This statement is in conflict with the thesis, 
because it argues that the application of the concept of ideology to IS-problems 
does not lead to the desired increase in knowledge about causes and effects. It will 
be argued that scholarship is an intellectual representation of 'Alltag\ and that, 
therefore, ‘systems ideologies’ are only abstract concepts. The discussion of the 
antithesis in chapter eight will point out the differences and stress similarities to 
the argument of the thesis. In chapter nine the synthesis takes up the argument 
about the possible existence of the connection between ideology and information 
systems. The ideological nature of thesis and antithesis is recognised and a 
consequent acknowledgement of the synthesis to be ideological creates a 
hypothesis about information systems that takes this limitation explicitly into 
account. The synthesis argues that neither of the two possibilities to interpret the
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connection between ideology and information systems as presented in thesis and 
antithesis do lead to superior action on the basis of superior knowledge. After an 
assessment of the structure of the arguments of thesis and antithesis it will be 
argued that nihilistic thinking has to complement knowledge in order to lead to 
the recognition of ‘inappropriate’ IS-thinking and -practice.
There is a wide range of possible results to this thought experiment. In the 
synthesis it could be argued for the concentration of the study of IS on 
technological, ideological or methodological matters. It could be argued for the 
complete disbandment of the study of IS into component disciplines. It could be 
argued for a complete domination of the study of IS in any matter which is of 
systemic nature. Or it could be argued for the futility of scientific investigation 
altogether. Yet, it is neither the aim of the synthesis to decide whether or not the 
connection between ideology and information systems can be established, nor to 
create superior knowledge. Its aim is to formulate a wider perspective which will 
allow us to discuss problems arising out of the differences between thesis and 
antithesis. Many such perspectives are possible. In this dissertation, though, only 
one perspective will be presented. To argue about different perspectives, which 
could be a potential synthesis to the conflict between the thesis and antithesis of 
this research, is an area for further research work.
Finally, reaching the conclusion of this research will necessitate the assessment of 
the implications of the thought experiment. This assessment will highlight the 
implicit conflict of a critique of science in a scientific treatise, as well as the 
fateful ambiguity of the chosen topic of ideology and information system. The 
question of self-transcendence and reflexive conservation, which features within 
the thought experiment, is repeated for the evaluation of the thought experiment. 
This entails a view on the whole research and its relevance in not just the 
academic, but a personal context. The question of further research becomes, thus, 
an evaluation of this research.
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Our uncertainty and insecurity with respect to computerised information systems 
has not been eased by the introduction of social issues into the study of IS. 
Computerised information systems are still a challenge to management, budgets 
are still not met, promises are still not fulfilled. As this dissertation will show, the 
wholehearted embracing of sociological theory, motivated by an attempt to make 
the study of IS truly multi-disciplinary, necessitates the acceptance of sociological 
method. As a consequence, the study of IS is subsumed in a tradition of social and 
societal learning that defies the often simplistic answers and solutions which 
characterise the application of technological theory to information systems.
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2. METHODOLOGY AND METHOD
Two major influences set the tone for the discussion of appropriate method for 
this research and for this dissertation. On the one hand, there is the general 
ambiguity which besets attempts to close in on a more thorough understanding of 
what an information system is and how related phenomena are supposed to be 
interpreted. On the other hand, there is the problem of multi-disciplinarity and the 
shift in emphasis from technological to sociological theory. These two influences 
do not allow methodological complacency. It is neither appropriate to bury one's 
head in the sand, hoping that the question will not be of major importance, nor is 
it appropriate to pick just any method in the hope that an accepted method will 
elicit appropriate results. Both strategies would be calamitous in this enterprise, 
because the contribution of the research is not a matter of progressing within an 
accepted framework, but an attempt to assess and discuss critically the possibility 
and the implications of a change of framework. Therefore, methodology and topic 
of this research go hand in hand, and the methodological discussion within this 
chapter clarifies the scope and validity of the research and its results.
As demonstrated in chapter one, sociological method has to feature prominently 
in this chapter, as it reverberates throughout the dissertation. Yet, this is not a 
dissertation in the field of sociology, but in the field of information systems. 
Questions about, for instance, the performance of a data-base are not only 
relevant on a sociological level, as is the aspect of integration into a social context, 
but also in terms of response time, which is a technological aspect. Similarly, 
questions about natural language processing are not only problematic in terms of 
the different use of language depending on social differentiation, but also in terms 
of transmutation of language into computer-accessible code. The particular twist 
of this research is that these problems are approached as if the technological 
aspects of information systems were socially determined if not socially constructed.
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Thus, the methodology of this research will reflect this social imperative in its 
discussion of method.
The topic of appropriate research method appears to be rather neglected by the 
general IS-community. There have been attempts to start and encourage a debate 
in this field [Mumford et al., 1985; Galliers and Land, 1987; Walsham and Han, 
1990; Wand and Weber, 1990] but these have not yet succeeded in penetrating 
profoundly into the world of IS-thinking let alone IS-practice. The 
acknowledgement of a justification for a plurality in research methods is often 
confronted with the entrenched practices of different scientific traditions. The 
orientation towards multi-disciplinary is, thus, often hampered.
The great variety of analysis and design methods, which are often labelled as 
methodologies, has not sparked off a similar amount of literature concerning 
‘pure’ research methods in the study of IS. Especially with respect to multi­
disciplinary research, no coherent body of methodology concerning research into 
information systems has evolved. Tacit assumptions, nurtured by years of 
education and experience, generally guide research. The article by Liebenau and 
Backhouse, which was referred to in chapter one, highlighted this inadequacy. The 
shift from a technological to a sociological nature of investigation necessitates a 
break with the tradition of technological research methods. There seems to be no 
alternative, therefore, for a research which is guided by social issues than to draw 
on the tradition of sociological theory. Research in information systems will have 
to develop an IS-methodology starting from sociological methodology.
The following paragraphs will discuss sociological methodology as it is relevant for 
this particular research. Generally the necessity to consider the question of 
method only arises because of the intention to clarify the essence of the research 
in some form. In the case of Ph.D.-research the form is a dissertation. This kind of 
presentation has to support the argument by giving an appropriate structure to the
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elements of the research. It has to take into account that the process of clarifying 
results is a social process and, therefore, subject to the same forces as the topic 
under investigation. The variety of social phenomena has led to a similarly great 
variety of interpretation. What ‘appropriate’ means in this context is heavily 
debated.
In the scientific discussion about appropriate scientific method opinions differ 
enormously as can be seen from the limited selection of points of view given 
below. Questions of method are perceived by some to be pivotal in a sense that 
"the unity of all science consists alone in its method, not in its material" [Pearson, 
1911, p. 12]. A point of view given by Rice is that methods "are aids to observation 
or inference. Hence, they are almost infinitely varied, as the data to be dealt with 
are varied" [1931, p.5]. Nevertheless, he insists that methodological reflections are 
an important part of scientific work, because they justify a scientist’s concepts and 
assumptions as part of his methods. Yet, methods are also seen as very 
problematic, especially for scientific work which tries to give new contributions to 
the field, because they do "not attempt to formulate general scientific ideals for 
the future" [Znaniecki, 1968, p.vii] and, thus, rather stifle scientific progress. The 
question has to be asked whether the application of scientific method does indeed 
induce scientific stalemate. The discussion of scientific method is enhanced by 
some by the introduction of a social dimension. Method becomes a vehicle for 
scientific power-play. Indeed, one proponent who explicitly attacks methods as 
dangerous is Feyerabend [1975]. In his opinion rules and standards restrict any 
scientific activity to the known or desired, suppressing opposing ideas and views, 
establishing power over knowledge. He writes: "those who admire science and are 
also slaves of reason ... have now a choice. They can keep science; they can keep 
reason; they cannot keep both" [Feyerabend, 1978, p. 16]
This wide range of opinions about scientific methods implies that the question of 
method cannot be answered categorically, but has to be negotiated individually in
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the context of the particular enterprise. A particular research enterprise has a 
particular topic, a particular author and follows a particular method. All three 
issues are intertwined and subject to social influences. Each issue is negotiated 
throughout the research enterprise, partly by design and partly by consequence. 
Attempts to approach the question of method methodically are, therefore, 
technical guidelines to an assessment of methods that fail to address the social 
nature of scientific research. A positivistic focus on observable features precludes 
an explicit treatment of the vagaries of a research enterprise that stem from its 
social nature. Conflicts in terms of hypotheses, research material, personality, etc. 
cannot be accounted in such an attempt.
A brief look at one of the major contributors to the theory of sociological method 
supports this point, because it introduces the one critical element that is lacking 
from so much of research in information systems: the role of the researcher. 
Giddens states that a method "is not a guide to ‘how to do practical research', and 
does not offer any specific research proposals" [1976, p.8]. This proposition is 
taken up for this research. The specificity of a research enterprise does not stem 
from a chosen method, nor does it stem from the chosen topic. It stems form the 
individuality of the researcher. As the author of the research enterprise he tries to 
mediate method, topic and his intervention to some extent, and finally he creates 
the result. Methodological considerations are, therefore, just as much an 
expression of the researcher’s self as his chosen topic. Research in information 
systems is always a process by which a researcher takes a position with respect to 
reality as he sees it. Hence, it is agreed that "anyone who recognizes that self­
reflection ... is integral to the characterization of human social conduct, must 
acknowledge that such holds also for his own activities as a[n] ... ‘analyst’, 
‘researcher’, etc." [ibid.]. The results of research into information systems are, 
therefore, bound up with the Weltanschauung of the researcher. Yet, self­
reflection does not necessarily have to produce a ‘rationalisation’ of one’s actions. 
There is more to human conduct than could be expressed rationally, nor is it
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necessary to give rational descriptions. Therefore, Giddens’ proposition "that social 
theory must incorporate a treatment of action as rationalized conduct ordered 
reflexively by human agents" [ibid.] cannot be accepted. The very problem of 
ambiguity surrounding information systems on a societal scale points to a richer 
picture than ‘rationalisations’ can paint.
Neither can it be accepted that social theory "must grasp the significance of 
language as the practical medium whereby this [treatment] is made possible"
[ibid.]. Despite the importance of language as a means to communicate 
‘rationalisations’, language is, therefore, not taken as ‘the practical medium’ of 
scientific research. Researchers in linguistics argue that it is impossible to pin­
point language as a concept [e.g. Downes, 1984]. Indeed, "the dominant mood 
among linguists seems to be one of caution about the applicability to linguistic 
science of any single simphfying concept" [McCormack and Wurm, 1978, p.3]. That 
Giddens advocates language as the ‘practical medium’ for research seems, 
therefore, to be part of the tradition of sociological method, as it has developed 
over time, rather than to be a consequence of an intrinsic property of language. 
Completely different perspectives to go about research are at hand which would 
be forfeited if such a limited proposition was taken up. Taoism, for instance, 
stipulates that "the Tao that can be expressed in words is not the eternal Tao" 
[Reese, 1980, p.567]. The insistence on a conscious treatment of language in 
sociological method is, thus, in conflict with Taoism, which rejects language as a 
medium for the attainment of truth. Hence, since no area of the human 
predicament should be ruled out prior to the investigation, no intentional 
limitation in terms of ‘practical medium’ is adopted. This research is interested in 
the challenge posed to information systems and our ways to cope with them that 
are brought about by diversity in a profoundly varied world.
A method can very well be described as a means for the rationalisation of a 
research enterprise, which finally leads to the presentation of results. But this
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rationalisation is only necessary exactly because scientific work is not rational; 
otherwise a rationalisation would not be necessary. Scientific work can be 
described essentially as a social process just as any other activity. Rationalisations 
of scientific activity are, thus, governed by social rather than scientific forces.
Bloor argues that "ideas of [scientific] knowledge are based on social images, that 
logical necessity is a species of moral obligation, and that objectivity is a social 
phenomenon" [1976, p.l41j. This argument reinforces a point made earlier about 
this research and its topic. The perception of information systems is biased by 
social forces that govern perception. Research into this phenomenon is again 
subject to these social forces. Thus, the question of intentionality arises as an 
answer to the question of method, because scientific activity, the topic under 
investigation and the presentation of results are so strongly intertwined by the 
shared social context. The question that governs the choice of method is, 
therefore, what intention is governing scientific work and the presentation of its 
results?
The results of scientific work are supposed to make a new contribution to an 
established body of scientific knowledge. Consequently, scientific activity is 
supposed to be free and unrestricted. It cannot be foreseen at the outset what the 
result of a scientific enterprise will turn out to be. A research method, on the 
other hand, if it is supposed to guide the research toward the achievement of 
particular results is a contradiction in itself. An appropriate research method can 
rationally only be selected with hindsight, because the result becomes apparent 
only at the end of the research. Selecting a research method before starting the 
research belies, therefore, the aim of research. Yet, even discussing the 
appropriateness of a research method after the result has been obtained is 
irreconcilable with scientific research, because the result would have been 
different if a different method had been applied. The entire research work would 
have been altered and with it the result.
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This reasoning can be clarified by giving an example from the study of IS. If an 
electronic mail system is tested on transfer time, a test can be set-up whereby 
through statistical means a numerical result will be obtained. This result should be 
verifiable anywhere if the set-up was successful. This is a technological method. 
However, if this electronic mail system is investigated along a social dimension, 
for instance, user satisfaction, then the set-up of a research environment will affect 
the way people respond. The selection criteria, the elicitation process, etc. will all 
affect the scope and validity of the results of the investigation. From a sociological 
point of view, information systems can, therefore, not be investigated as if they 
were technical and not affected by social influences. A  research objective, for 
instance, is necessarily an influence on the research, because the people involved 
respond in some way or the other to the research set-up. This can manifest itself 
in super-correct working-practices, in attempts to circumvent the set-up, in an 
artificial activity which is designed to please, or, in the case of covered 
investigation, in suspicion and defensive behaviour. Verifiability is, therefore, not a 
matter of attaining particular figures on a scale of an experimental set-up as in the 
case of technology. The scales of the experimental set-up change during the 
experiment. Attainment in itself becomes questionable as a result. Verifiability 
has, therefore, to acknowledge the social influences that feed back into any 
experimental set-up.
Another aspect of this problem, which is more relevant for this research, because 
it is a consequence of this difference in the understanding of verification, is the 
effect an intention or an objective has on theoretical research. As mentioned 
above, sociological methodology argues that research activity, researcher and topic 
of research are closely intertwined by the social forces that constitute the texture 
of any scientific enterprise. Taking on board this understanding, the question of 
intention governing results emerges. It would be very surprising indeed to find a 
researcher, who is known to have made a name for himself with the discovery that 
predominantly social forces decide about success and failure in information
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systems, suddenly to discover that technical details outweigh social forces in 
importance. Similarly, it would be surprising to find a researcher discovering the 
futility of planning after a life-long career based on the understanding that without 
planning sensible IS-practice cannot happen. This is not to say that researchers do 
not change their opinions, but nevertheless it remains an important point that the 
result of research seems to be subject to intention in many cases.
This research was not started with a particular intention, but to carry out research. 
The direction of research changed considerably over time. The issues of potential 
importance surrounding ‘ideology and information systems’ are so diverse, that 
many were interesting enough to be pursued. In fact, many issues were pursued, 
ranging from discourse analysis to technology transfer to developing countries, 
using the freedom of academic research maybe as a fig-leaf for an implicit lack of 
intention. No research method was followed consciously, because no particular 
objective was set. The entire research was a large adventure in observation, 
literature, practice and thought.
Writing this dissertation, though, was a different matter altogether. It is a 
purposive activity. An argument has to be presented. This argument is the ‘result’ 
of the research. Usually it is only but a fraction of the entire research work that 
goes into the argument. But exactly this twofold limitation, on the one hand, of 
changing from a rather intentionless research to purposive writing and, on the 
other hand, of ‘distilling’ a rational argument out of the research, leads to a 
rationalising reflection on the work done, in order to create a scientific treatise. 
This is where the question of method must not be neglected, because now a 
purposive activity with an objective of writing a ‘good’ dissertation precedes and 
accompanies the actual activity of writing. It is very difficult, though, to talk of a 
consciously controlled activity when referring to writing up a dissertation. Not only 
is there an enormous amount to be written, but also the very process of writing is 
influenced in a very complex way. For speech, such influences are analyzed in
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sociolinguistics. For writing maybe literature study could serve as a model for 
methodological considerations. For this dissertation the writing up constituted 
indeed a decisive part of the research enterprise. Writing and re-writing structured 
the research material from an initial attempt to present a result to a final version. 
In so far as this can be called a method, writing up actually contributed to the 
research.
Taking up Giddens’ quote that a method is not a guide on how to write, methods 
may better refer to how to present a scientific result; how to communicate in a 
convincing way whatever is supposed to be said, in accordance with the experience 
of the research as well as the ‘standards of science’.
In this dissertation the case of ‘ideology and information systems’ is supposed to 
be discussed. Is it possible to construct a systems ideology, and is it sensible? 
Arguments pro and contra are presented. Consequences are discussed and 
implications are pointed out. But what method is appropriate for such a 
discussion? The following paragraphs will give an indication as to what ideas are 
relevant for the research method of this research.
Agreeing with Protagoras of Abdera (480-410 B.C.) when he said that the measure 
of everything is man, the chosen method should not claim to be vested with 
inherent validity. Neither should the method claim that everything which can be 
said is wrong, as Gorgias of Leontinoi (480-375 B.C.) argued [Praechter, 1926, 
p. 122]. The method should allow for a discussion where the argument can be 
presented to the benefit of the reader, rather than to his instruction. In addition, 
the assumption, attributed to Socrates (470-399 B.C.), that people like to look at 
their beliefs as true, whereas they are only authentic, should be accommodated. In 
his opinion, truth depended on intersubjective agreement, whereas the authenticity 
of beliefs was achieved without any intersubjective mediation. Socrates 
pronounced those as tolerant who reflect on their knowledge and recognise that
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either their knowledge is true, as in the case of it being intersubjectively shared, or 
it is only authentic belief, as in the case of it being personal. Since this dissertation 
is a form of intersubjective mediation, its aim is to get the reader to reflect 
whether the thought experiment influences his beliefs [Lay, 1989, pp. 19-22].
Real tolerance has to acknowledge that all points of view are subjective. Thus, a 
person is not tolerant when he accedes, out of a feeling of superior insight, the 
fallibility of other points of view. A sensible discussion must take account of this.
It entails that the arguments are discussed with reference to the context of the 
discussion. For Socrates, this meant that it is important to know oneself (gnothi 
seauton) and to develop a method which enables meaningful discourse with other 
people, based on self-understanding. The dialectical method supports this 
discursive imperative, by adopting a conversational, i.e. dialectical, form.
Assuming that a discussion is never an argument between a right and a wrong 
point of view, but always an argument between two similarly uncertain points of 
view suggests that the result of the discussion should be mutually acceptable. Thus, 
two points of view get resolved into a third, which both parties can support. This 
combination of points of view forms a triad, which Fichte called: thesis, antithesis 
and synthesis. The acceptability of the synthesis is not context-free, though. It is 
dependent on the parties involved at that time and holds for them some truth. For 
other parties or in different circumstances it might not be acceptable. For the time 
being, though, it establishes for both parties a superior basis for action.
The driving question of the research was whether systems ideologies exist. During 
the research, however, doubts prompted research into the direction of the 
antithesis; i.e. systems ideologies do not exist. Researching this conflicting point of 
view was impossible without learning what eissumptions went into the formulation 
of the initial point of view. The research, therefore, had to take a critical look at 
both arguments. This learning process necessitated a self-analysis, which is what
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Socrates meant by gnothi seauton, because thinking about the research meant 
thinking about its justification which is firmly vested in the author. Social forces 
cannot take on the responsibility for the argument presented. During writing up, 
these issues became explicit, and the structure of the dissertation followed suite.
At this point it became apparent that the dialectical form, as described above and 
as it evolved over time, is the ideal vehicle to show this conflict of points of view, 
expressed in thesis and antithesis. The synthesis is, therefore, as much the 
outcome of a critique of the thesis and the antithesis, as it is a self-critique. 
Writing the text meant becoming the devil’s advocate in order to make the case of 
systems ideology in thesis and antithesis, while the synthesis reflects the ‘result’ of 
the research.
Writing the dissertation is, thus, a "systematic interpretation" [Couvalis, 1989, p.32] 
of the research. This means that all arguments derive their validity from the 
author. The structure of the dissertation is meant to put the reader into a position 
to grasp this. Therefore, the dissertation is separated into three parts: introduction, 
thought experiment and conclusion. The thought experiment is the ‘summary’ of 
the research, i.e. its scientific yield, whereas the introduction and the conclusion 
describe the ‘thought environment’ of the thought experiment in order to make it 
possible for the reader to familiarise himself with the research. Part I of the 
dissertation is laid out in a prologue, which introduces ideas pertinent to the 
research, a methodology, which introduces ideas pertinent to the dissertation, a 
historical account, which introduces ideas pertinent to the argument, and a 
summary. The historical approach to the ideas of the argument was chosen 
because "the contribution of history is perspective" [Landes and Tilly, 1971, p.6]; in 
this instance, the author’s perspective. As discussed above, there is no single true 
knowledge and only the author is a source of justification for this dissertation. In 
order to clarify the evolution of ideas pertinent to the dissertation the historical 
account was chosen, since "the study of any other branch of knowledge may begin 
with origins, but not that of history. After all, our historical pictures are, for the
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most part, pure construction" [Burckhardt, 1943, p. 18], In part II, thesis, antithesis 
and synthesis represent different stages of self-understanding as well as a different 
understanding of the literature and its relevance for the practice of the study of IS. 
Using the dialectic method, as described above, to present this progress is 
supposed to clarify the ideas of the research in a way that makes them 
‘communicable’. The chosen method serves the twofold purpose to present an 
argument derived from research and to satisfy scientific requirements. It gives the 
opportunity to present different and conflicting opinions, held by the author over 
time, as well as the author’s attempt to resolve the conflict. Examples from IS- 
practice are introduced to connect the rather philosophical argument with reality. 
In part III, the reader is invited to think about the value of the thought 
experiment. The dissertation is, thus, characterised as an individual effort in the 
wider context of scientific research.
The question of research method could be described as the problem of bringing 
the right information in the right form from the right sources to the right 
recipients. The analogy to (management) information systems is striking, and it is, 
therefore, disappointing that the question of research method has not attracted 
more attention within the IS-community. After all it is an ideal opportunity to try 
out theories on ‘home ground’ before applying them in other fields. Perhaps it is 
the most characteristic technological feature of the study of IS that as long as 
installations, products and services can be devised and sold, no alternative path is 
taken with respect to methodology. Only if a ‘better’ product, a ‘better’ analysis 
method or a more ‘successful’ installation can be produced, only then has research 
the power to convince. This chapter showed that this is a very peculiar point of 
view, where, in typically technological fashion, the researcher and the research 
community are not taken into account explicitly. The thought experiment is 
supposed to show that conflicting views about information systems can very well 
live side by side, just as information systems display conflicting features. The 
commitment to the interpretation of information systems as social systems is, thus.
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reflected in a sociological treatment of the topic. Such an investigation 
acknowledges the role of the researcher as well as the existence of conflicting 
strains in individuals. As it will be argued in the synthesis, the capability to reflect 
on such conflicts determines whether ideologies can be checked and counter­
balanced.
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3. HISTORICAL ACCOUNT OF SCIENCE, IDEOLOGY AND SYSTEM 
INTRODUCTION
The computerised information systems that are employed today are the result of a 
historical development of the sciences within a developing society. The study of IS 
is part of this development, on the one hand, providing explanations that can be 
transformed into products and services and, on the other hand, investigating 
causes and effects relevant in connection with these products and services. These 
activities happened in a societal context which supplied theoretical models as well 
as practical problems. The study of IS did not just suddenly appear. The success 
story of the British Secret Service, employing Alan Turing and other scientists, in 
order to crack the code of the german ENIGMA-device during World War II is, 
therefore, just as much relevant history to the study of IS, as was Big Bang in the 
City of London, the development of scientific practice or the fervent debates in 
the study of artificial intelligence.
Especially when considering the differentiation between the study of IS and the 
study of computing, as it is common in the anglo-saxon tradition, it becomes 
apparent that the search for position in relation to established sciences is not 
finished yet. The ever stronger orientation toward the social sciences within the 
study of IS makes a reflection on the roots of the current study of IS important for 
the discussion of epistemological questions.
The introduction of the concept of ideology and its further development were 
criticising the scientific tradition in a way similar to the thrust of criticism evolving 
in the study of IS. The concept of ideology was used to shape a new understanding 
of sociology. Likewise, the attempt to incorporate sociological methods into the 
study of IS is accompanied by the opportunity to use sociological methods to 
justify this incorporation and to attempt a critique.
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The target of the critique, i.e. the tradition of the study of IS and the form of IS- 
thinking and -practice it has led to, appears in a new light when such a critique is 
successful. The aim of the study of IS to create a new understanding of how 
information is produced, shared and disseminated will be seen as a continuation of 
a development from early science through social science up to the establishment 
of the study of IS as an own discipline.
In this chapter, the three subject areas of ‘science’, ‘ideology’ and (information) 
‘system’ are introduced. Each of these areas has its own vast body of literature 
which investigates topics and problems related to the respective area. The 
argument of this research is a result of ideas pursued along the lines of these 
studies. Taken in isolation, very elaborate introductions have been produced in the 
three studies; for such introductions in ‘science’ see Singer [1941] and Dampier 
[1948]; in ‘ideology’ see Lenk [1961] and Larrain [1979]; in ‘system’ see Buckley 
[1967], Laszlo [1972], Checkland [1981] and Open University [1981]. Perceived 
connections between these three studies gave rise to a speculative interest in their 
combination.
As mentioned in the first chapter, this research is intended to argue the case of 
ideology and information systems in relation to the study of IS. This topic is part 
of the common ground between the three studies. Consequently, the introduction 
has to take account of the purpose of arguing for the combination of the three 
studies. Rather than introducing the three studies independently, the introduction 
will try to prepare the ground for the thought experiment by being selective and 
purpose-driven. Perhaps only such a selective and multi-disciplinary way of 
introducing the studies makes their combination plausible, while a more elaborate 
and exhaustive account of the studies would highlight fundamental differences 
which rendered such a combination implausible and possibly even impractical.
Part of the set-up for the thought experiment is consequently an agreement to 
accept this purpose of the introduction. It is an essential prerequisite of the
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thought experiment to use this set-up for the formulation and discussion of the 
thesis, the antithesis and the synthesis.
The problem of knowledge about a subject area cannot be separated from 
knowing the subject area. This introduces a circular argument about knowledge, 
because it would be necessary to know a ‘fact’ in order to decide whether one 
knows it. If one was ignorant about a ‘fact’, how could one suddenly be able to 
decide whether one knows it or not? This paradox is being debated in an on-going 
discussion in the philosophy of science. In the study of (information) systems, 
however, the paradox of knowledge is not discussed in such a general way, but 
more as a by-product of problems of knowledge-based systems or in connection 
with knowledge acquisition and representation. The foremost critics of a cavalier 
way of the treatment of knowledge are Weizenbaum [1976], Winograd and Flores 
[1986] and Roszak [1986]. Their interest in the topic and their main line of 
criticism is the functionalism or ‘machine-behaviourism’ by which the creation of 
knowledge is explained as a consequence of an analogy between machineroutput 
and genuine human understanding. For example, when ELIZA, a computer 
program by Weizenbaum, is taken by a user as a knowledgable psychotherapist, 
immediately some scientists concluded that there must be some knowledge in the 
program. "And that is how far the computer metaphor has brought some of us" 
[Weizenbaum, 1976, p. 181]. Suffice it to say that the debate about ‘functional’ 
knowledge is far from the philosophical discussion about the nature of knowledge. 
The philosophical debate about this question displays a tendency to be never- 
ending; already Socrates discussed it in his Meno [Grene, 1966, p.23], and since 
then throughout the entire history of western philosophy it has never ceased to 
puzzle the minds of philosophers. This gives an indication of the marked contrast 
between the casual treatment of knowledge in much of the study of IS and the on­
going debate in the philosophy of science which leaves such questions largely 
unresolved.
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The question of what a systems ideology is and what is known about it will remain 
equally unresolved. We do not even have a thorough understanding of science, 
ideology or system. In fact, it will be argued here in this dissertation that 
‘understanding’ and consequently ‘usability’ are ideological positions, rather than a 
necessity. To strive for answers and truths introduces a partiality that conflicts with 
the open-mindedness required by the spirit of gnothi seauton.
As was already mentioned in chapter two, the pretence of truth and a consequent 
justification for instruction cannot be part of a sociological treatise. Nevertheless, 
for the sake of the argument, it is important to clarify the position adopted in this 
dissertation with what is meant by science, ideology and system, before embarking 
on the thought experiment. Clarifying these subject areas will lead, as a 
consequence of the reflection on information systems, to chapter four where the 
connection between ideology and information systems will be introduced.
From the possible ways of showing this, a historical account has been chosen. The 
succession of an introduction in science, ideology and system reflects the order of 
emergence of these three studies in an attempt to give a single coherent account. 
Presenting the material in a chronological way and, at the same time, leaving the 
three introductions into the studies vaguely apart, is supposed to help generate a 
familiarity with the ideas that are going to be used in part II. There, the ideas and 
concepts introduced will be used freely to argue the case of systems ideology. For 
the sake of the argument, it will be necessary to be able to refer to particular 
ideas from the introduction, because these will be taken out of context and 
applied in a new and speculative way.
At the same time it has to be pointed out here that the historical account does not 
try to argue for a historically determined connection between the ideas introduced. 
Earlier ideas may influence later ideas, but it is not the aim of the introduction to 
argue for or against a deterministic connection. Rather the succession of ideas is
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used to build a stock of related ideas which give rise and give credibility to the 
justification of the thought experiment as well as to the arguments used.
Since this research was initially directed by a curiosity, especially for the relevance 
of ideology to IS-phenomena, the historical account will not start with the earliest 
descriptions of science, but with the Renaissance and the Enlightenment, when the 
development of science was accompanied by phenomena that can be interpreted 
to have preceded current research into the concept of ideology. This decision to 
cut short the introduction stems from the concern of this research with the 
connection of the three subject areas. As discussed above, the question of Vhen 
the concept of ideology came into existence’ cannot be answered, but it can be 
said when scholars began to make ideas, idols and ideology their subject matter. 
That point will be the starting point for this historical account. Many phenomena, 
and that not only in the history of science, but also in various disciplines like 
philosophy, organisational theory, psychology, anthropology, etc., could be 
considered to represent similarities with phenomena described by the concept of 
ideology. This account, however, will focus on epistemological problems related to 
the concept of ideology as they arise especially with reference to the study of IS. 
For this purpose it suffices to say that a historical account of science starting from 
around the 16th century offers itself as a good route for an enquiry into the nature 
of knowledge about information systems.
SCIENCE
In the Tost-industrial Societies’ of the Information Age’, knowledge is seen as a 
competitive resource, and consequently already pupils are encouraged to pursue it. 
This relative freedom is only a recent development, and Galileo may serve as one 
of the most prominent victims of repression in the past. In the development of 
society up to the Renaissance and the Enlightenment, the Church and other 
worldly dignitaries had been patronising society. This entailed a monopoly on 
official knowledge and truth. Yet, with the emergent changes in society the
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Church came under pressure to justify its claim on truth. Its response was the 
institution of university chairs, which was the first step of the Church to give in to 
societal pressures, instead of remaining dogmatic. But rather than strengthening 
the position of the Church with respect to knowledge and truth as intended, this 
move only served to show that society had changed to such an extent that even the 
mighty Church had to react rather than act. "The very learning the Popes 
patronized and made fashionable resulted in a revolt against their authority"
[Flick, 1967, p.476]
It is a matter of perspective, to decide whether the changes in society enabled 
individuals to entertain their desire for knowledge, or whether their boldness 
made society change. What is important for the argument of this research, though, 
is that knowledge became disconnected from previously established authorities, 
and entered into a new era. The sciences were not established as professions at 
that time as they are today. The differentiation into disciplines was not very 
advanced compared to our present state of specialisation. Scholars were not 
usually scientists of one special field, but rather philosophers, statesmen, civil 
servants, noblemen, private teachers, or a combination of the same.
Francis Bacon (1561-1636), with whom this historical account starts, was a 
statesman and a public figure. He is described as a rather controversial man with 
his own ideas, cold-blooded, yet a willing supporter of the king. He is the first to 
be credited with an explicit treatment of knowledge not as being free but as being 
determined by various forces that characterise human reality. He described these 
forces as the four ‘idols’: the idols of the tribe, the cave, the market-place and the 
theatre [Spedding, et al., 1875, vol.l, p. 163]. The first are constraints imposed on 
knowledge by human nature, such as complacency to question cherished beliefs. 
The second are educational constraints, such as a stress on parochial superiority. 
The third are matters of language, such as the ambiguity of utterances. The last 
are explanatory systems, such as anthropocentric explanations. He considered the
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influence of these idols to corrupt knowledge. Especially he set out to charge the 
confusion of theology with philosophy as detrimental, because he considered 
philosophy to be scientific, and theology to be mystical. Science is what he 
advocated in his Novum Organon {Organon, being a word adopted from Aristotle 
describing a body of logic for gathering knowledge) as the way forward toward a 
better society.
This striving for a better society is a common theme among the authors who are 
going to be discussed. In Bacon’s case the enemy is quite clear; the Church with 
its self-righteous claim on truth as well as the various superstitions, 
misperceptions, demagogues and sophistries. He argued that the idols that beset 
knowledge had to be purged with a Novum Organon. Only an established body of 
logic that dispenses with the idols of human reality could protect man from fallacy 
and outright subjugation.
Antoine Destutt de Tracy (1754-1836), living in France approximately 200 years 
later, had similar ideas based on similar motives. He proposed a science of ideas 
that enabled man to account for all the ideas that had been conceived. This 
science he called ‘Ideology’, and thus he is credited with coining this term [Runes, 
1951, p. 140]. The scientific analysis of the ideas would ensure that the ‘good’ ones 
could be differentiated from the ‘bad’ ones. The study of ideas could be taught to 
students and progress would be achieved on grounds of educated people who were 
able to discern the quality and potential of an idea. With his ‘Ideology’ the 
projection of a selective treatment of knowledge into the future was cast into a 
coherent concept for the first time.
Auguste Comte (1798-1854), another Frenchman, who is credited with being one 
of the founders of a study which developed into sociology, went even further in 
the introduction of science as a means for societal progress. Formulating a 
programme of ‘Positive Science’, he propounded a treatment of knowledge as a
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derivate of scientific study. He regarded knowledge as belonging to either one of 
three categories: theological, metaphysical or scientific. Whereas theological 
knowledge was deemed to be fictitious, mystical, irrational and superstitious, 
metaphysical knowledge would be at least abstract and speculative. Nevertheless 
only scientific knowledge was justifiable by a scientific method and the object of 
investigation were positive facts, i.e. those which could be observed.
In chapter four the contribution of each of these writers to the thought experiment 
of this dissertation will be summarised. However, it is appropriate at this point 
that a short interim account of the main points of this section will be given.
These three writers have set out to give man tools with which he can battle the 
distortions that beset his knowledge of the world, whether this is Bacon’s Novum 
Organon, Destutt de Tracy’s Ideology or Comte’s Positive Science. The analogy to 
the study of IS is apparent. All three stress the importance of knowledge for man 
to build a better society. "Knowledge is power", as Bacon said, preempting the 
battle-cry of marketing campaigns advertising management information systems. 
The writers of the 16th to 18th century were all eager to point out that knowledge 
was the key to liberty; Bacon, Destutt de Tracy and Comte were no exception. So 
rather than investigating the nature of knowledge itself, these authors took 
knowledge almost as a neutral physical matter that could be used against an 
enemy and for the common cause. To ensure the quality of this weapon the ‘right’ 
method had to be used, i.e. the scientific method, thus, paving the way for 
conceptions of ‘functional’ knowledge. With tool and method in place the 
advancement of society could be increased almost at will by the gathering and 
teaching of scientific knowledge. The more knowledge is gathered, the stronger is 
the fortress of reason against the ‘forces of darkness’. In order to secure this 
status, the method had to be kept autonomous, untinted by any human 
deficiencies. Then the progress toward the ideal would be brought about by the 
advancement of science. Progress in science was equated with societal progress.
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The euphoric proclamations of the blessings of information systems have directly 
adopted this self-same tone of confidence.
The relevance for the thought experiment of this dissertation lies in the three 
crucial steps that these three writers stand for. Bacon stands for the establishment 
of knowledge as a power. Knowledge is subject to social forces, and controlling 
knowledge by means of science gives power to control the social forces. Destutt de 
Tracy stands for the societal value which is attributed to an enterprise that 
fortifies that society’s basis. He proclaimed his ‘Ideology’ to be able to decide 
between good and bad ideas, and to teach those ideas that support the beneficial 
development of society. Comte stands for the institutionalisation of a Baconian 
source of power as an enterprise in the sense of Destutt de Tracy, by establishing 
science as the guardian of proper knowledge.
On this foundation an understanding of the study of IS as a scientific enterprise 
that strives to come to terms with information systems through scientific 
knowledge can be constructed. The study of IS is a science in the tradition 
outlined in this section. Scientific method is seen as a means for the selection and 
tuition of good IS-thinking and -practice. As a consequence it is claimed that 
incremental progress can be made toward the proper treatment of information 
systems.
IDEOLOGY
Karl Marx (1818-1883) transformed much of what had been said up to his time. 
This German who lived in London for a long period of his life, witnessed the 
troubles that early industrialisation meant for the masses. All circumstances of life 
were dominated by economic conditions. These were determined by a small but 
powerful segment of society, which dictated the work that sustained such 
conditions. Any activity was dominated by these conditions: work, leisure, science.
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art, etc. This peculiar situation did not allow for a free development of knowledge, 
because everything is subject to the predominant socio-economic conditions.
Rather than focusing on human distortions of ‘objective’ knowledge, Marx used 
the concept of ideology within the wider framework of his writings. From his 
investigations stem the political as well as sociological use of the term ideology, 
and also much of its negative connotation. He tried to explain knowledge as a 
consequence of human existence rather than as some sort of ‘commodity’. His 
importance for the development of the concept of ideology cannot be 
underestimated.
In order to grasp Marx’s concept of ideology it is helpful to take into 
consideration some developments of western thought that paved the way for his 
kind of thinking. Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) was investigating the limits of 
human reason. As a result of his studies he came to formulate what was later 
called the ‘Copernican Revolution’. This is the tenet that man’s knowledge is 
limited by how man imposes his frame of mind on reality, rather than that 
knowledge was an unconditioned image of an independent objective reality. Thus 
Kant put general human ‘categories’ between reality and man’s knowledge of 
reality. The influence of these categories on knowledge reflected human terms 
rather than an objective reality. Georg Friedrich Wilhelm Hegel (1770 -1831) 
criticised Kant’s generalisation of human subjectivity for being not realistic. He 
said that everybody’s reality is subjective, but individually subjective and not just 
generally subjective. This entails a subjectivism that turns reality into a personal 
reality, determined by each individual’s personal life.
In the light of these developments, Marx’s concept of ideology took form as part 
of a description of the socio-economic circumstances of his time, rather than as a 
reflection on ‘pure reason’. Central to his writings is the notion of action as 
determining the reality of people; because only by acting does a person transgress
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the boundary between the self and the matter of investigation, or between subject 
and object. Action, it must be said, he understood to be any involvement of a 
person with its environment, whether this is social, physical or intellectual. Action, 
thus, mediating the conflict between subject and object, covers the entire spectrum 
of the human predicament and consequently all the aspects of development. A 
person’s interaction with reality produces an understanding of reality that derives 
its essence from these individual actions. What has not been experienced as a 
matter of interaction can consequently not become part of a person’s knowledge 
of reality. The manifest circumstances of a person’s environment, which Marx 
called the ‘base’, is transformed into a person’s understanding of this base, which 
Marx called ‘superstructure’. This limitation of knowledge through action is the 
conservative and propagative side of Marx’s concept of ideology.
The other side of his concept of ideology is that people have no chance to 
recognise having ideologically distorted knowledge. Since the conditions are given, 
nobody can experience any actions outside the predominant socio-economic 
framework and nobody performs any actions outside the framework that would 
allow for the creation of alternative knowledge. Thus, people not only live with an 
ideology, but they are not even conscious of this. It led Marx to call an ideology 
also a ‘false consciousness’, because it effectively gives people the impression that 
their ideology is reality.
Marx added a historical dimension to this. He wrote: "men make their own 
history, but they do not make it just as they please; they do not make it under 
circumstances chosen by themselves, but under circumstances directly encountered, 
given and transmitted from the past" [Marx, 1898]. The vicious circle of ideology 
exerts its power. Past structures form historically determined realities, which in 
turn determine possible actions, which in turn determine possible knowledge, 
which in turn determines the basis for future actions. Thus, circumstances are
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perpetuated through an ideology. Circumstances and people’s knowledge of the 
circumstances are, thus, ideologically stagnant.
Marx understood an ideology to be a conservative mechanism where knowledge 
gets determined by the possible actions within the given circumstances and vice 
versa. From these premises Marx suggested actions that would enable people to 
break this vicious circle. This reasoning leads to the more politically orientated 
aspect of ideology.
A different understanding of the problem of knowledge was held by Wilhelm 
Dilthey (1833-1911), the founder of the German ‘Geisteswissenschaften’. He did 
not work on the concept of ideology, but came from the discipline of history 
where he had been specialising on biographies. These studies made him develop a 
scientific concept of ‘Weltanschauung’ [Hodges, 1969, pp. 92, 152-155, 160]. The 
characters he described had a particular outlook on reality. Their view of the 
world affected not only their interpretation of the world, but also their actions. He 
tried initially to describe these Weltanschauungen as different in structure and as 
ordered according to particular qualities. Scientific discussion, though, necessitated 
him to give up his stance and to acknowledge the impossibility of making valid 
statements about the order of Weltanschauungen. In his later works he, therefore, 
advocates a relativism that gives equal standing and justification to each 
Weltanschauung, yet still retains the notion of different Weltanschauungen 
according to which a person’s life can be interpreted.
Dilthey’s theories are in line with Marx’s, where he talks about the shaping of 
knowledge and actions by a person’s Weltanschauung. He differs from Marx in so 
far as he does not use his method for describing how these Weltanschauungen 
come about, nor does he argue for a class-related ideology, but for a person- 
related Weltanschauung.
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The decisive re-formulation of the concept of ideology as a sociological concept 
was achieved by Karl Mannheim (1893-1947). He applied Marx’s concept of 
ideology on itself and thus added reflexivity to Marx’s concept [Mannheim, 1930]. 
He criticised Marx’s view of ideology as single-sided. If socio-economic conditions 
determine the ideology of people, then those conditions must also be responsible 
for Marx’s theory to evolve, i.e. determine Marx’s actions. Everybody’s actions 
happen in a historical socio-economic environment; one which is individual to 
each person. He argued that the subjugation of personal reality to the limiting 
influences of personal actions consequently applies to everybody and more 
accurately to everybody individually. No analyst can stand above his historical 
socio-economic existence. Just as Hegel criticised Kant’s subjective world not to be 
individual, so does Mannheim criticise Marx for not recognising that each person 
lives in his own world without any chance to experience something outside his life, 
not just outside his class or economic conditions.
Reflexivity, thus, became a central reference point in the sociology of knowledge. 
The theory that no single position can claim general validity without overthrowing 
the sociology of knowledge, as it had developed so far, put an end to any idea that 
aspired to find general answers and solutions. Any such answers and solutions 
would be absorbed by the social context and give rise to new actions and 
behaviour, generating new problems. The feed-back of knowledge on itself 
prevents, thus, the establishment of definitive knowledge.
The above argument, which was already responsible for Dilthey’s formulation of 
relativism, didn’t allow Mannheim to propound a theory which would claim 
validity on a general level. Therefore, he argued for a relationalism of individual 
ideologies. Relationalism he understood to be different from relativism. While 
relativism presupposed an ‘absolute’ reference point, relationalism did not.
People’s realities are formed in relation to their social existence. Their knowledge 
is ideological in so far as their relations within reality are personal. Ideas seem to
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them original, whereas from a sociological point of view they are reckoned 
ideological, and their ideologies are deemed socially determined by their relations 
to their social and material environment.
The ideologies have taken over the role of reality. The base is considered to be 
objective and the superstructure to be subjective. Yet, nobody has more insight 
than his subjective ideology permits. In this respect all people are equal; nobody 
knows anything absolute, but only in relation to his social and material 
environment.
Another writer who contributed to the debate of the nature of knowledge is 
Claude Lévi-Strauss (1908-). His structural approach to anthropology led him to 
try and understand realities (of foreign tribes) as structures of symbols. Every act 
of life is seen as a symbol that together make up a picture. Trying to relate them 
in many ways would finally lead him to a pattern where the symbols yield a 
meaningful account of the matter under investigation. Lévi-Strauss then justified 
this method by saying that man actually orders the symbols of his reality, because 
they only make sense to him in an ordered pattern. This feat is done contiguously. 
Man is a ‘bricoleur’, putting the bricks into place in order to build a structure that 
makes sense. His knowledge is, therefore, bound up with the structures that are 
permissible under the constraints of culture. Alternative structures are eschewed 
and, therefore, do not become part of knowledge. Culture affects this selective 
process, encouraging the selection of sanctioned structures, discouraging the 
adoption of new structures. In fact, he claimed that culture is the basis on which 
to build any investigation.
Lévi-Strauss offers, with this structural approach, an alternative to Marx’s 
historical approach. He preserves Marx’s idea that action determines knowledge, 
but not as a tradition of structures but as a phenomenon of culture. Thus, it is not
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just conservative with respect to time, but conservative with respect to the survival 
of a community as it is encoded in its culture.
Mary Douglas found this approach barren, because the elicited structure does not 
give any insight into the content. The production of a meaningful pattern does not 
constitute an understanding of the matter under investigation. Knowledge is more 
than ordered symbols. Knowing that a poem is written in the form ABBAC does 
not say anything about its topic or its mood. Jean Piaget’s (1896-1980) 
understanding of structuralism closes this gap. For Piaget, who started by 
analyzing child learning, structuring was in itself the process of creating meaning, 
the process of making sense of life, which he termed ‘genetic epistemology’. Man 
was not ordering symbols, which possess an innate significance, in order to ‘make’ 
meaning, but the process of ordering was the ‘making’ of meaning by attributing 
significance to the symbols. Thus, the gathering of knowledge was changed from 
an ex post interpretation of structure to a continuous re-interpretation of 
structuring. Man as a structurer was replaced by structuring man. He inferred 
from his studies that the attribution of meaning in this structuring process 
followed certain principles: the principles of wholeness, transformations and self­
regulation [Piaget, 1968, pp.8-16]. Only structuring according to these principles 
allows man to gather knowledge.
Knowledge, thus, becomes a result of on-going feed-back. Within the limitations of 
the three principles man goes about creating (and destroying) structures, and thus 
creating (and destroying) knowledge. In contrast to the previous approaches which 
were mostly concerned with the creative side of knowledge and its sustenance, 
Piaget made knowledge an ephemeral phenomenon that is connected to life. 
Knowledge is, thus, an emergent phenomenon that is not bound to conditions as 
perceived by an authority, but only consistent to an individual’s reality and the 
three principles.
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Coming back to the sociological treatment of knowledge, David Bloor has 
propounded a theoretical framework termed the 'strong programme for the 
sociology of knowledge’ [Bloor, 1976, pp.2-5]. He argues that knowledge can be 
investigated scientifically like any other phenomenon, and that the same scientific 
standards are sufficient for this task as for any other investigation. With his 
programme he expects to cover the sociological aspects of knowledge according to 
the following principles: causality, impartiality, symmetry and reflexivity. With 
these principles the social reality of knowledge should be accounted for. 
Knowledge is no longer regarded as, for instance, a problem of ideological 
distortion or a correlate to the process of life, but a mere reflection of the four 
principles in relation to the investigation of a person’s life. The concept of 
ideology has become absorbed and internalised in this effort to establish a 
framework for the investigation of knowledge. The social and material 
circumstances that are supposed to account for the creation of ideologies become 
the focus of investigation, rather than knowledge itself.
It is not entirely clear what Bloor means by knowledge. Knowledge becomes a 
mere shadow of the framework. It seems to have vanished into the haze in favour 
of the scientific treatment of manifested conditions of knowledge.
A brief interim account will summarise the main points of this section. These will 
be expanded upon in chapter four. The writers since Marx who were discussed 
came from various backgrounds, and their theories were not necessarily contrived 
to address questions of ideology. Nevertheless, they all address the problem of 
knowledge as deriving from the process of living. None of these authors assumes 
that there was knowledge without a knower or without a knower’s action. This 
assertion opens the concept of ideology to all actions of man, which is the reason 
for the versatility of the concept of ideology.
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Marx initiated the change in perspective from conserving knowledge for some 
purpose, to knowledge conserving the purpose. It is interesting to recognise that 
most information systems are still perceived to preserve knowledge such as 
production or sales figures. This way knowledge is seen to serve a purpose, as, for 
instance, machine utilisation or market penetration. Marx’s change of perspective 
allows us to see that the preservation of knowledge about production or sales 
figures can actually be interpreted as a purpose in itself. The preservation of data 
is the purpose of information systems, and machine utilisation and market 
penetration are only afterthoughts to an information system that has been 
installed. Measurements and reference numbers are gauged out of the information 
system, because it allows people to use its output for this purpose.
The lesson of Dilthey and Mannheim is that all knowledge should be considered 
to be ideological. This means that knowledge becomes a matter of circumstances, 
it is not any more a ‘neutral physical matter’. From this perspective, the discussed 
writers up to and including Comte can all be analyzed as being conditioned by 
their environment to adopt an approach that favoured some independent-sounding 
method for the provision of knowledge. Their advocation of science can be 
described as ideological, because a belief in the power of science opposes and 
replaces the belief in the power of the Church or some other authority.
Knowledge has changed from a tool to achieve an end, to a concept which 
explains living conditions. It is of special importance for the argument of this 
dissertation that science loses its superior legitimacy. Scientific activity is subject to 
socio-economic conditions just as much as any other activity. Ideology has made 
the step from a study to battle the ‘priestly deceit’ to a study of man’s reality. It 
has also made the step from science against ideological distortions to science as an 
ideology in itself [Barnes, 1974, p. 125].
The relevance for the thought experiment is that the concept of ideology is 
established as a means to show how knowledge and a person’s reality are linked.
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Marx showed how knowledge gets conserved into an ideology, and how this 
knowledge gets propagated through the ideology. This ideology is a ‘false 
consciousness’ that lets people believe that their ideology is reality. Mannheim 
showed that ideologies are reflexive, because it is ideological to talk about ideology 
from an ‘objective’ position. The study of IS can be seen as a phenomenon of 
social action, and, therefore, as an ideological science. The approaches of Lévi- 
Strauss, Piaget and Bloor show how the concept of ideology is characteristic for 
problems of knowledge and reality. Culture, ‘genetic epistemology’ and the ‘strong 
programme’ are means to explain knowledge about reality from within a structure 
of knowledge. Without explaining knowledge these three terms cater for the 
stability of the structure and the resilience of its explanations. In systems terms, 
culture, ‘genesis’ and the ‘strong programme’ are statements of homeostasis, 
conserving and propagating the derived knowledge about knowledge.
SYSTEM
Rather detached from such work in the philosophy of science, scientific disciplines 
have thrived on success. Yet, the success is wearing off. Consequences of 
successful technical achievements turn out to have adverse social and 
environmental effects, and new success-stories are ever harder to find because of 
the interrelatedness of phenomena. Knowledge in one field quite often is not 
enough any longer to get an enterprise going successfully. Laszlo, in fact, argues 
that an "atomized" [1972, p.4] understanding of reality is inadequate. He continues 
that "instead of getting a continuous and coherent picture we are getting fragments 
- remarkably detailed but isolated pattern" [ibid.]. Specialised knowledge is 
questioned and found to be inadequate; a different knowledge is necessary to 
explain phenomena, and Laszlo argues that "there is an emerging paradigm - a 
new way of ordering the information we already have and are likely to get in the 
foreseeable future" [ibid.]. The paradigm Laszlo talks about is the systems 
paradigm; also referred to as systems thinking, systems methodology, or the 
systems approach.
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The systems paradigm is said to have sprung mainly from two different sources. 
Checkland separates them into the system thinking of organismic provenance 
where ideas of "emergence and hierarchy" [1981, p.74] prevail, and in systems 
thinking of technological provenance where ideas of "communication and control" 
[ibid., p.82] prevail. The two different sources can be characterised by discussing 
two key figures: on the one hand, Ludwig von Bertalanffy who helped found the 
General Systems Theory (GST) movement, and on the other, Norbert Wiener who 
was the spiritus rector of the study of cybernetics.
V.Bertalanffy came from the study of biology to formulate a theory that could 
handle phenomena of "organised complexity" [1971, p.33] that were taken as a 
whole, rather than to break them down in an analytic fashion, to study them 
separately and to construct the end-results by putting together the isolated results. 
He struck an analogy from biology, where the objects of study are "wholes' or 
‘systems’, to general systems theory which concerns itself with ‘epiorganisms’. 
V.Bertalanffy boldly states that a "‘systems approach’ became necessary" [ibid., 
p.2], because of the innumerable problems of the modern world. Scientists could 
deal with problems of limited scope within their domain, but problems of societal 
or social relevance were too delicate to be dealt with in a specialised way, because 
"constitutive characteristics are not explainable from the characteristics of isolated 
parts" [ibid., p.54]. According to V.Bertalanffy, it is only possible to recognise 
emergent properties pertinent to the system, because of the understanding of the 
hierarchy of sub-system and system. Therefore, only a systemic or holistic view can 
lead to an appreciation and interpretation of complex problems. Specialised 
knowledge is directed toward sub-systems. It is inadequate to grasp the systemic 
nature of phenomena, and consequently solutions are sub-optimal.
Wiener, on the other hand, wrote about "servomechanisms" [1961, p.43]. Rather 
than occupying himself with wholes, he wrote about communication and control 
that makes such mechanisms work, whether animate or inanimate. For this
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purpose he devised a body of mathematics to describe relationships of switches, 
signals, effectors, feed-back, etc., which allowed him to "measure" information 
[ibid., p.61] in a statistical model. Since he was convinced that servomechanisms 
were dependent on messages that were communicated and, thus, controlled the 
existence of these mechanisms, such an explicit treatment of information was 
necessary. Constructing automata around controlled information flows meant for 
him constructing possible machines, some of which resemble existent 
servomechanisms. Thus, knowledge about these servomechanisms could be derived 
from constructing a corresponding machine.
The systems paradigm has absorbed a mixture of aspects of v.Bertalanffy’s and 
Wiener’s theories. There are variations within the systems paradigm in the 
understanding of system, as more open or more closed, and similarities, as in the 
explicit treatment of information flows. The essence of this approach is that "in 
some respect corresponding abstractions and conceptual models can be applied to 
different phenomena" [Lektorsl^ and Sadovslg^, 1960, p. 174].
Later systems theorists draw heavily on the two writers above and the ideas they 
represent. There are many variations of the basic themes. A common 
denominator, though, is the claim of the systems paradigm being its own discipline 
[Gérardin, 1968; Klir, 1969; Rubin, 1971; Miller, 1978; etc.], which "is a subject 
which can talk about other subjects" [Checkland, 1981, p.5], rather than about a 
particular problem-domain. The systems paradigm requires the systems thinker to 
look at problems with a systemic mind, which prevents him from being misled into 
tackling specific sub-problems. Optimal solutions for sub-systems might create a 
sub-optimal solution for the overall system. Therefore, the systems paradigm is 
characterised by taking "a broad view, which tries to take all aspects into account, 
[and] which concentrates on interaction between the different parts of the 
problem" [ibid.]. Thus, the discipline is not characterised by a particular theory, 
but by diverse aspects of systems thinking. Systems behaviour is investigated and
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conclusions are drawn from it. Central in this endeavour is the place of 
information, which, as can be seen, for instance, from Laszlo’s quote, has come to 
prominence in the systems paradigm. Using such insight, the working of the 
systems can be interpreted and understood on account of the discovered 
information flow.
The acknowledgement of this information flow to be a matter of social interaction 
within an (information) system, has led to the appreciation of social or ‘soft’ 
issues. ‘Information Theory’ was recognised to cover but a very limited and 
technical aspect of information. Moreover, the problems of today’s complex world 
suffer from the conflict of diverse perspectives which make the production of a 
good system a matter of negotiation, rather than engineering. Hence, the retreat 
from specific problems and best solution, to complex "problem-situations” [Wilson, 
1984, p.4] and optimal solutions. In this context information takes on many guises, 
which defy the singular concepts of information theory.
The self-proclaimed virtue of the systems approach of not being too specific, but 
rather of being synoptical and concerned with a general view, makes it very 
difficult to pin-point its epistemological standpoint. The systems approach is 
advocated as the only approach that can possibly tackle problem-situations of 
today’s complexity. It is a paradigm that lays a claim on ‘super-knowledge’ of a 
kind which cannot be achieved in any specialised discipline. This particular 
knowledge is derived from systemic thinking.
A brief interim account will summarise the main points of this section. These will 
be expanded upon in chapter four. The treatment of knowledge has changed again 
in this third subject area of system. Knowledge was treated in the first section 
almost as a neutral physical matter, in the second section it was treated as a social 
phenomenon. In the section on system these consideration are less important in 
comparison to a general analysis of effectiveness of knowledge. ‘Atomic’
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knowledge is considered to be just not good enough for today’s complex problems. 
Knowledge has, therefore, to be ‘super’, grasping the systemic nature of 
phenomena. The conceptual model of ‘information’ and ‘system’ is used for this 
activity to be ‘applied to different phenomena’. Can there be a more blatant 
expression of an ideology? Systemic knowledge is supposed to have superior 
power, it conserves and propagates systemic thinking and it applies it to anything 
it deems appropriate, because the world is perceived to be a hierarchy of systems. 
The marriage between ‘organismic’ thought and the ‘machine-metaphor’ has 
produced a familiarity with the jargon and the relevant authorities that breeds 
contempt for a renewed curiosity about information systems. This development 
creates a mind-set of ‘tried and tested’ ideas which, when grouped together, will 
be referred to in the thought experiment as an ideology of information systems.
The relevance for the thought experiment lies in the twofold applicability of the 
concept of ideology within the study of IS. Firstly, people involved with 
information systems, whether they are designers, analysts, users or commissioners, 
can be interpreted as having ideological perspectives toward information systems. 
Secondly, systems-thinking and -practice, which incorporates the study of IS, can 
be interpreted as ideological. Both applications of the concept of ideology are a 
consequence of the introduction of the social aspect to information systems.
CONCLUSION
The writers who have been introduced in this account of the three subject areas 
lived or live in very different circumstances. A critical appraisal of their position in 
their society and of their work cannot be attempted, because the richness of 
contextual information about anything introduced in this chapter renders a just 
treatment of each idea impractical. The thought experiment just takes the ideas at 
‘face value’. For the purpose of using the different ideas in part II of this 
dissertation this account has to suffice.
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The three studies of ‘science’, ‘ideology’ and ‘system’ have been introduced 
without paying tribute to all contributors in these fields. Nevertheless, those points 
which are relevant for the thought experiment have been introduced. Yet, the 
different treatment of knowledge as scientific, ideological and systemic showed the 
possible connection between these perspectives. Chapter four will summarise these 
and put them into a coherent picture in order to lead the reader to the starting 
point of the thought experiment.
Questions about the meaning of ‘information system’ have not been answered. 
Indeed, the historical accounts of ‘science’, ‘ideology’ and ‘system’ have only led to 
a different interpretation of phenomena pertinent to ‘information system’. Neither 
science nor the study of ideology nor systems thinking are going to provide one 
universal meaning. Moreover, the differentiation of ‘the notion of information 
system’, the concept of information system’ and ‘particular information systems 
installations’ has been diluted. Particular meanings attached to each phrase must 
be seen as influenced by each other. What is an information system is as much 
dependent on how the notion is used, as it is dependent on how the concept 
relates to this use, as it is dependent on what installations are referred to, and vice 
versa. Thus, these phrases are interrelated amongst themselves through feed-back.
How then did discourse about information systems evolve, and how did 
installations get going? Apparently, there was no consensus to suspend all IS- 
practice in order to think matters through. As argued above, that would have been 
pointless anyway, because thinking about the concept of information systems is 
dependent on IS-practice and vice versa. Neither was there a consensus to ‘muddle 
through’ with IS-practice and think matters through later. This would have been 
pointless for the same reasons as above. It seems that a discourse about 
information systems evolved and installations did get going as part of the 
evolution of society. No big upheaval interrupted the course of events, despite the 
literature that proclaimed a paradigm shift that would catapult society into the
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third millennium. Singling out the topic of information systems and portraying it as 
a manageable phenomenon is, therefore, an emphasis. Society does support such 
neatness of demarcation, yet at the same time trips over the mines such neatness 
disperses across common sense. It is on this foundation that the interpretation of 
‘information system’ is seen as a manifestation of ideologies. Despite the almost 
indiscriminate use of the label ‘information system’, ideologies give meaningful 
knowledge to those who feel a need for reassurance. This desire for meaningful 
knowledge quietens the nagging whisper that however clever the explanations are, 
they will nevertheless falter in the face of conflicting evidence.
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4. SUMMARY
Knowledge is the lynch-pin of the three subject areas science, ideology and 
(information) system and in particular of the their corresponding studies. The 
study of IS did not have to battle against a domination of knowledge by the 
Church or some other authority. It grew out of the natural sciences with a more 
recent injection from the social sciences. The study of IS has, overall, an entirely 
scientific tradition. No author has been found who discusses why books on the 
topic of information systems strive to capture the scientific aura, and only one 
book is known to the author which takes a humorous approach to systems, making 
a serious point in the disguise of a humorous treatise [Gall, 1975]. The scientific 
imperative (not only in the study of IS) allows critical and humorous approaches 
only in so far as the court jester was allowed to speak out in feudal times. 
Apparently, it is taken for granted that scholarly investigation is the solution to 
problems in IS-theory and -practice. Metaphysical speculation let alone theological 
belief are supposed to be inadequate. The respectability of the status of a 
discipline that has proven itself worthy of scientific laurels seems to be a common 
goal. The irony of this jostling for a place amongst the established disciplines is 
that respectability comes at a cost.
The approaches taken to explain what a system is, or how an information system 
should be analyzed and designed thrive on the treatment of information systems as 
if they were a matter of definitive knowledge. Some IS-methods do not explicitly 
refer to the process by which knowledge should be derived and what influences 
have to be accounted for; others do. In the field of intelligent knowledge-based 
systems a particular branch is concerned with knowledge acquisition. In keeping 
with the development of the systems paradigm, knowledge is acquired through a 
process that gauges the effectiveness of knowledge. Buchanan et al. refer to 
"identification of terms used" [1983, p. 134] and "strategies the expert uses" [ibid.]. 
The simple assumption is, that the expert knows; and what worked for him will
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work for us. It is a reasoning of linear extrapolation. Quite often, however, as in 
the case of large-scale data-bases, very little attention is given to the analysis of 
knowledge. It is trusted that vast quantities of data-input will secure a sufficient 
pool for knowledge-output. How the magical transformation is supposed to 
happen, is obscure. Again the initial assumption is that if the systems analysis has 
figured out how ‘the system’ worked in the past, then the efficient computerised 
version will do the same work for us in the future. However, in addition to this 
reasoning of linear extrapolation is a mystical belief that somehow a skilled 
operator can get information out of a data-base which nobody had put there, and 
therefore, which nobody had expected. This cavalier attitude toward the riddle of 
knowledge indicates the presence of an ideology, that precludes alternative 
evaluations.
In chapter three, various influences were described that condition knowledge 
according to the authors who were discussed; the power of authority, the tuition of 
proper ideas, the separation of appropriate and inappropriate methods, socio­
economic conditions, the Weltanschauungen, individual circumstances, cultural 
posits, ‘genetic’ development and sociological indicators. These alternative 
perspectives see knowledge not as a ‘datum’ that can be attained through effort, 
but rather as a consequence of the experience of a person, subject to the above 
influences. Metaphysical speculation, quasi-religious belief and other non-scientific 
vagaries are back on the agenda, since the above list of influences is so 
comprehensive with regard to the human predicament. If the human predicament 
is taken as the true background of knowledge, then it is significant to recognise 
that the phenomenon of ‘knowledge’ should be of similar profoundness. No easy 
answer should be expected that does justice to the problem of knowledge.
When it comes to giving meaning to a phenomenon, the different perspectives are 
telling indications of the problems of understanding. As was discussed in chapter 
one, ‘information’, ‘system’ and ‘information system’ are elusive notions that defy a
67
Part I 4. Summary
universal meaning. In the case of the notion of information systems the effect of 
human interaction has been mentioned to characterise the interpretation of 
phenomena that are relevant to information systems. Similarly, as chapter three 
has shown, the controversial notion of human interaction can also be taken to 
account for knowledge. The experience of human interaction was said to be 
crucially connected to the possibility of ordering these experiences. Hence, the 
capacity to order experiences, which then can be conceptualised into notions, 
raises the topic of whether man can know anything at all which he has not 
perceived through this order. Is not the attempt to come to terms with information 
systems a consequence of an imposition of personal perceptions, assumptions, 
beliefs, Weltanschauungen, experiences, etc.? A circularity of perception and the 
perceived characterises this puzzle. The concept of ideology accounts 
comprehensively for such phenomena, whether ideology is considered to be the 
ordering influence of a dominant class, as with Marx, or whether it is the ordering 
influence of culture, as with Lévi-Strauss. Thus, information systems can be 
understood only by the use of an ideological perspectives that allows the 
unordered and incomprehensible to be conceptualised, and conversely within 
information systems, ideologies allow for understanding of the unordered and 
incomprehensible.
As argued in chapter three, a universally valid explanation of what an ideology is, 
cannot be given. Any such attempt had to be ideological, because of the reflexivity 
of the concept of ideology. For this dissertation, though, some hallmarks of the 
concept of ideology will be singled out to be relevant for the thought experiment. 
These four hallmarks represent the author’s personal choice.
Firstly, an ideology is conservative. A person’s experiences get conserved into a 
person’s knowledge of reality. The person’s memory retains this knowledge over 
time. Thus, a clerk will always be conscious of the precariousness of a 
computerised information system that has let him down. Secondly, an ideology is
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propagative. Depending on what a person knows, he is going to direct his actions, 
which will be responsible for future experience and consequently future 
knowledge. The above clerk will be sceptical about any new system he is supposed 
to rely on. Even if the system is only a ‘humble’ word-processor, the clerk will 
direct his actions according to his previous experiences. Thirdly, an ideology is a 
person’s reality. It is impossible for a person to know anything apart from the 
things he has experienced. The totality of a person’s knowledge is his ideology.
The clerk will treat his computer-terminal with suspicion even if a new release has 
eliminated a bug that was responsible for the break-down. For him it was ‘the 
system’ that went down, and talk of ‘bugs’ and ‘new releases’ makes him only more 
suspicious rather than less. Fourthly, an ideology is reflexive. No person can claim 
any knowledge beyond his experiences. Personal experiences, thus, confront other 
personal experiences of a shared reality. A claim for validity can, therefore, only 
be based upon authority. Consequently, authority stands against authority, which in 
the case of the concept of ideology results in an epistemological relationalism. If 
the break-down of the computer-terminal was subject to overheating, because the 
clerk deposited a file on top of the cooling slots, this is most likely not apparent to 
the clerk. Indeed, he will not treat it as significant. Consequently, he will not 
report it to the systems support group of his company. All theories that evolve 
about why the break-down occurred are going to be similarly wrong. Any 
consequences depend, therefore, on the authority behind the clerk and the systems 
support group.
A person’s ideology can be described along the lines of these four hallmarks. An 
individual cannot know everything, but only what he experiences. Therefore, he 
cannot develop a complete understanding of a phenomenon. Nobody can. 
Therefore, knowledge is partial. This partiahty allows the individual to proceed 
meaningfully until his knowledge is challenged, because he is committed to his 
reality. The continuous feed-back of his past experiences on his understanding of 
phenomena builds his ideology. Taken together this amounts to a homeostasis of
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the mind. This homeostasis gives stability to a world view, and the ability to deal 
and come to terms with the otherwise incomprehensible.
In the case of the clerk, an acknowledgement of the ideological nature of 
knowledge would lead to the dismissal of the computerised information system. If 
nobody ‘really’ knows why the computer-terminal broke down, any action could 
have been responsible. Under these conditions further work on the computer- 
terminal is hazardous, because another break-down could occur any time.
However, the attribution of the break-down on some specific event as, for 
instance, the use of a formula with more than ten greek characters in one line, 
stabilises the organizational context. Only if such assumptions are challenged 
continuously does a serious situation arise.
The notion of system has been taken up by the systems paradigm, which makes 
great efforts to come to terms scientifically with systemic aspects and problems. 
Science has been analyzed as a social phenomenon, a group activity of typical 
nature, which displays all the signs of an ideology. And finally, the concept of 
system, as a notion as well as a study, can be described as an ideology. The three 
connections between science, ideology and system now appear complete.
In order to illustrate the latter point, a summary of chapter three is helpful. With 
Marx, science enters into a realm where institutions, like science, are treated as 
social phenomena of equal value with other phenomena of human reality. This is 
a consequence of human action being of equal ‘value’ regardless of what objective 
it pursues. Actions generate experiences which account for knowledge. Thus, 
scientific activity loses its special position. This distinct change in the outlook on 
the validity of (scientific) knowledge as a socially constructed phenomenon rather 
than a product of the ‘right’ institution has repercussions on the treatment of the 
study of IS. While Marx would have tried to show the expression of class interest, 
Mannheim would have tried to show the relational nature of the study of IS; Levi-
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Strauss would have tried to show the reflection of culture in the structure of the 
study of IS and Piaget would have tried to show how the development of the study 
of IS is a consequence of a ‘genetic epistemology’ of the IS-community and vice 
versa. The social reality of the study of IS might, thus, be thought of as an 
information system of a complexity well beyond human comprehension.
The entire treatment of knowledge as ideological renders a social and historical 
component to any activity. Social reality, as it exists over time, must be considered 
to influence knowledge. This can manifest itself in socio-economic influences, as 
Marx would have argued, in terms of a particular Weltanschauung, as Dilthey 
would have argued, or in any other way described by the authors discussed 
previously. Information systems and the study of IS, thus, may be considered to be 
a special kind of social reality. Peculiarities and particularities which are pertinent 
to information systems and its study are hunches that let limited knowledge 
become a real possibility. What manifestations this has will be discussed in the 
next two chapters.
So far the assumptions taken from Marx, Mannheim, Lévi-Strauss and Piaget have 
been accepted in order to describe the concept of ideology. But are these 
assumptions valid, do ideologies and consequently systems ideologies exist? Since 
those assumptions sustain the argument in favour of systems ideologies they have 
to be scrutinised critically and the results have to be pondered in order to discuss 
the concept of systems ideology properly.
First of all the validity of action as a means to bridge the gap between subject and 
object has to be considered. Marx, Mannheim and the other authors discussed in 
the section on ideology assume that through action people experience their 
environment and thus create their reality. The question is then whether social 
action is such a basic concept that it can account for the concept of ideology 
without itself being ideological. The writers mentioned above are dealing very
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much with a concept of action rather than with action itself. It is, therefore, 
appropriate to argue that the use of such a conception is ideological. Yet, if it 
were ideological to built the concept of ideology on the concept of action, then the 
entire theory is flawed, because of its circular reasoning.
Secondly, it has to be considered, whether the historical continuum of experiences 
actually determines a person’s knowledge. Marx’s statement that man does not act 
in a vacuum, but in a historically determined environment, and that, therefore, his 
actions are historically conditioned is again circular reasoning. Only if a 
historically conveyed environment necessitated certain actions, only then would 
such a reasoning be convincing. But since any particular action can happen and 
might be undertaken under any circumstances, a historically determined activity 
loses its credibility. The fallacies post hoc, propter hoc (economics) and correlation 
indicates causation (statistics) warn of the shaky philosophical basis of such 
simplistic assumptions. Historical influences can affect actions, but they might 
affect them to lead into one direction to suit circumstances, or they might affect 
them to lead into another direction exactly in defiance of circumstances. Indeed, 
they might lead anywhere in ignorance of particular circumstances. The 
interpretation of such compliant or adverse developments is dependent on the 
interpreter, whose power of interpretation cannot claim absolute validity without 
violating the premise of historically determined actions. But this is exactly what is 
done if the circumstances are taken to be somehow objective and if a necessity 
rather than a potential for action is derived from such an interpretation of 
circumstances. The clerk of the above example might rely on a new computer 
system or not. What decision he takes is not dictated by necessity. Thus, the 
perceived necessity of actions stemming from particular environments is a self- 
fulfilling assumption. Only if such a necessity is accepted as the only possibility for 
a connection between circumstances and a person’s actions, only then does the 
concept of historically determined actions convince.
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A third assumption which has to be considered, as a consequence of the two 
previous assumptions, is the establishment of a connection between circumstances 
and action (and phenomena in general). This can also be called the question of 
structure. Generally actions are not considered to be meaningful without reference 
to their context; actions are not considered to be 5e//-evident. Therefore, in order 
to make meaningful statements about human behaviour, they are made out to be 
meaningful in relation to their environment. For instance, a man switching off a 
computer is not a very compelling drama. If he switches off the control system of 
a nuclear power plant, or if he switches off the flight control support system, as 
some U.S.A.F. pilots have been reported to do, the action becomes immediately 
impressive. Thus, a conceptual separation is introduced which singles out actions 
within their environment by drawing (arbitrary) boundaries. The establishment of 
such a dualism is then used to ‘prove’ various assumptions, be it statistical, 
metaphysical or argumentative. Thus, the meaning of actions is vested in the 
interpretations of the chosen scenario. The introduction of the dualism, though, 
which put actions into opposition to their environment in the first place is taken as 
meaningful. Self-evidence of actions is dismissed in a matter of fact way as 
mysticism, as in the case of intuition or gut feeling or some other ‘quasi-holistic’ 
phenomenon. The introduction of boundaries, which gives such tremendous scope 
to elaborate matters and, therefore, to explain connections, intricacies, feed-back, 
etc. seemingly does away with such mysticism. That this way of going about things 
is just as mystical is obscured by the very elaboration of structures in explanatory 
frameworks. Thus, it is often overlooked that the structures explain nothing 
beyond the structural framework, which was put up in the first place on the 
assumption that actions are not self-evident. The dualism introduced between 
circumstances and action (and phenomena in general) has, thus, established 
explanations for such structures’, the phenomena themselves, as they occur, 
unrestricted by imposed boundaries, remain as obscure as ever.
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Fourthly, it is questionable whether it is possible to talk of an IS-community as a 
coherent group. Only if the IS-community is coherent can an IS-ideology arise and 
vice versa. Yet, not only is the IS-community not defined and its members not of a 
special kind, but the very idea of a group of people being equal in some respects 
is problematic. In spite of the widely accepted belief that members of groups 
display shared properties, this belief can be shown to be another instance of 
circular reasoning. Social action of a typical nature is expected to be a 
consequence of a professional preoccupation with typical phenomena. However, 
the contact with a typical environment does not necessitate a typical response to 
it. A person’s behaviour is not deterministic like that of a machine. Thus, 
experiences will vary from person to person and consequently no typical 
experience springs from an involvement in a typical environment. If a community 
is ‘defined’ by its shared properties, and the shared properties are ‘defined’ as a 
consequence of the existence of a community, circular reasoning is in full swing.
These four assumptions have been singled out to discuss the validity of the 
concept of ideology. It is a matter of perspective, whether to agree with them or 
not. It is a matter of perspective too, whether the choice of these four assumptions 
is valid. Circular reasoning is often believed to discredit a concept. Yet, is not all 
reasoning circular according to the concept of ideology? The homeostasis of the 
mind is a phenomenon of feed-back, which reveals circularity in assumptions that 
were supposed to be straight forward. Circular reasoning, where explanations for 
phenomena are revealed to be based on themselves, is an ideological phenomenon 
par excellence. It is a feature of the homeostasis of the mind that was discussed 
earlier. The hermetically sealed circle described by the concept of ideology 
constitutes a blueprint for the circularity of arguments in general. These four 
criticisms are, therefore, criticism or justification of the concept of ideology, 
subject to interpretation. Hence, the concept of ideology cannot be dismissed 
easily and, therefore, a thought experiment of ‘ideology and information systems’ 
is worthwhile.
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On the basis of the concept of ideology, three positions toward information 
systems will be argued. In the thesis, the concept of ideology will show how action 
is the basic concept of human reality and how the concept of ideology gives insight 
into IS-thinking and -practice. In the antithesis, the concept of ideology will be 
portrayed as a conceptualisation that is inadequately explaining IS-thinking and - 
practice, because it is based on a concept of action, rather than on action itself. 
IS-thinking and -practice are, therefore, obscure, and scholarly explanations are an 
Ideologisierung of the Alltag. In the synthesis, finally, the conflict of thesis and 
antithesis is resolved into a position of nihilistic thinking. Only the readiness to 
‘transvaluate’ gives the resilience necessary to adopt IS-thinking and -practice 
reasonably, whereas knowledge gives the stability necessary to develop this 
resilience.
The recurring assertion that there are no panacea becomes comprehensible in this 
context as a nihilistic statement. IS-thinking and -practice evolves along ideological 
paths. Interpretations of this evolution as progress are wishful thinking, Only 
because phenomena are constantly re-interpreted, or ‘transvalued’, can a resilient 
study of IS exist. However, the ‘elitist’ treatment of the study of IS has all the 
hallmarks of a predominant paradigm that degenerates into an inappropriate 
ideology.
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5. THESIS 
INTRODUCTION
The first part of this dissertation gave a historical account of science, ideology and 
system, where thoughts and ideas on these topics were presented in a selective 
and descriptive way that represent a personal choice. In this part, the thesis will be 
formulated, and its implications will be discussed, using cases from IS-practice.
The first part of the thought experiment is the formulation of the thesis. In this 
research the thesis is: "'systems ideologies’ exist". This means that IS-thinking and - 
practice are conditioned by human limitations. Assumptions, beliefs, luck, 
inclinations, preferences and other influences have to be taken into account. 
Indeed, these influences amount to an environment that binds the IS-community 
together. Within this ‘culture’ a collective IS-ideology rules. In this chapter the 
necessary argument will be delivered to show that the thesis is a sensible 
statement. In chapter six, the thesis will be discussed in detail and implications will 
be derived from this discussion.
Neither Marx nor Mannheim wrote explicitly about information systems. In their 
day, the term information system had not evolved. By discussing how the 
hallmarks of the concept of ideology, as selected in chapter four, are to be 
interpreted with reference to the study of IS, it will be attempted to give a 
Marxian and Mannheimian perspective on information systems. This entails that 
the concept of ideology, as presented in part I, will be applied to the subject 
matter as well as to the study of IS itself. By means of introducing the author’s 
interpretation of Levi-Strauss’s, Piaget’s and Bloor’s thoughts to the study of IS 
and its subject matter, the meaning of systems ideologies and the crucial step from 
individual systems ideologies to a collective IS-ideology will be demonstrated. The 
result of this first part of the argument is the clarification of individual systems 
ideologies. The second part concentrates on the demonstration of the evolution of
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a collective IS-ideology. As a consequence the position of the concept of ideology 
within the study of IS should become apparent.
ARGUMENT
As was discussed in the first part, the concept of ideology really became viable 
with Marx. His ideas are, therefore, the starting point for the establishment of an 
argument for systems ideologies. If the study of IS and its subject matter are to be 
approached from the point of view of Marx’s writings, then the concept of social 
action, which is so central in his writings, has to be used accordingly. Any action 
within the study of IS, as well as any action within the subject matter of the study 
of IS, is social action in a Marxian sense. These social actions happen in a typical 
IS-environment. Consequently, only typical knowledge can be derived from these 
experiences. On the basis of this typical knowledge future actions in the IS- 
environment will be shaped. The first step to the establishment of a concept of 
systems ideologies is done. The credibility of this step is dependent on the 
observation of a typical environment.
In the case of the IS-community this environment is characterised by words like 
‘system’, ‘information’, ‘computer’, ‘byte’, ‘data’, IT  and ‘processing’, words that 
feature prominently in its discourse. Because of the diversity within the IS- 
community, there is also a wider range of IS-j argon. This includes words like 
‘spreadsheet’, ‘bug’, ‘Weltanschauung’, ‘computability’, ‘virus’, etc. The professional 
life of the IS-community is dominated by a concern for the things these words and 
combinations of these words stand for. Although it is pointless to try to define the 
IS-community, it is nevertheless clear that it is common practice to talk of people 
as IS-people, either to characterise them or to differentiate them from other 
communities.
Even though the IS-community is diverse, it nevertheless rests on the often casual 
use of ‘system’ and ‘information’ as the pillars of its identity. Everything is
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considered in the light of these two concepts, and although everything can be seen 
through the tinted spectacles of system and information, this does not establish a 
justification why this should be done, let alone why it should be appropriate. In 
fact, systems-thinking and -practice adds another structure to the social whole and 
thus produces, as a consequence of both its introduction into and its interaction 
within the social whole, another layer of complexity together with emergent 
relations to and from other social structures that are affected by it. This is a new 
layer which owes its existence to IS-thinking and -practice. It is in this respect 
typical of the IS-community. Moreover, access to this layer comes through 
involvement with the same (typical) IS-thinking and -practice. When access is 
gained this layer feeds back to IS-people, and thus re-enforces their sense of 
identity.
This can be clarified with an example. A problem is usually stated in terms of its 
features as, for instance, ‘the furnace temperature varies too much’ or ‘documents 
which are older than four years take up too much space in the office’. The 
investigation by a systems analyst will produce a specification requirement for a 
computerised information system that controls furnace temperature or stores old 
files. A whole new layer of phenomena are created: measurement converters, 
communication lines, scanners, optical discs, etc. This layer of devices, 
organizational measures and conceptual novelties establishes a source of identity 
and power for those who have access to it. Some people will be ‘in the know’, 
others will not. Groups will form and additional changes, related to the new layer, 
will take place.
The ‘hermetic’ circle described by Marx, of a social reality which permits only 
particular actions as a basis for experience and consequently knowledge, is closed 
by the re-enforcement of structures which are conceivable on the basis of limited 
knowledge. In the above example, this could be a suggestion for improvement of 
the storage procedure, which, even though it makes sense with respect to the used
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equipment, actually goes counter the initial problem of a crammed office. All the 
phenomena which Marx stipulated for the emergence of an ideology are existent 
in the field of systems-thinking and -practice. From a Marxian perspective, the 
conservative and propagative property of ideology traps the study of IS and its 
subject matter within limits of a ‘superstructure’ that do not represent the limits of 
its ‘base’, yet nevertheless convey the impression of representing a whole reality.
The above idea of systems ideologies is the consequence of the application of 
Marx’ concept of action on human reality and its consequent mediation between 
subject and object. Taking the study of IS and its subject matter as a phenomenon 
made up of social action makes the above point a valid conclusion. Literally all 
phenomena under investigation by the study of IS, whether it be participative 
methods in IS-design, competitive influences of object-oriented programming in 
the banking-sector or people’s attitudes toward information, are describable as a 
consequence of actions taken by individuals. The specific contribution of Marx is 
the labelling of such a realisation of knowledge as ideological, describing a series 
of influences and grouping them together into one concept. A true Marxian 
investigation would then try to establish a connection between the economic 
circumstances and the emergence of one particular systems ideology on the basis 
of the struggle between a ruling and a ruled class. The ideological distortions 
would be seen as upholding the ruling class’s socio-economic supremacy over the 
other. As the discussion of Mannheim in chapter three showed, this is a one-sided 
approach.
What becomes apparent from this Marxian perspective is that no clear meaning 
evolves of what an information system is. Despite a bias toward information, 
system and information system these terms are used in an idiosyncratic way. The 
importance for the argument of the thesis lies in the absence of any objective 
reference. Individual experience within a typical environment determines the
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gathering of knowledge. The first three hallmarks of the concept of ideology are 
fulfilled.
A Mannheimian investigation would adopt a different point of view, taking a 
relational perspective. Such an investigation would accept the Marxian premise of 
action, and agree that the social determination of action shapes a person’s belief 
that his knowledge is original, whereas it is really determined by what his 
circumstances allow him to experience and consequently to know. His knowledge 
is, therefore, from a sociological perspective not original, but ideological. Going 
beyond the Marxian understanding of the concept of ideology, a Mannheimian 
investigation would argue that since all knowledge is ideological in this sense, 
there can be no independent or objective knowledge. This entails that also the 
notion of ideology is ideological, because this proposition is as well a consequence 
of experience through action which is dependent on circumstances. The notion of 
ideology is, therefore, not an original thought, but a result of what circumstances 
allow a person to know. The notion of ideology is, therefore, not an objective 
truth, but a result of actions that have taken place in the social and material 
environment.
Applied to the study of IS, this entails that actions and ideas appear original; yet, 
they are ideological in so far as actions and ideas are typically concerned with 
information systems. With reference to IS-thinking and -practice, it can be argued 
that the circumstances of the actions of people are constitutive for their 
knowledge. For example, particular circumstances prevail during the production of 
a specification for an information system or in connection with the implementation 
of a decision-support-system in a far away subsidiary. People will treat their 
knowledge as original and their consciousness is formed accordingly. From a 
different point of view their knowledge and consciousness appears conditioned by 
those circumstances, and consequently ideological. Yet, this perspective is just as 
ideological, since it is based on a different set of circumstances, as, for example.
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not being part of the specification team or working in the R&D-department of 
headquarters. All points of view are, in this sense, ideological in relation to a 
person's circumstances. Yet, they are also ideological in relation to each other. 
With the introduction of this relationalism, perspectives concerning specifications 
or implementations are not only ideological in themselves, but also the idea of 
taking them to be ideological is ideological. The consequence of this strict 
application of the concept of ideology is a relationalism of perspectives and ideas, 
which does not allow for independent or objective knowledge, and, therefore, 
necessitates the proposition that any perspective within or outside any specific task 
is relational in nature, and not absolute. The reflexivity of the concept of ideology 
does not allow one perspective to dominate another on the basis of superior 
validity.
Thus, the Marxian possibility to differentiate between ‘good' and ‘bad' on the basis 
of an analysis of the socio-economic background is no longer possible. On the 
basis of a Mannheimian understanding of the concept of ideology, there can be no 
‘absolute' valid basis for arbitration or evaluation. All actions are equally 
ideological, and consequently so are all points of view. It is, hence, invalid to talk 
of one particular systems ideology, but rather of multiple systems ideologies. They 
cannot represent an absolute aspect of the base, but only a relative one. The 
Marxian struggle between different classes is thus disposed of. Consequently it is 
impossible to talk of ‘false consciousness' in a Marxian sense, resulting from an 
unjust stratification of society. If a ‘false consciousness' exists, then it had to be a 
result of the typical and often fortuitous peculiarity of the IS-environment in a 
Mannheimian sense. Social influences, like power and authority, decide about 
superiority of perspectives, and not ‘absolute' knowledge.
The recent development of the concept of the ‘Hybrid-Manager' is one well- 
publicised phenomenon [Johnson, 1990], which can be interpreted as a 
consequence of the realisation of ideological limitations. IS-managers were
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perceived to be too limited in their education and their consequent understanding 
of information systems. Consequently, a broader curriculum of subjects was 
advocated to widen the limitations of understanding and knowledge. Thus, the 
Hybrid-Manager was supposed to be able to understand and communicate a wider 
range of experiences and to be able to take a wider range of actions. Contrary to 
the assumption that this is going to lead to a breed of managers who will be able 
to tackle problems better, an ideological interpretation suggests that it will only 
lead to a wider ideology, which will have a different perspective, but not 
necessarily a better perspective.
In addition to this interpretation, there is yet another way to interpret the 
emergence of the concept of Hybrid-Manager. Career paths for IS-professionals 
are not very well developed. Indeed, if a career reaches the level of project leader 
or project coordinator, there is hardly any prospect left, except maybe to become 
an IS-consultant within or outside the company. The move to develop from within 
the IS-community a breed of managers that have the air of generalists, or systems- 
thinkers, is a clever move to conquer other career paths. To this end an ideology 
of the importance of information systems has to cover up the gap that exists 
between claim and reality. On the one hand, the ideology has to convince 
personnel officers that the Hybrid-Manager is indeed what companies need. On 
the other, the IS-community has to be educated as to accept Hybrid-Managers as 
IS-people. Pushing through the concept of Hybrid-Manager is, hence, an exercise 
of authority.
The four hallmarks of the concept of ideology lead to an assessment of people 
which are involved with information systems along the lines of their actions. This 
assessment is valid for users and analysts alike. However, in the following, the 
argument concentrates on the relevance of the concept of ideology on the IS- 
community. In the IS-community a strong involvement with information systems 
results in conceptual approaches to information systems in addition to the ad hoc
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responses of ordinary users. This study of IS will be shown to coincide with a 
collective IS-ideology that supports and justifies the study of IS.
The "working' of a systems ideology as a cultural phenomenon can be shown with 
reference to Lévi-Strauss. The similarities between an anthropologist’s and an IS- 
person’s task are striking. Levi-Strauss’s approach closely resembles the approach 
that systems analysts take when they go to an organisation that wants parts of its 
business converted into a (computerised) information system. The systems analyst 
has to make an analysis of the ‘symbols’ that are of importance and assemble 
them according to the ‘rituals’ within the company into a meaningful ‘culture’. 
Levi-Strauss’s structuralism was criticised for the danger that his ideology drove 
the construction of a "whole’ which was rather a personal than a true reflection of 
the situation. This means that his ideology translates his experiences of what a 
‘family’, an ‘adult’, an ‘aggression’ is into a prescription for the foreign culture. 
Thus, he would impose his conceptions onto the culture he ‘discovers’. The 
appropriation of meaning and the claim to wholeness of that culture was, thus, a 
mere reflection of his ideology. The criticism in its most extreme form has, 
therefore, called anthropology the ‘continuation of imperialism’.
This imperialism of the analyst is a valid idea for systems analysis in general.
Some examples will show how IS-methods encourage an imposition of ideologies 
onto an organization. The first example is John Camillus’s and Albert Lederer’s 
proposal of a three-dimensional design-support tool. This structure allows the 
system under investigation to be classified along the three dimensions: Transaction 
Processing System (TPS) versus Decision Support System (DSS), Strict versus 
Flexible Policy Stance and Mainframe versus Micros Hardware Configuration 
[Camillus and Lederer, 1985]. These three dimensions are a product of a 
particular and arbitrary analysis of business. The analysis cannot be objective, it 
has to be ideological. What specific influences governed this particular analysis is 
not important, because it is just one out of many such analyses, which come to
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formulate different dimensions. What is important, though, is that the three 
dimensions are supposed to be the result of such a thorough analysis, that they 
cover all there is to ‘corporate strategy and the design of computerised 
information systems’. However, not only does the necessity for such a three- 
dimensional matrix only arise because business has adopted the computer as a 
valid technology within its framework, but also because effective computer-use has 
become such a prominent topic within business. Furthermore, the classification of 
an IS-project along those three dimensions is again a matter of ideology. Whether 
an information system is rather a TPS or a DSS is very much dependent on whose 
perspective is taken. In a participative company, employees will be involved in the 
deliberation, whereas in an autocratic company, the deliberation is a matter for 
top management. Business culture, thus, strongly affects the choices taken in 
systems analysis and design. The systems analyst plays an important role here, by 
selecting a method or advocating a classificatory scheme, by involving a large or a 
small set of people in the analysis and design process, thus allowing for a large or 
a small number of different perspectives, by choosing only sales-representatives or 
only women, etc. He has to make precarious choices when he vests a structure of 
the prospective system with meanings, because these choices can predetermine the 
result of systems analysis and design to a great extent. A prevalent ideology, in the 
sense of Levi-Strauss’s culture, is taken, consciously or rather unconsciously, as an 
unproblematic datum to justify the systems design tool and the delivery of 
meaningful answers. Systems ideologies decide whether computer-use is seen as a 
valid addition to business, they decide whether there are three dimensions or 
seven, they decide how to understand classificatory schemes and how to evaluate 
them. The link between action and knowledge prevents, thus, an objective 
treatment.
Another example is, for instance, the systems analysis and design method of D. 
Jeffrey and M. Lawrence [1984], which is closely allied to DeMarco’s. They choose 
the model of a flowchart and a restricted set of flowchart symbols to represent an
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information system. The systems analyst’s choice to use these symbols introduces 
‘cultural posits’ into the process of systems analysis and design. The ‘ritual’ 
application of this method to any system under investigation creates a culture of 
systems analysis and design. The systems analyst introduces an ‘alien’ syntax into 
an environment. The syntax represents his educational background, his 
assumptions and beliefs, i.e. his ideological superstructure, while the environment 
is the base which this superstructure tries to represent. He projects his systems 
ideology on the system under investigation, just as anthropologists project their 
ideology on the foreign tribe under investigation. And just as the argument waged 
in anthropology as to what extent the anthropologist affects the society he studies, 
this argument should also wage among the IS-professionals.
Systems analysis in general is, thus, susceptible to such criticism, because of the 
crucial role of the systems analyst to draw boundaries where none existed, to 
introduce formal structures where informal structures existed, etc. Why, indeed, do 
flow-charts introduce boundaries? The structuring of a problem is supposed to 
clarify the phenomenon under investigation by reducing complexity. Yet, 
boundaries are very complex. Indeed, the introduction of boundaries adds a whole 
new collection of problems to the phenomenon under investigation. Problems of 
ambiguity, problems of flexibility, problems of change will emerge as a 
consequence of the alien boundaries introduced by the analyst. Complexity is, 
thus, increased as much as it is decreased. The resulting chaos puts heavy 
demands on management, and even the whole organization. IS-methods 
camouflage this disastrous consequence with the euphemism ‘maintenance’. This is 
as much a ritual to convey the impression as if maintenance was under control as 
it is a self-delusion. Spiralling maintenance costs send a clear message: IS-methods 
are not in control! No wonder computerised information systems are loathed as 
much as cherished.
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To discuss such issues only with an eye on which method is better suited to create 
‘good’ information systems, neglects that all methods are culturally or for that 
matter ideologically restricted to confounding complexity within an organization. 
The assembling of computerised information systems becomes a ritual task, and in 
the contest for the best structuring method, the most relevant point, i.e. that they 
are only structuring methods, is lost. The convergence of the IS-community to 
task-orientated issues, makes it unreceptive to consequences that cannot be 
captured within their ideologies. Spiralling maintenance costs are not interpreted 
as a consequence of systems analysis and design, but as a consequence of ‘bad’ 
systems analysis and design. Various points are neglected. Firstly, maintenance 
costs spiral, because the organization has been thrown into turmoil. The simplistic 
snapshot of systems analysis cannot capture the complex nature of organizations, 
and systems design constructs simplistic mechanisms that neither harmonize with 
human behaviour, nor keep pace with organizational change. Secondly, intention 
rules over consequence. ‘Good’ analysis and design is supposed to control 
maintenance; i.e. by being clear about the goals and means, it is expected that one 
can contain negative consequences. Thirdly and lastly, there is an immense 
support for ‘good’ IS-thinking and -practice. If an information system is a success, 
then it was ‘good’ IS-thinking and -practice. If it is a failure, then it was ‘bad’ IS- 
thinking and -practice. This is a perversion of definition. All three points 
demonstrate the effect of a force transcending individual limitations. A collective 
IS-ideology establishes such defences. This collective IS-ideology can be 
interpreted as a cultural phenomenon, which protects the members and rituals of 
the IS-community.
The above affords an assessment of the methods advocated in the field of 
information systems and of their handling as a ‘cultural’ phenomenon. Taking a 
Piagetian view leads to a critique of the very process of IS-thinking and -practice. 
As Piaget claimed that structuring is actually making sense of life, so Levi- 
Strauss’s focus on culture is replaced by a more personal idea of generating
87
Part II 5. Thesis
meaning and knowledge within a culture. A systems analyst might just as well be 
described as making sense of life while going about his task. By doing so, he 
generates his personal knowledge. This ‘genetic epistemology’ of his personal 
knowledge is derived from the way he goes about his job. This activity is part of a 
wider context of his life. Living generates his understanding of the world. The 
genetic epistemology of his personal knowledge of information systems is, hence, 
only a part of his personal understanding of the world. How a systems analyst 
understands an information system would then have to be considered as 
contingent on much more than just the narrow confines of his task such as the 
studied organisation, but also on the self-understanding of the systems analyst, his 
method, his Weltanschauung and quite possibly even the prevalent Zeitgeist. If, in 
Piaget’s sense, living is the making of sense through the way in which one goes 
through life, i.e. structuring, then a professional structurer, as for instance a 
systems analyst, has to question his task as a professionalisation of life. His 
professional structuring is not different from mere living, when living is 
structuring. The ‘genetic epistemology’ of a systems thinker and practitioner 
generates knowledge parallel to the ‘genetic epistemology’ of all people around 
him. Anybody involved in the system under investigation and anybody involved in 
the tasks surrounding its creation generate their knowledge as they live. Any 
attempt, therefore, to stop the structuring process is bound to generate problems 
when faced with a continuing structuring by users. The ‘genetic epistemology’ of 
systems thinkers cannot but use the systems methodology as a tool in the totality 
of his life. Personal creation of artifacts is a consequence, with all the conceivable 
influences on the created information system. Does his structuring, which is meant 
to last through the creation of a system, conflict with the continuous structuring of 
the users and society at large living in the system’s environment? A critique of 
ideology in the sense of Piaget’s ‘genetic epistemology’ will clarify the issue.
For instance, Peter Checkland’s CATWOE analysis states that C, the customers, 
are those "who would be victims/beneficiaries of the purposeful activity" [1990,
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p.87]. How then does a systems analyst classify people in order to find out who are 
and who are not the customers of the system? According to Piaget, any answer 
would have to be considered as temporary, because it would be part of an on­
going genetic epistemology of knowledge. For instance, if it was said that white 
collar workers were the beneficiaries, blue collar workers, for instance, could 
become customers as well, because not mentioning them would soon get them 
upset and, therefore, involved. The systems analyst’s statement would, thus, have 
created a change in the system under investigation, and consequently a different 
understanding by the people involved. Their changed social circumstances lead 
them to form a different understanding according to their ideology. The 
generation of knowledge never stops, as long as people live. If a systems thinker 
decides to stop the process by making, for instance, a CATWOE-statement, he has 
to be aware that this is going to have consequences. A ‘genetic epistemology’ 
cannot be controlled. An attempt to do so by designing a purposeful activity is, 
therefore, always a recourse to the systems analyst’s ideology.
The difference between the individual structuring in a person’s life and the 
general structuring as with the systems paradigm accounts for the difference in 
derivable knowledge. The similarity in the concepts of "organised complexity" 
[v.Bertalanffy, 1971, p.33] and of Piaget’s ‘self-regulated transformations’ is only 
marginal. While both the systems paradigm and Piagetian structuralism say that 
knowledge only comes in wholeness, they differ in that they take different 
perspectives on wholes. Piaget says that what man structures he structures into 
wholes, i.e. there is no partial knowledge, whereas according to the systems 
paradigm wholes are the basis for systemic as opposed to reductionist 
understanding. So while GST is a unifying principle [Ackoff and Emery, 1972, p.3], 
Piaget’s structuralism is an individualistic principle. The property of any unifying 
principle to structure according to one (non-individual) principle makes its 
predominance dependent on the power-base of its ideology. Again, as in the above 
example, the coincidence of a powerful IS-ideology is, therefore, a necessary
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condition. IS-methods can override individual differences, only because a collective 
IS-ideology justifies a unifying principle. Its authority helps to support the general 
approach, but at the same time preserves the IS-community’s relative isolation.
Finally, discussing the study of IS from the point of view of Bloor sheds light on 
the topic from yet another angle and gives additional validity to the possibility of 
the existence of systems ideologies. Bloor’s four categories of causality, 
impartiality, symmetry and reflexivity can be taken to account for the 
circumstances of an IS-person’s realisation of knowledge. The interpretation of 
phenomena is reduced to interpretation of the circumstances of phenomena which 
gives much wider scope for ideological distortions. Using the deliberate aloofness 
of Bloor’s explanatory framework in the study of IS leads to an epistemology of 
‘anything goes’ [Feyerabend, 1975], where base and superstructure can change 
without any teleological direction, and merely the account of the conditions of 
knowledge renders insight into the study of IS as well as into information systems 
themselves. The interpretation of circumstances of phenomena allows for an 
almost cynical expansion of the influences that are to be held accountable for 
knowledge. Knowledge becomes, thus, the result of the unconscious design of a 
person’s ideology.
The increasing elaboration of the study of IS follows this ideological path. Many 
textbooks in the study of IS are now concerned with formulating fundamental 
prerequisites, necessary conditions and/or critical success factors. Information 
systems are taken as a matter of course, with eclectic and arbitrary choices 
determining the set up of discussed circumstances. The focus on information 
systems is fading. Information systems have been absorbed into the consciousness 
to such an extent that they are used unquestioned in most textbooks as if they had 
an objective existence. That they have not is all too often forgotten. The example 
of Camillus and Lederer showed that some scholars even consider there to be a 
dimension to measure information systems. Such a pretentious neglect of the
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controversy that surrounds information systems can only be justified by the 
evolution of a collective IS-ideology.
Thus, information systems lose their importance for discourse which is dominated 
by social circumstances like culture, ‘genetic’ development or scientific ritual. As 
described with reference to Lévi-Strauss, Piaget and Bloor, there are various 
threats to the study of IS. Problems of justification on a cultural, ‘genetic’ and 
scientific basis raise the question about how the systems paradigm can be justified.
The belief in the efficacy of a systems methodology, which is very much based on 
knowledge about organised complexity by means of an understanding of its 
structure of information flows and the influences on this structure, is indicative of 
the sense of security the various systems ideologies render. This secure position of 
professional dominance creates the collective prerequisite for the emergence of a 
collective ideology and vice versa. In the case of the IS-community, the 
unquestioned existence of individual (competing) systems ideologies, such as ‘hard’ 
and ‘soft’ artificial intelligence, entails a collective IS-ideology that protects the 
members of the IS-community and their theory and practice, as well as giving 
them a basis for generating ever more systems ideologies in line with their IS- 
ideology. The above example of a conflict between white and blue collar workers 
might serve to demonstrate this. Their conflict may be transferred into a 
competition of systems design proposals by the different parties. The competition 
of one design against another reinforces the use of systems design, with one side 
advocating, for instance, CATWOE-analysis and the other side adopting JSD. The 
chosen method is, to a large extent, irrelevant to the conflict. While the conflict is 
about white versus blue collar worker interests, it takes systems design as a 
‘vehicle’ for lobbying. The effect is a reinforcement of an IS-thinking and -practice 
which is connected to problem-solving of a distinct IS-epistemology of 
"bubbleware" [Straub and Angell, 1990]. The competition of different systems
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ideologies within the IS-community, thus, establishes a professional environment 
which coincides with an IS-ideology.
In accordance with Comte’s classification of knowledge, the study of IS is solidly 
committed to scientific reasoning by its practitioners. The firm belief that 
knowledge, and especially scientific knowledge, is power, encourages an ever 
increasing effort to come to terms with information systems scientifically. This 
ranges from efforts of a highly theoretical nature to grasp the notion of 
information and system to long-term empirical studies of influences of business 
policy on the formation of IS strategy. Such an accumulation of ‘scientific facts’ 
about information systems is supposed to lead toward a better understanding of 
information systems. It is expected to be taught and propagated amongst students 
and practitioners. Thus, Destutt de Tracy’s vision of a science of ideas is repeated 
on a less grandiose scale with a science of ideas about information systems.
Despite vast amounts of literature on the history and philosophy of science, which 
have led to a reassessment of scientific knowledge in the social sciences, it seems 
as if the study of IS has made only haphazard attempts to consider its scientific 
knowledge as socially influenced and thus ideological. Singular textbooks and 
schools of thought that introduced the study of social influences in information 
systems exist, for instance, in the field of IS-methods and artificial intelligence. 
However, there is no sign yet, that even those schools consider their knowledge as 
ideological. The study of IS is still very much concerned with the quest for the 
‘right’ questions and the ‘right’ answers, just as if knowledge was a ‘neutral 
physical matter’ out there only waiting to be discovered. The study of IS has all 
the hallmarks of a positivistic science where a critical and reflecting position 
toward knowledge within the study of IS is not adopted.
It is indicative that most books on systems analysis do not even bother to address 
the question of knowledge; no epistemological discussion of the subject is carried
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out. A notable exception is Jackson who writes that "in JSD the real world is 
given, a fixed starting point" [Jackson, 1983, p.x]. Apparently, Jackson sympathises 
with Comte’s point of view that facts are the basis of (scientific) knowledge, and 
that, therefore, systems development should deal with the hard facts as they can 
be observed and formulated as systems development input. He continues that "our 
concern in JSD is to ensure that the system correctly reflects the real world as it is" 
[ibid.] (italics added). A consequence of the proposition that facts are ‘given’ by 
the real world is the possibility of ‘correctly’ mapped systems. Systems can be 
correct, because everything can be proven by facts; at least by users who in 
specifying their requirements have "the determining voice" [ibid.]. No mention is 
made of who gives and who receives what, why and how. In fact, any such problem 
"is no part of JSD" [ibid.]. Such practice opens the door for ideological abuse of 
this method.
However, there is a slight deviation from ‘positive science’ in JSD. Since the task 
of systems development, rather than the establishment of ‘positive science’, is the 
aim, the primary commitment to a given real world is somewhat curtailed. 
Although JSD "regards the real world as given, we do not, o f course, exclude the 
possibility that some or all of the real world must be invented or changed" [ibid.] 
(italics added). It is a hint that forces, other than scientific, govern system 
development. The gap between, on the one hand, the commitment to a given 
world, and, on the other hand, the readiness to invent the entire system is the 
space which the IS-ideology fills. Reconciling the former with the latter without 
straining the consciousness of IS-people is what the IS-ideology achieves.
The IS-ideology achieves this by shifting the focus of IS-theory and -practice from 
information systems to tasks surrounding the creation of information systems.
Most IS-methods are predominantly concerned with the functional side of a task. 
Very telling in this respect is the omission in Olle’s list of important questions on 
‘IS methodologies’ of any question whether IS-people know what they are doing
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[Olle et al., 1988a, p.2]. The concentration on the task has proceeded so far, that 
not even in a book on the comparative review of IS methodologies is asked an 
existential question. This, at least, would be the place where the question is asked 
Svhat is an information system’, "what does an analyst do’ and consequently Vhat 
is the role of IS-methods’. Instead, all sorts of questions, internal to the IS- 
ideology, are discussed.
Jackson is a rare exception in explicitly addressing such an issue, and he should be 
appreciated for his explicit mentioning of a crucial point. The task to produce 
systems is such an overriding theme of many books [e.g. Checkland, 1981; 
Rosenhead, 1990], that fundamental questions are not asked. No reflection on the 
task is done. Consequently, a positivistic understanding of information systems is 
prevalent, where even the treatment of information systems as ‘social systems’ 
merely indicates a practice of social systems engineering. This phenomenon of 
avoidance and projection is not restricted to the study of IS. Generally in systems 
analysis of, for instance, the energy sector, the status quo of imperative task 
accomplishment overrides professional reflection: "energy systems analysis, then, is 
simply the quantitative treatment of such problems [of the interaction of energy 
with economic development]" [Meier, 1984, p.2]. Quantitative, fact-based analysis 
is the accepted standard. Systems paradigm protagonists firmly believe in the 
equation of progress in the (scientific) systems approach with progress in systems 
thinking.
CONCLUSION
This chapter has shown how the concept of ideology is relevant for the study of IS. 
On one level, the question of the ‘best’ way of knowledge gathering comes under 
ideological attack; on another level, current scientific activities in the quest for a 
better understanding of information systems as well as in the task of applying IS- 
methods is seriously troubled by ideological implications. The Marxian concept of 
action renders users’ and analysts’ experiences personal, creating the ideologies
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that leads them to see problems in an ideological way. Mannheimian relationalism 
denies the possibility to judge these systems ideologies on an objective scale. Lévi- 
Strauss, Piaget and Bloor give examples how a justification of perspectives could 
be ascribed to culture, ‘genetic epistemology’ or science.
The question of what an information system is, becomes very problematic. Since 
the concept of ideology encompasses the entire reality, whether that is in terms of 
socio-economic conditions, in terms of possible knowledge, in terms of culture, in 
terms of personal ‘genetic epistemology’ or in terms of a scientific programme, 
there is no escape from ideological knowledge. Arguing about information systems 
without ‘really’ knowing what information systems are, is thus, the fate of the study 
of IS. In this scenario, the collective IS-ideology guarantees the homeostasis of the 
IS-community as the individual systems ideologies guarantee the homeostasis of 
the mind in the face of these weird circumstances.
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6. DISCUSSION 
INTRODUCTION
The previous chapter tried to present systems ideologies as a valid possibility, but 
do systems ideologies actually exist? This chapter is intended to discuss that 
question. Examples are used to show how the interpretation of phenomena in IS- 
practice are affected by a perspective which takes systems ideologies into account.
In chapter five, systems ideologies were shown to exhibit the four hallmarks of the 
concept as described in chapter four, using Marx’s and Mannheim’s thought. Levi- 
Strauss’s, Piaget’s and Bloor’s thought was used to show how these systems 
ideologies Svork’ and how a collective IS-ideology justifies the individual systems 
ideologies of IS-thinking and -practice. In this chapter, this reasoning will be 
discussed, and the implication that the introduction of the concept of ideology 
gives alternative explanatory power which points at dangerous developments for 
the study of IS will be shown.
To this end the ‘bug/feature’-example will be introduced to show the working of 
ideological explanations, and to point out the implications this has for the study of 
IS. Then, the evolution of a collective IS-ideology will be demonstrated and its 
consequences discussed.
ARGUMENT
The famous "It’s not a bug, it’s a feature!" is known widely in the IS-community. 
The funny undertone of the statement points out that there is a problem of 
ambiguity here which cannot be resolved easily. The joke also hints that a bug can 
be a feature just as much as a feature can be a bug; it is not just a one-way 
relation. However, the underlying problem is very simple in terms of the concept 
of ideology. Making sense of a computer program leads one person to assume that 
some action of that program is a bug, whereas another insists that this action
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makes sense as a feature. Interpreting this example with the help of the concept of 
ideology suggests that the two people each have a different individual reality in 
which the program’s action has different meanings. Looked at from an outside 
point of view, there is nothing to suggest that the program’s action should favour 
one person’s reality over the other, or one person’s knowledge over the other. 
After some explanation, it might be resolved as a bug or feature and both people 
can incorporate the program’s action in the same way into their reality. They have 
compromised on one way of interpreting reality. Yet, overall it still leaves them 
with two otherwise different realities.
The example of the bug/feature-controversy shows the existence of different 
subjective realities, which differ, for instance, in personal beliefs and/or attitudes 
which are shared by social groups of which the person is a member. The different 
attribution of truth is a consequence of the difference in personal reality; for A it 
is true that it is a bug, for B it is true that it is a feature. Without any mediation 
between A and B, both would go on believing in their truth, and none of them 
would feel the need to challenge this, because their reality is in accordance with 
their knowledge, even though a third party could easily spot the clash. What is 
more, there is no social mechanism that would automatically trigger a mediation. 
Both could go on, A disgruntled and B satisfied. This means that their realities 
become ‘updated’ by their respective experience of the bug/feature. Both go on 
with their initial ‘Weltanschauung’ intact and unchanged. Existing beliefs and 
shared attitudes of their social groups have been reinforced. Another important 
point is that neither A nor B even realise that they are at ease with their ideology 
if they do not explicitly reflect on this experience. And why should they? For them 
everything is in accordance with their ideology.
Without deliberate intervention, their ideologies are reinforced and A and B are 
trapped in their way of thinking. The implication of this example is that if only 
people would talk to one another about the conflict and about why they hold
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different opinions, then ideological clashes may be resolved. The claim of many 
methods [e.g. DeMarco, 1978, pp.6-7] to be basically a communication device to 
bring the parties together and to get the problems out of the way, plays on this 
point, hinting at the problems these methods have in bringing about ‘quality 
systems’. In the light of the following analysis of the study of IS these problems 
are not surprising, and the claim to resolve these problems methodically becomes 
questionable.
On the one hand, according to IS-methods, the quality of information systems 
depends on a proper functional decomposition of the task which they are to 
perform. The cybernetic origins of much of these current IS-methods necessitates 
an apphcation of logical, analytic thinking. This quasi-mathematical treatment of 
systemic structures refers back to philosophical roots in writers as, for instance, 
Poincaré, who defended numerical models. He writes that "it is the intuition of 
pure number, that of pure logical forms, which illuminates and directs those we 
have called analysts" [Poincaré, 1913, p.221], asking from the analysts primarily a 
good command of logic, because "logic, which alone can give certainty, is the 
instrument of demonstration" [ibid., p.219].
On the other hand, systems methods have to deal with the legacy of v.Bertalanffy, 
whose holistic approach to phenomena necessitates a grasping of the whole 
phenomena, as described by Gestalt psychology or Verstehende philosophy. Kohler 
writes about the "properties of organised wholes" [1930, p. 144] that have to be 
grasped because of additional aspects that might appear "mysterious" [ibid.] since 
they are beyond the local limits of the system in focus. Thus, a non-reductionist 
element is introduced which complements the use of reductionist elements in IS- 
methods. Through methodical usage, though, the holistic component of the 
systems approach is instrumentalised and subjected to subjective deliberation, as 
v.Bertalanffy acknowledges when he writes that the wholeness of a system "must 
be intuitively seen and recognised" [1971, p.69]. The difference between the
98
Part II 6. Discussion
mathematical decomposition and the psychological intuition is highlighted by 
Poincare's belief that: "intuition is the instrument of invention'' [1913, p.219]
(italics added). Since the ‘whole’ has to be intuited, the basis for any systems- 
thinking cannot be methodical.
In this conflict of analytic logic with verstehende intuition the systems analyst plays 
a crucial role. Stamper [1973] has recognised the crucial role of the systems 
analyst. He argues that any system has as its ‘root antecedent the analyst’, which is 
IS-jargon for: all entities in a system’s structure derive their ontological 
justification from the discretion of the systems analyst. This radical subjectivism is 
very difficult to translate into practice, because often the analysis is carried out by 
a constantly changing team and because of other limitations. The attempt to build 
a valid systems structure increases the importance of producing an invariant 
structure. In Stamper’s case this is reflected in the use of ‘affordances’ as cultural 
invariants, according to Shaw and Bransford [1977, pp. 59-61]. Thus, the drive for 
deliverables, which can work independently of the systems analyst, counteracts the 
initial insight [Poulymenakou et al., 1990]. The importance given to the role of the 
analyst, in comparison, is diminished, and the root antecedent is reduced to a 
footnote. The quest for usability corrupts philosophical rigour.
Because ‘quality’ is in the eye of the beholder, ‘quality systems’ are a matter of 
negotiation between different perspectives. The feature of IS-methods to support 
the process of negotiation by making structures, components and sometimes 
motives explicit is seen as the communicative element of IS-methods. However, 
this is the ideal case which is hardly implementable in IS-practice, because any 
honest participant is taken in by those who ‘cheat’.
The bug/feature-example shows how the concept of social action can yield an 
explanation of people’s different points of view. Based on their experience, they 
take their subjective reality for objective; they behave ideologically, ‘they know no
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better’. The example shows only one particular instance of disagreement and the 
possibility to reduce it to an ideological phenomenon through recourse to 
individual backgrounds of social action. However, it is an indication that 
differences in general can be explained in an analogous way. A wide range of 
differences in personal experiences which amount to a person’s ideology can be 
revealed. People act on the same base, i.e. the same social and material 
environment, but in an individual way. In so far they are ideological, and just as 
much as they are ideological with respect to bugs and features, they are 
ideological with respect to information systems. The way they Verstehen’ or grasp 
the notion of system is idiosyncratic.
Yet, the example can also be used to show a different aspect of systems ideologies 
to propagate their limited grasp on an ‘objective’ reality, to the exclusion of 
alternative ways of understanding. Taking an outside point of view gives the 
opportunity to negotiate a compromise between A and B. With hindsight the 
arisen conflict could be interpreted as a result of ‘bad design’. Systems methods 
implicitly claim that good designs follow a good analysis, for which some stress 
structural rigour [DeMarco, 1978], others participative methods [Mumford, 1979]. 
The implication is that if a conflict like the above had been taken care of in the 
analysis of the system, the system could have been designed to prevent such 
problems. Valuable and scientifically sound as these measures might be, they do 
not preclude failure. Murphy’s law, that everything which can go wrong, will go 
wrong, is not invalidated, because this law applies to human shortcomings in 
general and, thus, is independent of what action a person is involved in. 
Nevertheless systems methods are used; sometimes even ad absurdum. What starts 
as sensible systems-practice as the application of a systems ideology, transmutes 
into an ideologically rigid application of systems-thinking. The implication that 
there is a correct use of methods and that if the methods are used correctly, good 
systems will be built is indicative of the belief in inherent validity, a claim, which 
is only possible within an ideology. While the concept of ideology suggests that the
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base is a muddle of equally valid perspectives which interact in a complex way, the 
superstructure, that is the current IS-ideology, is beset by the quest for the best 
method under which all problems can be unified.
Superstructure and base are greatly at variance. The superstructure of a collective 
IS-ideology champions the use of IS-methods. The power of the individual systems 
ideologies is derived from the prevalent positivistic attitude toward knowledge of 
this IS-ideology and the imperative use of scientific method in the study of IS. 
Systems methods textbooks give no advice on when to apply these methods, which 
can lead to a system overkill, where systemic thinking transmutes into systematic 
thinking. The consequent over-exposure to systems-thinking and -practice 
conditions the consciousness to ‘think systems’. The consciousness is false in a 
sense that it uses these methods almost with deliberate disregard for the base. 
Thus, the limited grasp of systems ideologies on reality encourages the use of 
systems methods for lack of alternative perspectives. Thus, the propagation of the 
knowledge they conserve, to the exclusion of other approaches, is put into effect.
The example of the bug/feature-controversy shows the explanatory power of the 
concept of ideology. The implication is that points of view can no longer be 
described as straightforwardly right or wrong. Both A as well as B are right in 
their own way. The assumption that either one of them is right, thrusting one 
particular Weltanschauung on others as an ‘objective’ frame of reference, is in 
itself ideological. This change in interpretation of people’s points of view comes 
about by means of the historical orientation of the concept of ideology. Thus, 
beliefs, assumptions and truths but also systems-thinking are put into a perspective 
that makes them appear justified in their environment. Consequently, no right or 
wrong systems analysis, design and management exists, but only ideologically 
justified ones. More importantly, even considering ideologies, or assumptions, 
beliefs, goals, etc. within the study of IS, will lead just as much to ideologically 
distorted IS-thinking and -practice. This means that any approach towards
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information systems can be considered ideological. The suitability of any approach 
rests on the appropriateness of its ideology to the social and material environment 
into which its methods are introduced. However, appropriateness is a matter of 
ideology. The powerful IS-ideology seriously infringes attempts of assessing the 
appropriateness of the study of IS for information systems. Indeed, ‘good’ and ‘bad 
design’ have to be seen as a matter of ideological prescription.
The application of the concept of ideology to the study of IS, thus, leads to the 
notion of systems ideologies within the IS-community. As a consequence of these 
individual systems ideologies the evolution of a collective IS-ideology is a valid 
conclusion. The implication of these two ideological phenomena is that while the 
first implies an open-minded approach toward information systems, the second 
effectively prevents open-mindedness to develop. The stability of the study of IS as 
a professional institution is preserved, but at the cost of the resilience of the study 
of IS to respond to the challenge of information systems. This calamitous 
reasoning is a consequence of the introduction of the concept of ideology. In the 
following paragraphs this reasoning will be discussed further.
The state of the art in the study of IS is only partly advanced beyond a stage 
reached in the early 19th century by the writers discussed in chapter three. 
Consequently, the discussion of an IS-ideology did not arise. Only if the study of 
IS is viewed from the point of view of Marx and the writers discussed in the 
section of ideology does the relevance of the concept of ideology become 
apparent. The introduction of action as the lynch-pin between subject and object 
makes any knowledge dependent on a person’s practice. Thus, the embellishment 
of a positivistic and task-orientated study of IS by some more sociologically 
orientated issues must be seen then as just a substitution of one ideology by 
another. It does not convince that such a replacement should be a general 
improvement of the study of IS. Firstly, sociology is not more virtuous than any 
other science. Sociological practice is, therefore, bound merely to lead to a new
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and different set of working-patterns that replace a technologically driven systems 
approach, but retain the trappings of an isolated IS-ideology. Secondly, the 
assumption of more science, in this case the addition of some sociology to the 
study of IS, equalling better science is very much positivistic. It is most surprising 
to witness how systems failures are followed up by further research into the 
matter, when the break-down occurred despite or possibly even because the 
‘systems approach’ was taken. The conclusion that more scientific research is 
needed, when tasks have gone wrong [Martin, 1978] is only one possibility out of 
many. That the IS-community very often draws that conclusion is a sign of its 
healthy quest for self-preservation. Yet, the effectiveness of the IS-ideology to 
achieve the homeostasis of the study of IS as a scientific enterprise, might obscure 
the meaning of the task.
The introduction of the study of IS has changed the subject matter under 
investigation. It changed ‘the name of the game’. Therefore, it cannot fulfil the 
task to look at knowledge ceteris paribus. However, the systems approach is hailed 
as if it could integrate all other approaches and account for other knowledge 
within its epistemological framework without paying attention to the changes it 
produces. Wilson, for instance, tries to formulate a systems epistemology and 
stipulates that "the type of knowledge needed for praxis or action must be based 
on the total system in which the action is to be executed" [1973, p. 123]. After what 
has been said, the concept of a total system cannot be taken to be an objective 
reality, but must be understood to be a subjective conception. The authority which 
formulates the total system is, therefore, imposing its perspective on the total 
system and consequently that authority is becoming itself an important agent 
within this total system. The propagation of a systems epistemology and with it the 
propagation of systems-thinking and -practice is already transgressing the 
borderline between a genuine methodology and its subjective degeneration. 
Systemic thinking is changed into systematic thinking, when, for the mere 
fulfilment of the method, various influences are grouped together ideologically.
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This eclectic approach is systematized by the systems approach. Yet, the systemic 
imperative, that everything affects everything, is thrown overboard.
Indications of ideological distortions become perceivable when the claim of 
validity of the systems approach is discussed. The possibility of its proclaimed all- 
encompassing validity being limiting is not considered within the IS-community. 
The claim to be a super-science is seen as being typical, yet not as typically 
limiting but rather as typically integrating. An ideological bias toward the positive 
prevents the study of IS to develop into a balanced or even a negative enterprise. 
Implicitly the typical properties of IS-thinking and -practice are seen as a virtue. 
The recognition of the IS-ideology is, thus, a recognition of the self-preserving 
mechanism of the study of IS. The existence of the study of IS coincides 
necessarily with the existence of a collective IS-ideology.
However, the claimed super-applicability of the systems approach leads to the very 
phenomenon of disabling oneself for other ways of looking at things by installing 
an overriding principle. The systems approach is even used to look at the systems 
approach [Mead, 1968]. Thus, only typical knowledge can be realised, but not 
super-knowledge. Quite the contrary, experience of non-systems approaches is 
discouraged and reality is interpreted in special IS-terms.
Interpreting reality in IS-terms allows only for typical knowledge to be realised. 
The implication of the concept of ideology, though, is that IS-people are not 
conscious of their ideology; they have a false consciousness in so far as their 
reality favours some actions over others, some experiences over others. 
Consequently, the preoccupation with optimising systems rather than solving 
particular problems is only ‘super’ in a sense that it does not expect stable 
solutions. Yet, it is not ‘super’ in an epistemological sense. A different technique 
and a different focus of the systems paradigm does not allow people to know 
anything they have not experienced. IS-professionals are limited, just as much as
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‘narrow’ engineers are limited, by what they know. Members of both groups 
depend on their experiences for their knowledge, which is basically a reflection of 
their life. A claim to super-knowledge in a super-discipline could, therefore, only 
be defended on the basis of a ‘super-life’.
The IS-ideology is not bad in itself. Everybody is ideological in so far as the 
relation to the social and material environment determines one’s knowledge. 
Ideologies become problematic, though, when their claim for validity exceeds their 
justification for validity. The growing strains in the realm of information systems 
indicate that the IS-ideology is becoming problematic for the study of IS. The tacit 
assumption that the systems approach is super-applicable does not allow for much 
variety. Yet, if there are multiple ideologies to be found, and a pluralist society 
suggests such a conjecture, as well as Dilthey’s experience of the different 
Weltanschauungen, then the IS-ideology, which attributes meaning to life 
according to a structuring principle of information systems, is singularly ill 
equipped to heed to the implications given above. Regardless what properties the 
underlying reality, that is the base in Marx’s terminology, might have, the realising, 
or structuring in Lévi-Strauss’s and Piaget’s terminology, of it according to the IS- 
ideology corresponds to an imposition of systemic thinking on a possibly non- 
systemic situation that is experienced differently by people with a different 
ideology. Besides, different personal ideologies coincide with a perception of 
different personal realities; a ‘false consciousness’ lets people live in different 
realities, not just different perceptions of reality. Yet, the IS-ideology does not 
permit any reality beyond its own, and thus stifles the study of IS into a systematic 
stability which is inappropriate to its systemic subject matter.
It is questionable to what extent the social world can be seen as being objective. A 
person’s subjective reality, though, necessitates an ideological approach toward his 
environment. In individual instances, compromises will be made and differences 
will be reconciled. For the study of IS as a group-activity, it is difficult to do so
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because collective features dominate over individual experiences. In the 
competition between the study of IS and experience, conflicting experiences are 
denounced as inappropriate or as exceptions. Cause and effect are fabricated in 
accordance with the IS-ideology. The social interaction within the IS-community 
and to its environment as expressed in the IS-ideology is an expression of a means 
for group cohesion. Lévi-Strauss would argue that the members of this particular 
group receive their identity from their ideology. The inherent danger stems from 
the discrepancy between the stance of the IS-ideology and the tolerance of the 
‘objective’ social world. If the study of IS loses the connection with the meaning of 
the tasks, that is if the study of IS is professionalised to such an extent that the 
feed-back of the IS-ideology overrides experience, then there is a real danger of a 
loss of the capability to adapt. The consequence would be that the study of IS 
progressed into extinction. Changing circumstances would deliver a shock to the 
non-adaptive IS-ideology that necessitated a dramatic change of the study of IS.
That many obsolete information systems exist is indicative of the influences of an 
aberrant IS-ideology. As long as society tolerates obsolete information systems and 
the waste of resources in their production then, nothing has to be done. The time 
for change comes when the complexity of the world of information systems 
requires a variety of the study of IS and its members in its responsiveness which 
cannot be delivered within the confines of the IS-ideology. It will be challenged as 
a consequence, and whether the IS-ideology will survive this, nobody can tell. 
Perhaps the IS-ideology will be seen as the Trojan Horse of knowledge in the late 
20th century, where the god-sent power of computerised information systems turns 
out to be the disguised source of terminal destruction.
CONCLUSION
The explanatory power of an ideological appreciation of phenomena goes beyond 
current IS-thinking. It generates a different understanding of human behaviour as 
it has to be taken into account when information systems are understood to be
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social systems. As such, it is an alternative to technological explanations without 
offering a superior but just a different quality of insight. It also draws attention to 
the dangers of IS-thinking and -practice because not only the user behaviour but 
also behaviour of IS-people can be explained. As such it thrusts new insights on 
the IS-community itself that are dangerous to ignore.
Thus, the explanatory power of the concept of ideology for the study of IS is 
twofold. On the one hand, for the analysis, design and management of information 
systems, multiple ideologically justifiable perspectives have to be acknowledged. 
Opinions are appropriate in their own right and, therefore, have to be 
accommodated. On the other hand, for the study of IS the spectre of a collective 
IS-ideology is also a danger to its validity. IS-thinking and -practice is only 
appropriate in its own right. The claim to super-applicability is an inherent 
contradiction to this limitedness. The limits of validity are not clear-cut, but they 
loom as an imminent danger.
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7. ANTITHESIS 
INTRODUCTION
In this part of the dissertation the antithesis will be formulated and discussed. The 
argument of the antithesis conflicts with the argument of the thesis, making a 
different statement about systems ideologies on a shared basis of premises. A 
different interpretation of these premises leads to a view that is opposed to the 
one argued in chapters five and six.
The thesis argued that systems ideologies exist. This proposition is an ontological 
statement about the concept of systems ideologies. The antithesis too argues for a 
proposition which makes an ontological statement about systems ideologies. In this 
research the antithesis is: "‘systems ideologies’ do not exist". In this chapter a 
dichotomy will be introduced that separates scholarship and science from 'Alltag\
It will be argued that the concept of systems ideologies is used within the ‘ivory 
tower’ of scholarship. Its application, though, is not a matter of scholarship, but an 
action firmly based in the Alltag. The relevance of the concept of systems 
ideologies is, therefore, restricted to the scholarly world of contemplation and 
argument. In the Alltag, though, systems ideologies do not exist. In chapter eight 
the antithesis will be discussed, and implications will be derived from this 
discussion.
The pros and cons of the existence of systems ideologies have been discussed in 
chapters five and six. The first stage of the thought experiment has comprised a 
discussion of arguments both in favour and against the assumptions that helped to 
establish the thesis. The antithesis is supported by a different perspective, and the 
discussion of the antithesis is, therefore, not a mere reflection of the discussion of 
the thesis.
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The argument of the antithesis starts from the proposition that scholarly work and 
Alltag are essentially different. This differentiation will lead to a discussion of the 
nature of this difference and of the nature of the circumstances of this difference. 
To this end the notions of scientific discourse and methodology, protocol, context 
and phenomenon, and explanatory structure and knowledge are used. This 
argument will lead to the statement that systems ideologies have a very shaky 
ontological foundation and should, therefore, not be used in order to explain the 
Alltag. They are useful, though, to explain how scholarship works and why 
scholarship is curiously inert with respect to the Alltag. The establishment of the 
argument of the antithesis is followed by three examples from the IS-world that 
clarify the argument.
ARGUMENT
The power of the concept of ideology holds some surprises for everyday thinking. 
In spite of its arguable validity, it becomes quite unsettling for someone who 
considers himself independent-minded to be told that he is acting ideologically. A 
rather devious twist to this is that even if one tries to argue oneself out of such an 
accusation, the logic of the concept of ideology forces one to consider the 
argument which achieved this to be again ideological; except, of course, one does 
not recognise this, which in turn might just be an indication of a ‘successful’ false 
consciousness. This is the essential difference between thesis and antithesis. For 
the thesis everything is a broth of social action that forms ideologies, while for the 
antithesis the concept of ideology is a consequence of scholarship and, therefore, 
not a part of the Alltag. The handiness of the concept of ideology, though, which 
makes it so easy to use it as an attack, makes it difficult to claim here in the 
antithesis that systems ideologies do not exist, because any attempt to question the 
concept could be labelled ideological. From the perspective of the thesis, the 
dichotomy of scholarship and Alltag is seen as ideological and, therefore, a 
consequence of Alltag. Whereas from the perspective of the antithesis, the 
dichotomy might be ideological, but it nevertheless points out the limitations of
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relevance for this scholarly concept, thus, supporting the validity of the dichotomy. 
It is, therefore, opportune to attempt a critique of the concept of systems 
ideologies by criticising the process of conceptualisation which led to the 
formulation of this concept. This amounts to a critique of scholarly work.
Many authors have written about the essential difference between scholarly work 
and the life to which it is relevant: Georg F.W. Hegel differentiated between 
philosophy and life. Max Weber stipulated that scholarly work was necessarily 
value-free in contrast to its subject matter, Karl Popper "formulated and solved 
the problem of demarcation between science and non-science" [1972, p.l] and 
Alfred Schütz analyzed the different worlds of 'Wissenschaff and 'Alltag\ He 
makes the point that Alltag and scholarly work are two different worlds. Popper, 
indeed, formulated a theory of three different worlds which he labelled: World I,
II and III. World I refers to the physical world. World II refers to experience and 
thought in the subjective sense. Finally, world III refers to objective thought, like 
products of the human mind. All these writers claim to see an essential difference 
between scholarly work and the Alltag. This critique of scholarly work has a 
tradition, which has touched, among other things, the connection and relevance of 
scholarly work and its results to the Alltag. In a discussion of the relevance of the 
concept of ideology for the study of IS, such a tradition of thought has important 
implications. If there is an essential difference between the study of IS and 
information systems, then the relevance of the concept of ideology is seriously 
curtailed.
In order to pursue this argument Hans-Georg Soeffner’s contribution will be taken 
as a reference point. Soeffner, a sociologist who writes, among other things, about 
the problems of methodology in the social sciences and about sociological 
hermeneutics, claims, that the belief that scholarly work should be of help for 
v4//rogy-problems, corresponds to a myth of the power of scholarship to be 
somehow superior to everyday actions. He criticises this myth because it disregards
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the essentially different environment of scholarship versus Alltag. Soeffner points 
out that Alltags-diCXiom happen in context, where the actor is at the same time the 
"author" [1989, p.40] of the action. Whereas in all scholarly work the context is 
removed and the actor is not at the same time the ‘author’ of the action but its 
‘interpreter’ via ‘protocols’ and ‘texts’. The scholar is not there, he is not the actor 
in the situation. Any attempt, therefore, to try to bring the two together leads to 
an "Ideologisierung" [ibid., p.38], where the validity of a particular perspective, that 
is a scholarly one, is extended to a general environment, that is the Alltag. The 
point Soeffner tries to make with his argument is that any application of the 
results of scholarly work to the Alltag is an Ideologisierung, which stems from the 
difference between scholarly work and the Alltag.
This means that when scholarly enterprises like the systems paradigm are applied 
to the Alltag this amounts to an Ideologisierung. They are a product of scholarship. 
Many hours of abstraction and conceptualisation have gone into them. Likewise, 
the announcement of the sixth generation computer systems can be interpreted as 
a result of an Ideologisierung. Fifth generation computer systems are still in a stage 
of experimentation and concern [Angelides and Sabanegh, 1990]. Conceiving the 
sixth generation is so far removed from the Alltag, that it is apparent that 
governments who are willing to jump on the bandwagon of this development are 
following an ideology. It is surprising that, in spite of the troubles the fifth 
generation computer systems project ran into, there seems to be a convincing 
argument why sixth generation computer systems should be used. The frenzy of 
high technology, the momentum of scientific research and the threat of economic 
competition add up to a general conviction that it is advisable to give the go- 
ahead for this new project. That this conviction is not based on ‘hard evidence’, 
but, on the contrary, thrives on the shambles of previous efforts, shows the power 
of an ideology to attribute meaning to actions that are otherwise without meaning. 
In both examples the link between claim and reality is provided by a particular 
ideology that supports the use of the systems paradigm or of the sixth generation
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computer systems on grounds of the claim. The fact that such ideologies are 
driving action, makes an impact on the Alltag. This impact is an Ideologisierung, 
because claims and a considerable amount of wishful thinking are shaping the 
Alltag.
Since Soeffner’s argument is a scientific protocol it can be subjected to scientific 
interpretation. If, for instance, the concepts of the writers discussed in chapter 
three are used, then an ideological case could be constructed for Soeffner’s 
argument. The following are some examples of how such an interpretation might 
start: The distinction of various tiers of knowledge and the establishment of 
scientific knowledge as a special tier within this framework is a thought in the 
tradition of Bacon, Destutt de Tracy and Comte. The tradition of Marx, Dilthey 
and Mannheim affords Soeffner’s argument to be described as a product of his 
circumstances with a validity that rests on his relations with his environment. The 
interpretation of the use of results of scholarly work in the Alltag as an 
Ideologisierung is almost an exact repetition of Levi-Strauss’s interpretation of 
myths. They both serve as purposeful explanatory frameworks. Yet, the structures 
which Soeffner interprets are results of scholars, while Lévi-Strauss concentrates 
on the interpretation of tribal myths. The idea of an ambiguous orientation of 
structure, whether scholarly result or myth, on the one hand, to explain reality to a 
group of people and, on the other hand, to knit the group together by means of 
this shared explanatory framework has distinct anthropological qualities. These 
few examples show how easily a scholarly discussion could evolve to absorb 
Soeffner’s work and come to stigmatise it as ideological. This susceptibility to 
‘ideological attack’ was described earlier as the consequence of the difference to 
the thesis. Yet, Soeffner’s argument is poised to cut through such a discussion. It 
makes an onset where scholarly explanation is trying to assume authority of the 
Alltag.
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The proposition that everything is ideological does not satisfy the critical mind; 
especially when the analysis of ideologies is itself ideological. The notion becomes 
empty and, therefore, a tool of questionable relevance. A critical person starts to 
wonder whether the concept of ideology is not after all just a scholarly 
contrivance. It might be just another one of those clever ideas that sound great 
but do not work. The caveat of this line of argument is that questioning the 
concept of ideology means as a consequence questioning scholarship altogether.
Soeffner’s rather commonsensical premise led him to investigate the relationship 
between scholarship and Alltag closer. His understanding of the matter is 
perceptive and it is relevant for the study of IS. It goes as follows. A scholar works 
on a situation interpreting recorded actions and contrasts them with scenarios of 
possible actions, which leads him to deduce statements. The man on the street, on 
the other hand, does not create a "Versprachlichung" [Soeffner, 1989, p.29] of his 
reality in order to act. As much as scholarly work might have contributed to his 
interpretation of the world, it is nevertheless impossible for him to use protocols 
directly; the gap between a Versprachlichung of actions and action itself cannot be 
bridged by a protocol. The man in the street is in a unique situation by ‘being 
there’, and it is up to him to act (appropriately). The gap to be bridged is, hence, 
more than a mere result of the nominal separation of action and protocols about 
actions; actions and their textual representation are basically different. Of coiu*se, 
an individual might ponder before he acts, and various scholarly ideas might come 
to his mind, but it still leaves him puzzled when concerned about his actions, 
because he cannot simultaneously conceptualise his actions. The scholar, on the 
one hand, can go on treating his protocols to all sorts of coding, ranging from 
word-analysis to three-times differentiable matrices that he derived from the 
protocol. The man on the street, on the other hand, cannot do the same in his 
Alltag with the situation he is in. His actions are not conceptually expandable, they 
are, so to speak, a priori to him. A direct link between action and protocol can 
only be imposed by fiat. A discussion of a scholar’s work as ideological in the
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sense as attempted in the first part of the thought experiment would thus remain 
scientific, leading to all sorts of scholarly results. The Alltag, though, would remain 
separate.
In the context of information systems this means that even though a programmer, 
for instance, can read a protocol which stipulates that an appropriate mix between 
quahty and cost has to be achieved, he is still left without a means to assess 
appropriateness, except for his personal conscience. Similarly, when a textbook 
points out the importance of top management support for an IS-project, it is still 
unclear how this applies in the ‘here and now’ of a situation a project leader is 
faced with. In any situation in the Alltag, it is a matter of doing the right thing, 
whether that is the mix between quality and cost or the support of top 
management. But doing the right thing is not a matter of prescription, it is a 
matter of interpretation. In the Alltag this comes after the action, whereas 
ideologies try to make us believe that it could be done beforehand.
Based on Soeffner’s argument, this leads one to question the applicability of 
scholarly work for the Alltag. This question can be clarified if, for instance, 
assumptions that go into scholarly work are considered. Most assumptions are not 
made explicit; many of them are unconscious. They remain opaque, because they 
are part of a scholar’s Alltag, where he "thinks with his beliefs, but not about 
them" [Barnes, 1974, p.l]. The socio-historical a priori of ihQ Alltag, thus, 
penetrates the detached world of scholarly work.
Anybody who has tried to apply a protocol to a situation he is faced with, will 
have experienced the disillusion when suddenly the terms of the protocol did not 
fit the task. This discovery is not just limited to software handbooks, where it is 
positively annoying, when two terms are used apparently interchangeably, but do 
not have the same meaning, as in the case of different key-boards or different 
computer-terminals. It applies also to more important issues, as for instance, when
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a problem has to be assessed along a dimension of ‘programmability’. If a problem 
is programmable it can be put on the computer, if not, it cannot. But how is one 
supposed to assess, when the reasoning could be just as well reverse; i.e. if a 
problem can be run on a computer, then it is ‘programmable’, if not, it is not. A 
circular reasoning is, thus, easily discovered, just as in chapter four. And again, it 
is a truly ideological phenomenon.
Another example that shows the gravity of the problem are data-bases. If, for 
instance, the structure of a data-base requires an item to have a reference 
number, but the item has none, then some numerical mechanism has to be 
conceived. Usually one is found, but the result is an Ideologisierung of the 
application. The application which worked without a reference number for years 
has suddenly to incorporate some awkward arithmetic, because the data-base 
requires it. The ideology which supports the use of data-bases sees the world in 
terms of numbers and their relation to each other. Consequently, an application 
has to comply, if it is to be computerised. Yet, human nature is not ‘ideal’, and 
compliance is not one of its straight forward traits. More likely than not, the work­
around will be corrupted by laziness, ignorance, resistance to change, etc. As a 
result ideal and reality drift even further apart.
Another example is the use of the term ‘system’. The very assumption that there 
are systems is a consequence of reflection. System serves the purpose of scholarly 
discourse to denote a complex phenomenon of some order. However, in many 
cases the identified system is a matter of vested interest. Either a phenomenon is 
called a system in order to preserve or to change it. Identifying a ‘system’ is, thus, 
a consequence of a particular ideology, rather than of ‘objective’ observation. It is 
subject to the agent’s complex predicament within the Alltag.
Scholarly work is just as much pervaded by such a priori actions as is the Alltag of 
the scholar. In the Alltag, on the one hand, implicit assumptions are not a
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problem, i.e. they are not made problematic in a scholarly sense. In scholarly 
work, on the other hand, assumptions lead to discussions about validity and 
justifiability with respect to reference points such as protocols, experiences, other 
‘implicit’ assumptions or prevalent scientific attitudes. Scholarly discussions are, 
therefore, disconnected from action and linger on about problems which stem 
from the nature of the scholarly work rather than from the situation which gave 
rise to the discussion. Taking the Alltag as reference point rather than scholarly 
work, it is even questionable whether it is appropriate to talk of assumptions, 
because it is only possible to talk of assumptions if they are made explicit through 
language. Thus, scholarly work does not just disconnect its practice from the actual 
situation through Versprachlichung of the Alltag, but creates, as a consequence of 
its methodology, an artificial environment in order to carry out its discourse.
Scholarly work is, therefore, not only at variance with Alltags-diCiiom because of its 
different level of discourse, i.e. context-removed protocols versus action in context, 
but also because of the very discourse itself. In X\\q Alltag, any consequences 
arising from actions are necessarily actions again, whereas discussions in the 
scholarly realm are ever more and more theoretical, they lose more and more the 
connection to the context in ever decreasing circles. Thus, a world of scholarship is 
created, that takes on a life of its own. Popper called this the World III of 
knowledge without a knower [1972, pp. 106-152]. This knowledge feeds back into 
the Alltag, but not via direct application of protocols to actions but via a process 
of socialisation. Whatever socialisation might be, it is a phenomenon of the Alltag 
and not of scholarly work. The problem of connecting the two worlds will remain 
an inexplicable y4//^flg5-phenomenon, ‘explained’ by another concept of scholarly 
work, adding yet another ghost to the World III.
The concept of ideology is just such a ghost of the World III. It is not just that one 
cannot observe an ideology, as an empirical positivist might argue, but that the 
concept of ideology is a scientific concept, and, thus, a result of conception.
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Despite the use of the term ideology in the Alltag, the discussion of symbol 
structures, social systems, action-generated knowledge, etc. is a matter of scholarly 
discussion. The socialisation of such terms is just an indication of the social link 
between scholarly work and Alltag; i.e. scholars are people like you and me, and 
people like you and me get to know some works of scholars. The fabric of society 
and its culture take care of this.
Consequently, there have been attempts [e.g. Cassierer, 1950; Piaget, 1971;
Barnes, 1974] to limit the approach of ‘total relativism’ of the thesis by a hint at 
culture as an objective basis that gives viability to at least some assumptions. Yet, 
these attempts rest in a similarly ill understood concept, i.e. culture. There is no 
essential difference in protocols about culture and protocols about any other 
phenomenon. Protocols are protocols, and their abihty to capture reality is limited. 
To illustrate this point, just take Bloor’s strong programme as an example of the 
scientific culture producing a framework of principles. It falls short of questioning 
the hermetically sealed character of its approach, i.e. the sociology of knowledge. 
The stability of the framework compromises the epistemological validity. A case in 
point is the assumption that four principles can be used to account for knowledge. 
Why four, why not three or five or thirty-seven? Furthermore, by complying to 
rules like consistency and integrity it aspires to a universal validity, which falls 
short of the complexity of the Alltag. The question of epistemology ‘what can we 
know’ is discarded in favour of the question ‘what can we explain’.
Again the idiosyncratic treatment of assumptions is a telling example of this. The 
realisation that assumptions can change, points as much to the possibility that they 
are changing over time, as it points to the possibility that verbalising a 
phenomenon into an assumption was the wrong thing to do in the first place. 
Either the assumption is objective, but was not covered by its textual 
representation, or it is objective, but cannot be covered by a protocol, or it is not 
objective and the author has projected his own ideology into the protocol.
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However, in spite of the impossibility of finding a rational solution to this 
problem, a discussion which verbalises all the points in order to satisfy the 
scientific imperative is the only alternative open to scholars. The consequence is 
the production of ever more and more protocols. Similarly, the habit of discussing 
an ideology in the hermetically sealed world of scholarship, therefore, only leads 
to further discussion rather than (appropriate) action. The scientific reduction of 
problems of the concept of ideology to ever more ‘basic’ concepts like ‘man’ or 
‘action’ or ‘culture’ or ‘system’ can only serve the purpose of scholarship to have 
ever more scenarios at hand for ex post explanation. But these explanations serve 
only the realm of scholarship.
If the question of the ontology of ideology was left to scholars, it would necessarily 
lead to an expansion of the concept of ideology and a profusion of protocols about 
the subject. Not only would the issue be absorbed into a swamp of scientific 
discourse, but also the inability of the scientific community to muster the authority 
for a decision would hardly become apparent. In comparison, from the v4//rag’s 
point of view, does it convince that knowledge is determined by action? Isn’t this 
just academic mumbo-jumbo to talk of action and knowledge, when scholarly 
investigations are only able to make valid statements about phenomena that are 
verbalised and stripped of all life? Barnes writes, for instance, that it is impossible 
to conceptualise science [1974, pp.45-46]. All the reasons he gives for the 
impossibility to characterise a particular social phenomenon like science could also 
be used to argue that a particular social phenomenon like an individual’s life 
cannot be characterised. But how then can one argue that one’s life will determine 
one’s knowledge of reality, that is one’s ideology? If there is no way to 
characterise one’s life, then this supports the claim that knowledge might come to 
a person by inexplicable ways at least as much as by action.
This leads to the conclusion that, like Soeffner argued, all results of scholarly work 
are ideological. In addition, the Alltag does permit all actions and consequently
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allows for the use of scholarly results, including the concept of ideology, in a way 
that is beyond scholarly explanation. Despite the power of scholarship to explain 
protocols, the Alltag retains its secrets. The thesis fell short of recognising this, by 
treating the representation of the Alltag in protocols as all there is to Alltag. 
Therefore, it argued that systems ideologies exist, as they were apparent from the 
protocols, despite the disputed validity of the concept of ideology. The argument 
of the antithesis challenges the thesis, by stating that the argument of the thesis is 
a valid scientific statement within the realm of scholarship. Yet, since the thesis 
did not recognise the essential difference between scholarship and Alltag, it fell 
short of recognising its own scientific limitations.
The study of IS is a form of scholarship and, hence, the argument of the antithesis 
applies to it. Before discussing the antithesis in chapter eight, some examples will 
show as to how the antithesis applies to the study of IS.
One common example in the study of IS is the ‘systems life cycle'. This term is a 
creation of the systems paradigm, which characterises the system as a project 
within time. "In information systems, indeed for all systems, the basic period for 
temporal analysis is the systems life cycle" [Ein-Dor and Jones, 1985, p.37]. The 
first step of scholarly work is done. The Versprachlichung of a complex 
phenomenon, in this case the on-going evolution of a system over time, into a 
concept with a label allows the systems life cycle to become a matter of scholarly 
work. However, since there is ambiguity to the Alltag of systems the scholars 
always return to actual systems to investigate and check. As a consequence of the 
scholars’ different perspectives, the systems life cycle is divided in different phases 
which vary in number as well as content and emphasis. Candidates for such phases 
are: project initiation, user request, inception, definition, specification, design, 
coding, production, testing, verifying, certification, acceptance, implementation, 
release, operation, maintenance, extension, evolution, obsolescence and phaseout 
(all terms are compiled from [Sommerville, 1982; Lewis, 1982; Birrell and Ould,
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1985; Simons, 1987]). Many of the protocols which are concerned with information 
systems are written by people who have actually built information systems. In 
those instances the Alltag of the evolution of an information system over time was 
experienced first hand by those authors. Their involvement with a particular 
information system was one of immediate interaction to the socio-historical a 
priori of their task. In those cases they experienced their ‘authorship’ of their 
actions. Yet, when writing about the respective information systems they interpret 
their authorship as well as the actions of the others involved. As a consequence a 
protocol is created that is taken to represent the actual actions in context.
The second step is the direct consequence of this Versprachlichung. Consequences 
and implications are derived from these protocols. Yet, the derived implications 
are a game with words. The Versprachlichung of the Alltag introduces a meaning 
that pertains to the terminology and its set-up much more than it relates to the 
Alltag. For instance, if requirement specification is included in a systems life cycle 
then, "there is no point in setting about a complex procedure of software 
development unless a clear need has been identified" [Simons, 1987, p.57]. Of 
course not! But one might say analogously that there is no point in setting about a 
complex procedure of software development unless any pretence about ‘clear 
needs’ has been routed. The neatness of ‘clear needs’ is a very powerful ideology 
but a very weak observation, because it is a hostage to fortune and abuse. The 
deduction of implications is, thus, based on a logic that exploits the 
Versprachlichung, rather than serves the Alltag.
The Alltag of a ‘complex procedure of software development’ is truly complex. The 
poverty of a ‘linear’ systems life cycle was, therefore, exchanged for the poverty of 
a reiterating systems life cycle. But is not this change an amendment to an 
inadequate concept? If feed-back between phases is allowed and even encouraged, 
"there is, of course, a danger here, namely that of iterating so much between 
phases that the boundaries between them become blurred and indistinguishable"
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[Birrell and Ould, 1985, p.5]. This means that the force of the Alltag is about to 
assert itself over an inadequate Versprachlichung. The phases were ill-conceived, 
and the Alltag of software development, with all its inconsistencies and hiccoughs, 
upset the protocol so much that it is in danger of becoming meaningless. But, "the 
solution to this is simple. Each phase ... must have a clear start and a clear end" 
[ibid.]. Now this is a fine prescription. After the failure of the clear 
Versprachlichung to capture the messy Alltag, all that has to be done is to insist on 
clarity. The concept of the systems life cycle is preserved while the conflicting 
complexity of the AUtag is ignored. The aim to control software development has 
subsided to control of the control of the control mechanism. An unnecessary focus 
on control is the consequence of the failure to accept profound complexity.
It becomes apparent that the Versprachlichung of the perception of different 
phases in the evolution of an information system has made it necessary to make 
the Alltag comply to scholarship. All sorts of checks and balances have to be 
introduced in order to allow the systems life cycle to survive as a concept in the 
face of counter-evidence from the Alltag. This is what Soeffner meant when he 
talked of Ideologisierung. The systems life cycle becomes a totem which is afflicted 
onto ‘indeed all systems’. The fact that there are numerous different 
representations of the systems life cycle, does not constitute a convincing argument 
that anything like it exists in the Alltag. When the software development turns bad 
the failure is blamed either on the lack of clarity in the set-up of on the 
inappropriate use of the systems life cycle. How much evidence does it need to 
show that the systems life cycle is an afterthought? It is a conception to cope with 
the messy Alltag. The hope that the Alltag will comply with the systems life cycle 
is, therefore, naive. The systems life cycle is a part of Popper’s World III. As such, 
it has even become itself a victim of computerisation in the form of computer 
aided software engineering. Even software factories are built around the systems 
life cycle [Matsumoto et al., 1981, p.310]. Yet, this attention the systems life cycle 
gets, does not make it any more than a scholarly ideology imposed on the Alltag.
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As a second example the debate about management information systems (MIS) 
shows how the process of Versprachlichung, as described in the first example, leads 
to a controversy. Of special interest are the article of Russell Ackoff "Management 
Misinformation Systems" and John Dearden’s article "MIS is a Mirage", and the 
responses these articles provoked. A good summary of these debates is printed in 
[Davis and Everest, 1976, pp. 17-21, 109-126]. Without reiterating the points of 
disagreement and controversy, it is nevertheless possible to use these examples as 
an explanation of the argument of the antithesis. The consequence of 
Versprachlichung and the implications derived from such a Versprachlichung is a 
lively exchange of protocols about MIS. Even a secondary body of literature 
emerges which uses these debates to argue for or against something, like Davis’ 
and Everest’s book or this dissertation. None of these protocols is sufficient to 
close the matter as settled. Everybody is only trying to sell his point of view, or his 
ideology. Only the Alltag can decide with respect to each situation how the issue is 
tackled at that point. In contrast, a general discussion about some conception 
about MIS will only lead to more protocols. There are certainly people who are 
genuinely interested in an ‘objective’ answer to the question of MIS. However, 
there are just as many people interested in MIS because they can make money 
with them, or get promoted, or get a publication (or even a Ph.D.!).
A third and last example for the argument of the antithesis is this dissertation.
The notion of systems ideologies is part of Popper’s World III. The dissertation 
itself is a protocol which is based on a Versprachlichung of Alltag. The analysis of 
activities within the study of IS and its subject matter in order to highlight its 
ideological properties and, therefore, to explain them with the help of the concept 
of ideology is an Ideologisierung in the spirit of the thesis. Whereas the assumption 
that the Alltag is a separate world from that of scholarship, and that, therefore, 
scholarly statements about the Alltag are an Ideologisierung, is an Ideologisierung in 
the spirit of the antithesis. After all the effort which has gone into the 
establishment of the notion of systems ideologies and their pros and cons, what do
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we know about the Alltag that we did not know before? Nothing! The entire 
discussion of this dissertation remains curiously inert with respect to the Alltag, 
because of its scholarly nature.
Coming back to the first chapter of this dissertation, the question of what an 
information system is, has to remain obscure. An information system, for whatever 
it is, is a phenomenon of the Alltag. Concepts and notions that try to capture what 
an information system is, are an imposition on the Alltag. The ideologies that 
reverberate through scholarship made up of assumptions, beliefs, aspirations, etc. 
are ‘human, all too human’. The Ideologisierung of the Alltag seems an inevitable 
consequence of scholarship. However, ultimately the Alltag rules scholarship and 
not vice versa.
CONCLUSION
Together with IS-methods the spectre of systems ideologies has to be banned into 
Popper’s world III. They exist in protocols which make statements about people’s 
reality. Interpretations of these protocols may feed into the Alltag through 
socialisation. However, socialisation is a process beyond scholarly prescription.
The Alltag of information systems is profoundly complex, and will, therefore, defy 
enthusiasm and authority. Passwords that are scribbled on the side of the terminal 
and users who type ‘RETURN’ instead of hitting the return key are phenomena 
that have a tendency to elude protocols. Hackers are successful, because they are 
‘street-wise’. They can double-think the mind set of others, and are, thus, able to 
cheat. The AUtag rules over scholarship exactly because scholarship creates a gap 
in order to preserve its activity in the ivory tower. It has to be acknowledged that 
attempts to overcome the gap between scholarship and the Alltag are futile. 
Systems ideologies do not exist in the Alltag, and their use will not advance the 
study of IS toward an understanding of information systems.
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8. DISCUSSION 
INTRODUCTION
The argument of the antithesis is a response to the trouble of the ideological 
reflexivity of the thesis. Defending oneself against being called ideological, 
because of the negative connotation that goes with it, can again be called 
ideological. The implication is that the knowledge which governed such a defence 
is not original in a Mannheimian sense, but conditioned by the complex 
involvement of a person in his social and material environment. There is no 
escape from this argument since every person can be portrayed as being involved 
with his environment and, therefore, had to be ideological in whatever argument 
he pursued. Yet, as argued in the antithesis, this whole argument is based on a 
scholarly interpretation of the Alltag. Only after the Versprachlichung of the Alltag 
into discrete and concrete concepts can the above argument be applied. The task 
of this chapter is to show the consequences and implications of this 
Versprachlichung and to demonstrate that on the basis of the Versprachlichung a 
typical activity evolves which, for this very reason, cannot transcend its 
epistemological base.
To this end, two strands of analysis of Versprachlichung will be pursued. Firstly, 
the representation of the Alltag in the form of phenomenon, protocol and context 
will be shown to have implications on the efficacy of this explanatory ‘landscape’. 
Secondly, the method which is afforded by such a landscape will be described as 
implicating a detached and self-perpetuating activity whose basis is an 
interpretation of a representation of the Alltag. It will be demonstrated that the 
systems paradigm is a vehicle of such interpretation. Hence, the danger of its 
irrelevance will be discussed. Finally, a short critical appraisal of the antithesis will 
conclude this chapter.
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ARGUMENT
The argument of chapters five and six did not state that the concept of ideology is 
invalid. It was not argued that systems ideologies do not exist. The validity of the 
concept of ideology, though, was said to be restricted to a discourse which takes 
for granted the authenticity of scholarly work with the Alltag. In those chapters, 
the essential difference between actions and ‘protocols’ about actions was not 
treated as important. Rather everything was subsumed to an overall assessment of 
activity as social action, and, therefore, as a basis for ideology. The argument of 
the antithesis interprets the differences in activity as important. Thus, actions and 
the treatment of protocols about actions are interpreted as being different in that 
the former is Alltag whereas the latter is scholarly work, which is in itself a 
particular form of Alltag. Does this suffice then as an argument that systems 
ideologies do not exist? The investigation of the Versprachlichung of the Alltag will 
give an answer to this question.
In an attempt to capture the complexity of the Alltag a protocol can only represent 
a phenomenon or several phenomena and their context. Each phenomenon can be 
described as embedded in a variety of circumstantial phenomena. The selection of 
those phenomena is not determined by necessity. Yet, scholars discuss a protocol 
as if phenomena and context were all there is to a situation. They impose a 
perceived, and, therefore, artificial, order on the situation where phenomena of 
the same kind are juxtaposed to different circumstances. For instance, companies 
are evaluated to follow different IS-strategies in different markets. The 
representation of ‘company’, ‘IS-strategy’ and ‘market’ is highly abstract. 
Nevertheless, phenomena and context are discussed as if such a representation 
was relevant. The genuine situation on which conceptions of phenomena and 
context are imposed is not represented in the protocol. Thus, ‘system’, ‘data’, 
‘objectives’ or ‘strategies’ are dealt with as if these phenomena were actually 
existent.
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The establishment of this explanatory landscape highlights the conceptualised 
phenomenon and its context, yet neglects the uniqueness of any situation it aspires 
to represent. But exactly because such a landscape is established, a discussion can 
take place where a phenomenon becomes a ‘matter of interest’ with the discussion 
itself being the manifest event for its members. The preparation of the situation 
has given rise to a scholarly discussion which argues about the representation, but 
not about the situation the representation tries to represent. Thus, the paradox 
emerges where an increase in the potential to explain concepts reduces the 
opportunity to use this potential for lack of relevance.
In the case of the bug/feature-controversy, A and B are represented as persons ‘of 
the same kind’ in circumstances ‘of the same kind’. Their different relation to 
these circumstances is said to estabhsh their different realities. The ‘authorship’ of 
A and B in the Alltag is entirely neglected in favour of a perceived responsiveness 
of two ‘persons’ A and B to circumstantial phenomena. The attempted 
representation of the bug/feature-controversy in a protocol necessitates such a 
treatment because human behaviour cannot be captured accurately in a 
representation. A protocol necessarily leaves out many aspects. Treating A and B 
as persons presupposes a conception of ‘person’ that satisfies the conditions of the 
discussion as well as represents A and B (and any other person involved) 
adequately. An equation is struck between A and B and a protocol which is 
supposed to represent them.
Moreover, for the representation of person A and B in the protocol, the reality of 
the controversy does not exist beyond the description of the situation. The actions 
of A and B respectively, as recorded in the behavioral evidence of their different 
attribution of truth, places them in a position relative to the circumstances and 
relative to each other. This relative relationship of one person to another is only 
possible on the above assumptions that there is a landscape of context and 
phenomenon. Taking away only one of these ‘absolute’ conceptions makes arguing
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for relative positions of persons (and other phenomena) to the context impossible. 
The explanatory power of the concept of ideology is, therefore, restricted to 
protocols. This implies that the validity and relevance of the protocol decides 
about the validity and relevance of its explanations.
This implication is responsible for the scholarly discussion which emerges when 
different protocols, with different perspectives, are introduced as being valid. In 
the case of the bug/feature-controversy, validity can be claimed for many 
perspectives, because none of the protocols can capture reality. Every protocol will 
draw attention to different aspects of the controversy, always failing to present an 
exhaustive picture. One protocol might stress the difference of expertise between 
A and B, another might point to the organizational relevance of A's and B’s 
opinion and yet another might highlight the authority which A and B have 
respectively. All protocols are valid in their own right, all contribute to the 
discourse, but none resolves the issue.
The Versprachlichung of the Alltag, though, spurns also other curious consequences 
of their combination. Various restrictions have to be taken on board when a 
textual representation of the Alltag is discussed and if the results of such a 
discussion shall be used. As soon as it is written, a representation becomes a 
matter of a possible scholarly discussion. Such a discussion, as a part of a scholar’s 
Alltag, is a merger of protocol and action, conveying a strong impression to its 
participants that comprehension comes through explanation of the textual 
recreation of reality, or as Pankow put it: "not only is language a conscious re­
creation of our world of experience; the world of experience is also a concrete 
representation of language" [1976, p.27]. A bias toward protocols, which stems 
from the reduction of Alltag into a ‘matter of interest’ and the contrasting manifest 
reality of the discussion, limits understanding to the understanding of protocols 
and in a bold statement makes reality the ‘concrete representation of language’, 
thus trying to vindicate discussions of protocols as relevant for the Alltag. By
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discussing protocols, the ‘real situation’ loses its flair of Alltag and becomes a trite 
textual representation. The discussion itself, however, is ‘real’ for its participants.
It is their Alltag, even though it is only of limited relevance to the matter of 
interest. The Versprachlichung of the Alltag has, thus, established the claim of 
leadership for those who study its representation over those who are involved in it.
In addition, a discussion gives the opportunity to choose circumstantial parameters 
and to measure both their importance for, and their impact on, the phenomenon 
under investigation. Both are helped by the establishment of the conceptual 
separation between phenomenon and context. The ensuing profusion of 
parameters is not only a consequence of such a Versprachlichung, but it also 
becomes a requirement for the participation in a scholarly discourse. A simple 
statement which is not supported by a, possibly elaborate, structure of arguments, 
based on contextual parameters, and references to previous protocols is not 
considered to be proper. Even if such a statement would constitute the foundation 
of a new ‘paradigm’, it would not be accepted immediately by the community. The 
choice of parameters might be ’at free will’, or it might be limited by social norms 
and conventions. The chosen parameters and their choice have to be justified to 
satisfy the scientific community. Hints at how such limiting conventions may 
operate in the scientific community are given by various authors. Amongst the 
most prominent explanations for such conventions feature the system of 
"irreducible posits" [Quine, 1961, p.44], the "paradigm" [Kuhn, 1970] or the "style 
of reasoning" [Hacking, 1983, p.l27f]. Quine sees science as "extremely 
underdetermined by experience" [1961, p.45] and holds cultural influences 
accountable for the most part of science "with all its elaborate myths and fictions" 
[ibid.]. Kuhn introduced the "image of science" [1970, p.l] as a commonly held 
misperception of science. Indeed, he argues that historical analysis would show 
that science is dominated by authority. During periods of ‘normal science’ a 
prevalent ‘paradigm’ would keep scientists on track, while only in times of ‘crisis’ 
will this authority be challenged by a ‘revolution’. A new paradigm which is
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sanctioned by authority will ultimately start a period of ‘new normal science’. 
Hacking, finally, suspects that "a style of reasoning may determine the very nature 
of knowledge that it produces" [1983, p. 128], Yet, since "we are left with no 
external way to evaluate our own tradition" [ibid.] we are unable to control the 
quality of knowledge. The style of reasoning, thus, reflects a predominant 
constellation of culture and society into scientific practice. The implication of this 
consequence of Versprachlichung is a detachment of scholarly work and its 
protocols from the Alltag, which makes its results increasingly relevant for 
scholarship, but also increasingly irrelevant for the Alltag.
In the case of the notion of system, the systems paradigm has already set the 
scene for further discussions. Not only are there already university departments 
and IS-companies established, but there is also a public debate about computers 
and the information systems they serve. There is no shortage of opinions about 
what a system is. This situation is encouraged by the labelling of all kinds of 
organizations, concepts, mechanisms, etc. as systems: health systems, traffic 
systems, control systems, soft systems, etc. Has this plethora of systems-thinking 
and -practice increased the body of knowledge about systems? Yes and no. Of 
course we know much more about the paradigm, because "it is solving the puzzles 
that it creates as solvable" [Hacking, 1983, p.56]. But then, we did not really want 
to know about the systems paradigm, we wanted to increase our knowledge of 
system. In what way the systems paradigm can help in this respect remains 
unclear.
A second strand of argument to support the antithesis builds upon the first strand, 
yet it is also corollary. On the one hand, the representation of reality, or possibly 
its scholarly preparation or even ‘re-creation’, affords a particular methodology. A 
protocol can be analyzed and treated in various ways, depending on its form, 
whether it is numbers, language or any other sort of code. On the other hand, a 
methodology cannot be thought of without the basis on which it acts. The question
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whether the presentation of reality preceded a particular methodology or vice 
versa cannot be rationally resolved, and, therefore, the two strands of argument 
are taken to be consequent as well as corollary. Representation and methodology 
go hand in hand.
The basis of scholarly method is a Versprachlichung of its subject matter. In the 
case of the study of IS various manifestations can be shown. For instance, 
functional decomposition as well as data decomposition are basically a 
Versprachlichung of actions and context. One exception among IS-methods, the 
MEASUR-method [Stamper, 1988] explicitly addresses this issue by stating that 
the symbols of an information system have no meaning except through their 
interaction with people. For any scholarly work in general, the reality has to be 
translated into a symbol structure which could be manipulated in various ways, but 
which needs human interaction to make it a meaningful manipulation, because the 
Versprachlichung has stripped away the uniqueness of the situation and authorship 
of the persons involved. The interpretation of action into protocols precedes any 
scholarly discourse. Thus, interpretation enters the scholarly method as a 
consequence of Versprachlichung. In this sense Popper’s statement is taken up, that 
the connection of World III with World I has to go through World II.
Looking again at the systems paradigm for a clarification of this argument, the 
example shows the following. System is a concept of World III, which is used to 
explain phenomena in the reality of World I. In order to do so, the ‘knowledge 
without a knower’ about system has to be interpreted by the ideology of the agent, 
a part of World II, in order to make ‘system’ meaningful.
The primary interpretation of the Versprachlichung contributes to the particular 
nature of scholarly method which leads to a secondary interpretation of the 
protocols. These give the opportunity to deal with reality by naming it. A higher 
level of abstraction is reached, where not the actual involvement, but a textual
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representation is concerned. In spite of Marx’s statement of the necessity to 
change the world, scholars only become involved in the Alltag through 
interpretation. Such practice is built upon an understanding of names. Now the 
argument could continue with the argument of the thesis in chapter five. How 
does this understanding come about and what does it mean? Ideological 
phenomena can be used in a variety of issues relating to this question. The result 
would be a perpetual discussion. Yet, the argument of the antithesis is not based 
on the question how this knowledge comes about, but rather how it comes about 
that this sort of understanding is treated as knowledge, and what consequences it 
has to treat it as such.
The key to investigate this question is structure. The treatment of names, or 
labels, as if they actually were the phenomena they stand for, gives a new meaning 
to structure, making it a matter of interest in its own right. In the Alltag, structure 
does not occur as a perceivable property of a situation. As Piaget argued, structure 
is more like a consequence of living, or really, it is living. Yet, within protocols, 
structure is a phenomenon of order. Different orders of labels generate different 
structures. Structure can be used as a variable in order to rearrange names, thus 
allowing the scholar to test alternatives and by trying to build a structure that 
resembles a perceived reality. This opportunity to change structure and to 
rearrange labels gives the impression that a ‘re-creation’ of reality was possible. 
Hence, Wiener’s approach to construct machines, or servomechanisms, that 
resemble and thus explain phenomena. Yet, in contrast to the Alltag, structure 
orders abstract and context-free labels, whereas the man in the street cannot 
rearrange his immediate reality, but has to accept the situation as constituent of 
his predicament.
Thus, structure takes on a critical role in protocols. The ordering of labels gives 
the scholar the opportunity to choose among various alternatives and then to 
explain the Alltag in analogy to the order he sees in the protocol. Ordering
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principles, then, are structures given to different scholarly approaches to structure. 
The systems paradigm is a case in point. The insistence on thinking in ^wholes' 
and the ordering of labels so that ‘feed-back’ takes place in a complex web of 
‘communication’ and ‘control’ shows clearly what prominence the ordering of 
labels has in the systems paradigm. Structure is, thus, on the one hand, a 
consequence of representing reality in protocols and separating phenomena from 
their context and, on the other hand, a prerequisite of scholarly work, enabling 
scholarly discourse and scientific justification.
Structure gives meaning to a scholarly discourse which disputes alternative ways of 
analyzing and treating protocols. Protocols which are considered controversial 
either do not fit current scientific thought and practice, or they do not satisfy 
scientific standards of representation and/or method. These standards are 
orientated toward an ideal of rational knowledge. Thus, Dilthey was forced 
through pressure from other scholars to change his theory about 
Weltanschauungen, because it was ‘proven’ that he was logically inconsistent. The 
scholars used the ‘unifying’ principle of logical consistency to coerce a member of 
the scientific community to change an otherwise sound research into biographies. 
Thus, a ‘structural’ argument brought about a change in content. At the same time 
this example shows that the pressure from within a scientific community demands 
that theories and ideas have to be justified. Lakatos would call this insistence 
mythical, and attribute it to the ‘negative heuristic’, a "set of devices ... designed to 
neutralise the destabilising effects of anomalies" [Fuller, 1988, pp.58-9], of the 
scientific community. Different opinions within a group of scholars are discussed 
until one opinion prevails which can be justified to all its members. Thus, two 
phenomena are important: the preservation of the shared accord and the 
introduction of structure into the discussion in order to bring this accord about. 
The ability to discuss structures of ideas makes it possible to explain them and, 
therefore, to defend them against other structures and schools of thought. The 
epistemological possibility of objective knowledge ceases. "The shift from
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knowledge to justification results from serious doubts about the possibility of 
attaining the kind of certainty that knowledge has been taken to involve” [Kekes, 
1977, p.87].
Indeed, the computerised spreadsheet might serve as an example for this. As an 
instrument to create scenarios and to rearrange bits and pieces of the 
representation of a system, it is supposed to allow the user to come to results that 
are optimal. Yet, it could be argued that all the spreadsheet does, is to 
demonstrate that there are various ways to compute the matter. The system it 
represents, though, is not computational. The user might assume he has control 
over the system as he has over the spreadsheet. When one particular result is 
chosen then this choice becomes effective. In the case of the spreadsheet this 
choice will be determined by the possibility to justify the selection, whether to 
superiors, peers, subordinates or to oneself. This justification is built upon a 
Versprachlichung of the Alltag, where names represent entities and all sorts of 
interpretations have affected the structure and content of the spreadsheet. The 
relevance of this process to the represented system is questionable, and with it the 
efficacy of the choice. In addition, it is quite often disregarded that the A4 size of 
paper dictates the format of the output, and, thus, to a certain extent the content 
of the spreadsheet. Variables which cannot be put on one sheet of paper have to 
be presented on two sheets, even though they can fit on a single spreadsheet. A 
decision taken in the past about standards of the size of paper influences the use 
of high technology in our times. However, a print-out from a spreadsheet carries 
its weight in a meeting; facts can be presented, choices justified: mission 
accomplished.
The structure of the mechanism of investigation with its conceptual separation of 
phenomenon and context in conjunction with the shift from objective knowledge 
to justifiable knowledge characterises the second strand of the argument. Structure 
gives the opportunity to explain, whereas the Alltag does not lend itself to such
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practice, because it cannot be grasped or abstracted. The possibility to explain is, 
hence, subjected to the social forces of scholarly discourse in two ways. On the 
one hand, structure becomes in itself an issue and a hallmark of scholarship. On 
the other hand, it lends itself to the pressure from cultural influences to comply 
with current standards. This means that power rather than knowledge decides the 
content of the protocols.
An interpretation of the results of scholarly discourse will lead to actions which 
will draw their justification at least partly from this tertiary interpretation of 
protocols. It is the third stage of scholarly work. Firstly, actions are recorded into 
protocols. Secondly, these are disputed in a scholarly discourse. Thirdly, the results 
are applied in the Alltag. All three stages of this process are subject to 
interpretation.
The systems paradigm has come to play a prominent role in this respect. Hailed as 
a means for communication among different people [e.g. v.Foerster, 1968] it plays 
on the difficulty of negotiating different interpretations of reality. The question of 
knowledge has been relegated in favour of mutual understanding by means of an 
explanatory framework which assumes a position of superior interpretative power. 
As stated in chapter seven the shift from Svhat we can know’ has been made to 
‘what we can explain’. The explanatory power of theoretical concepts is high in the 
latter, but low in the former. Interpreting protocols and analyzing a protocol’s 
context gives a tremendous scope for scholarly discourse, the merits of which are 
supposedly seen in the progress of science. Yet, the perennial quest for knowledge 
cannot be achieved through an increase in many alternative explanations of the 
inexplicable.
The implications of the two strands of analysis on the systems paradigm are far- 
reaching. As a scholarly enterprise it is caught in a power-game of interests.
Within the scholarly community it increases its relevance through the power-base
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which has been created for it. Outside this community, though, it falls seriously 
short of demonstrating its relevance.
In order to support this implication, the example of the competitive advantage 
which computerised information systems are supposed to give can be discussed. 
Michael Earl states that generally "managements have not realized the full 
strategic potential of an IT-based weapon" [1988a, p.276]. This statement sets the 
scene for much elaboration on this topic, because it is a claim which is based on 
"investigations at Oxford" [ibid.]. This blatant display of authority which a place 
like Oxford commands by its tradition is the ‘urbi et orbi’ for its message. Other 
scholars are bound to take up the issue because of the precedent set by a scholar 
from Oxford. Not that ‘strategic potential’ was a generic Oxfordian discovery. This 
term is used in connection to a whole culture surrounding ‘competitive strategy’ 
and ‘competitive advantage’ as coined by Michael Porter [1980, 1985a]. Yet, as an 
additional source of literature which sanctions this culture, Earl’s book serves as a 
means within the scientific community to support the paradigm. This ‘political’ aim 
of the statement becomes obvious when the next sentence is considered. "Of 
course it could be that in some sector ‘competitive advantage’ is mostly 
ephemeral" [Earl, 1988a, p.277]. The interpretation of ‘investigations at Oxford’ is 
only powerful enough to corroborate the initial statement, when supported by the 
current paradigm and the authority of Oxford. In the case of contrary evidence ‘of 
course’ some exceptions could be granted. This generous gesture to admit 
conflicting evidence to be an exception to the rule, tries to justify the rule rather 
than to accept the limitedness of the paradigm. No wonder, therefore, that 
competitive advantage is mocked by those who see it as a paradigm that supports 
scientific complacency [e.g. Warner, 1987]. Not that these critics possess the truth, 
but they interpret their investigations differently. That they try to make a point 
‘against Oxford’ or ‘against M IT is most likely part of the game.
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This example shows that there is a wide scope for interpretation. However, more 
importantly, the example draws attention to the implication that the motivation of 
the scientific debate comes from within the scientific community. Despite the 
subject matter being the Alltag, paradigms like competitive strategy are the 
gravitating forces that keep the scholarly discourse together. The question whether 
this paradigm, or for that matter any other paradigm, can justify its relevance has 
to be answered negatively, because the paradigm is an experimental representation 
of an interpreted Alltag. As such it is already detached from the Alltag through a 
Versprachlichung which gives rise to a discussion of a detached and self- 
perpetuating nature. The imposition of this debate on the Alltag is an attempted 
Ideologisierung.
The study of IS should not let itself degenerate to an Ideologisierung of the Alltag. 
Rather than preaching its gospel of IT and IS, it should look at the Alltag and see 
what is happening. It should acknowledge that there is a complexity beyond 
scholarship. Consequently, any ideology which emanates from scholarship should 
try to contain as much the possible consequences of the Ideologisierung of the 
Alltag. This means that systems-thinking should take account of systems-practice as 
the pillar of justification.
Before concluding this chapter some critical points have to be raised. This 
discussion of the antithesis is problematic, because of the strong distinction it 
makes between the Alltag and scholarly work. It has been said in this chapter that 
scholarly work is also Alltag in its own right. Furthermore, the difference of the 
Alltag and scholarly work was said to consist in the different approaches to 
interpretation. Whereas in the Alltag interpretation is simultaneous and context- 
free in a sense that there is no such thing as a protocol, scholarly work exclusively 
and specifically interprets protocols. Yet, the separation of protocol and action is 
problematic, and this is where a critique of the discussion of the antithesis has to 
start.
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Many scholars explicitly addressed understanding and thinking in terms of 
language as a constitution of reality; Pankow and Giddens have been mentioned. 
At different points in this dissertation it has already been argued that protocols 
are taken for reality. For instance, Hegel argued that all thinking is in the form of 
language, because ideas are expressed in language. Only because they are 
communicated can they be understood. Private ideas are, therefore, meaningless, 
because they have no relevance to a community. A similar statement was made by 
Wittgenstein, when he said that there can be no private language. Thus, there is a 
strong case that language and, therefore, protocols are really meaningful, because 
they are the only way of sharing ideas. They are possibly even the only meaningful 
representations of reality open to man. Yet, this possibility of representation does 
not constitute a necessity to represent, nor does it constitute a proof that protocols 
are a true representation of reality, nor that they are beneficial.
The separation of protocol and action, as constituent parts of reality, is a 
philosophical question that ‘oscillates’ between acceptance and rejection. This 
philosophical question does not ask for an answer, but for a philosophical 
response in whatever way. The validity of the discussion of the antithesis, though, 
is dependent on this philosophical response.
CONCLUSION
Where does this leave the efficacy of the concept of ideology for the study of IS? 
There is a strong case for the statement that the concept of ideology emerges as a 
consequence of scholarly representation of the Alltag and to the used 
methodology. The existence of ideologies is therefore a matter of scholarly 
discourse, which thrives on discourse rather than helps in understanding the 
subject matter. Ideologies do not exist in the Alltag, because of the 
‘immediateness’ of the experience of reality. The imposed structure of scholarship 
will never overcome its self-created gap between ‘knowing’ and ‘explaining’. It will, 
therefore, only affect the way we explain reality without helping to understand the
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human predicament. The concept of ideology should, therefore, not enter into the 
study of IS, since it will not contribute to the knowledge of the subject matter.
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9. SYNTHESIS 
INTRODUCTION
The thesis and the antithesis discussed two different points of view concerning the 
relevance of the concept of ideology for the study of IS. The thesis took a 
relativist and historicist point of view arguing that, since all knowledge is 
instrumental, the concept of ideology can be used as an instrument in scholarly 
discourse. The connection between the concept of ideology and the study of IS 
was demonstrated. It was shown how meaning and knowledge is constituted in a 
world of ambiguity and change. Consequently, the use of the concept of ideology 
within the study of IS was advocated. This part of the argument concluded with 
some cautionary remarks, which drew attention to the limitations of the argument 
of the thesis. The antithesis took a ‘realist’ point of view. Granting relativist and 
historicist notions of reality and consequently of its concepts, an argument was 
developed which challenged that stance as being hermetically sealed and trite. The 
unconnectedness of ihç, Alltag and its study left the two realms distinctly apart.
The gap between 'res extensa’ and 'res cogitans' [Descartes, 1986, pp.68-74], the 
world as it is and as we see it, was taken to be too wide to be bridged. Any 
scholarly concept was, therefore, argued to be purely theoretical. The addition of 
another concept whose justification lay more in its relevance for scholars than for 
reality was not deemed to be appropriate. The incorporation of the concept of 
ideology into the study of IS was, therefore, not advocated.
The synthesis builds on these two arguments. Both, thesis and antithesis, have to 
be acknowledged and preserved to some extent. Yet, the synthesis has to try to 
absorb both arguments and achieve a different level of discourse.
To this end this chapter is split into three sections. Firstly, an assessment of 
chapter five to eight will show the conflict between epistemological and 
‘transcendental’ issues in these chapters, and the way in which a collective IS-
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ideology resolves this conflict. Secondly, an assessment of chapters five to eight 
will show how thesis and antithesis are in themselves two ideological positions that 
establish a stability of interpretation which renders them homeostatic. This 
emphasis on stability forsakes the necessary resilience these perspectives would 
need in order to meet the challenges to the study of IS. Thirdly, a summary of the 
relevance of the chapters five to eight for the study of IS leads to a critical 
questioning of knowledge as the lynch-pin of science, ideology and system. In 
contrast to the empty promise of knowledge, nihilistic thinking is advocated as a 
means to stay abreast of the stifling onslaught of knowledge on the study of IS. 
Tactical advantage gained from knowledge should be complemented by a strategic 
exploitation of nihilistic thinking [Straub and Angell, 1991].
This argument is based on the understanding that ‘good’ information systems are 
not a matter of knowledge. Max Hopper, the director of SABRE (the American 
Airline’s computerised reservation system), contends that the time of large 
competitive information systems is over and that "astute managers will shift their 
attention from systems to information" [1990]. He acknowledges that whatever 
‘good’ or ‘competitive’ means, their meaning is only appropriate with reference to 
the knowledge derived from within a position and is, thus, transitory. Indeed, when 
he compares the development effort for SABRE of 30 years with the replacement 
time for a competing reservation system of 30 days, he concludes that the 
investment in systems, that is the analysis, design and management of organized 
complexity with the ultimate aim of controlling the known, loses out to 
investments in information, that is the mundane yet unaccountable phenomenon 
of human interaction that thrives on communicating the unknown. His analysis is, 
hence, in line with the argument of the synthesis, that stresses the human 
capability to interact flexibly, to change positions, to transcend boundaries and to 
transvaluate. The knowledge about information systems is the basis on which IS- 
thinking and -practice is built, but any such knowledge is temporary according to 
the chosen course of action. The ability of individuals to deny themselves in a
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nihilistic fashion is a lesson which has to be learned as part of the study of IS, and 
which will lead to new ways of IS-thinking and -practice.
ARGUMENT
The differences between thesis and antithesis can be described as a conflict 
between two types of fundamental question. One type of question inquires after 
the nature of things, such as what is a system? What is an ideology? What is 
action? What is the connection between action and ideology? These questions are 
linked with the idea that if the nature of these phenomena is understood, 
epistemological progress can be made, because reality is constituted by the 
interaction of different ideologies. Yet, the inquiry into such phenomena is 
particular, in so far as these questions always refer to ‘entities’ such as ideology 
and system, within a ‘broth’ of complex experience. An element of choice precedes 
these questions, when the boundaries are drawn that signify such entities. The 
second type of question is a consequence of this way of inquiry. Questions of the 
second type ask for the way the new understanding of a particular phenomenon 
can further the understanding of the ‘broth’ and the role of that phenomenon and 
its particular understanding. Such questions are concerned with the 
‘transcendental’ value of the understanding gained in an inquiry of the first type, 
like what is gained by assuming that every thought is ideological? Is it valid to 
separate phenomena of scholarship from those of the Alltag? What does it mean 
to assume that reality is constituted by the interaction of different ideologies? 
These questions are ‘transcendental’ in that chosen boundaries are transcended by 
a look at the profound complexity of the human predicament to make sense of the 
‘broth’. Thus, a conflict of constitution and dissolution of understanding arises 
where statements which are born out of an inquiry of the first type, with its 
position, its framework and its Weltanschauung, are challenged by statements 
which are born out of an inquiry of the second type where the inquiry is not 
necessarily a means to an end, but rather an end in itself.
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With respect to the concept of ideology and its relevance to the study of IS, this 
conflict is exemplified in the mesmerising ambiguity that emerges from the 
juxtaposition of any one position taken and the perpetual change to which such a 
position is exposed. The thesis and antithesis have shown this conflict in arguing 
two out of a multitude of different possible perspectives. The establishment of any 
such hypothesis necessitates the taking of a position and the defending of this 
position on the basis of the understanding that the respective perspective renders. 
A position is challenged, though, by the inevitable emergence of tautologies, 
syllogisms and solipsisms that stem from the introduction of a position. The 
circular reasoning which has been described in chapter four underpins such 
positions. Examples are the dependency on action or history as a concept that 
makes historicism viable, or the necessity to introduce a demarcation between 
Alltag and scholarship in order to make an argument about their difference. 
However, not just these two positions of thesis and antithesis entail criticism 
directed at simplistic transcendental flaws and their epistemological presumption
over transcendental uncertainty. Most if not all attempts at a h ig h e r ....................
epistemological certainty are subject to such criticism. One apparent example is 
the claim that the computer can be developed into a brain-like machine based on 
the assumption that logic underpins human reasoning, and the almost haughty 
rejection of this position in the face of its imposition of the machine metaphor on 
human nature.
It has been argued by various scholars of the philosophy of science that belief 
systems are responsible for such perspectives and the consequent understanding 
[e.g. D’Amico, 1989]. Statements of quasi-religious nature are supporting theories 
within the sciences. This can be said as well for the study of IS where information 
and system are positions of belief that are the Mecca of an entire community. 
Probably the most obvious example of the quasi-religious authority that is given to 
the pursuit of information, reviving the old meaning to the word ‘profession’, is
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Dretske’s "In the beginning there was information. The word came later" [Dretske, 
1981, p.l].
This dehberate biblical reference is not supposed to portray the study of IS as a 
sect. Rather Dretske intends to signify his position. Yet, the religious metaphor 
highlights the importance which is given to information within the study of IS.
Even the creation of the 'world* is relegated to second place. In addition, the 
metaphor does not just state one belief, but hints at a complex ‘cosmology’ 
characteristic of the study of IS that is evoked with this simple single mythical 
statement. Even though it would be simple to discard this one statement as 
insignificant, its power to form an effective myth should not be dismissed, because 
it is "not by listening to the fragmentary mythical stories, but by living within the 
social texture" [Malinowski, 1926, p.55] that such fragments become effective. For 
instance. Porter’s article "How Information gives you Competitive Advantage" 
[1985b] has become something like the Ten Commandments of IS-strategy, 
because of the way in which his position has been taken up by others [e.g. Earl, 
1988b], which warrants calling them his ‘followers’. Dretske’s statement and 
Porter’s framework serve as cornerstones in the social texture of the study of IS, 
and the apparent necessity for belief, in information or in competitive advantage, 
disencumbers the study of IS of the conflict between epistemological and 
‘transcendental’ questions.
In the shadow of this IS-ideology, different scholars have produced different but 
equally important positions in the ramifications of IS-theory and -practice. As a 
result, the entire study of IS looks like a loosely connected flock of sectarian 
groups, held together by the gospel of information and system. Sectarian religious 
groups are not known for their extraordinary tolerance. Different positions are 
defended with great alacrity. With the help of the concept of ideology, though, it is 
possible to explain the different beliefs and cosmologies that support these sects.
It is a classical example of the versatility of the concept of ideology. In the chaos
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of meaning an ideological stagnation makes activity on this basis meaningful, 
irrespective of a changing world.
However, the concept of ideology and the question of its relevance to the study of 
IS are themselves riddled by the emergence of ‘transcendental’ questions that 
challenge positions of knowledge. This means that even though an argument can 
be made, such an argument has to be understood to reflect an ideological 
framework. Challenging such a framework with a ‘transcendental’ argument makes 
it possible to unveil an underlying ideology. Yet it is impossible to prescribe future 
actions upon this revelation. Only an interpretation of the past is possible. An 
analysis in systems terms of thesis and antithesis will clarify this dilemma.
The concept of ideology and its relevance to the study of IS was discussed from 
two different perspectives in the thesis and the antithesis which has led to the 
observation that each of these positions is ideological. The positions taken in the 
thesis and the antithesis conserve their epistemological content and recreate it in 
whatever milieu crops up. They afford a self-regenerating intellectual perspective, 
which makes the situation of a phenomenon a matter of its own perspective and 
the conservative forces behind it. So, for instance, if one ‘knows’ what a system is, 
then there is no perceived need for reflection (or transvaluation). The ideological 
order of one’s position allows only this order to be recognised. This means that a 
programmer sees a system in terms of lines of code and the systems analysis that 
stands behind it, whereas a computer illiterate user sees a system as the machine 
in front of him and the behaviour the man-machine interaction requires. Both 
persons project their understanding of reality on their involvement with ‘the 
system’. Accordingly, they see what they can possibly understand. Described in 
systems terms, their ideological positions display homeostatic and autopoetic 
[Jantsch and Waddington, 1976] properties.
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The analogy which can be struck between ideology, homeostasis and autopoesis is 
a hint at the ambiguity which emerges, when the epistemological progress which 
these terms can render is transcended by means of transvaluation. While 
homeostasis and autopoesis have become jargon within the study of IS, ideology 
draws attention to the intellectual side of conservative self-perpetuation which 
stands behind the application of the other two terms. In order to clarify how a 
systemic interpretation of positions can use the research on homeostasis and 
autopoesis, an analogy to Pankow’s account of systems properties given in 
"Openness and Self-Transcendence" [1976] will be drawn. The critical doubt about 
positions as described above can be extrapolated beyond the subject matter of 
Pankow’s account, if a position, as for instance the thesis or antithesis, is 
understood as a system of intellectual pedigree. Pankow argues that systems with a 
high degree of stability tend to have a low degree of resilience, that is to recover 
into an altered status of stability once they have been pushed out of the confines 
of their initial stability. In an analogy it can be argued that systems of belief have 
a degree of stability and resilience, and the more one position, or an individual 
systems ideology or a collective IS-ideology for that matter, is adhered to the less 
resilience does such a position contain.
The security which a position gives in ordering the phenomena of this world, or 
the sense of identity which an ideology conveys to the members of its community 
is one side of the coin. It must not be forgotten that the inertial effect which a 
position has, does not necessarily have to be interpreted negatively. There is also 
the positive side to stability and relative certainty which it entails. In a further 
extrapolation of the analogy to Pankow’s account this relative certainty gives a 
degree of freedom within which action can be taken at ‘free will’, as long as the 
stability of the position is not violated. Probably the most famous example of this 
point is "The Great Inquisitor" by Fyodor Dostoyevsky in his novel "The Brothers 
Karamazow" [1958]. With deadly precision a position is argued in order to 
preserve the status quo of relative freedom, in spite of the clarity of the
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consequences of this action, that is the increasing epistemological ossification and 
the decreasing ‘transcendental’ liberty. The Great Inquisitor has travelled so far on 
the road of stability that he has no trust in resilience or, in this analogy, 
‘transvaluation’ of meaning and liberty at all. The dilemma between taking a 
position for the benefit of greater explanatory power and to the detriment of 
transcendental sincerity, or between stability versus resilience or freedom versus 
liberty lays plain open.
Transposed into the world of information systems, this metaphor highlights how a 
commitment to the stability of one position, whether that is a commitment to the 
practice of a systems development method or to a particular intellectual 
understanding of system and information, results in two effects. On the one hand, 
a greater security and certainty can be developed from within a position on the 
basis of the meaning it provides. On the other hand, it becomes more difficult to 
transcend that position without overthrowing its body of knowledge. Quite possibly 
both results are linked. Only if one works from within a position can there be a 
basis knowledgable enough on which to build alternative views. However, only 
transcending a position can mean that positions can be appreciated. How an IS- 
person stands in relation to this is a personal affair. For those who lack arguments 
or who are hesitant about abandoning cherished knowledge, the lecture of the 
Great Inquisitor stands as a warning.
In order to conclude this metaphor Arthur Koestler’s novel "Darkness at Noon" 
[1940] can be used, because it takes up the dilemma between epistemological and 
‘transcendental’ questions and the consequences for man. Here it is Rubachov 
who, once being a devoted communist, develops over time into a critical observer. 
His development is a consequence of his involvement in certain tasks which are 
masterminded by a perfectly logical elaboration of the communist theory, yet 
which go counter to his own grasp of justice and that of people he grows to 
respect. Yet, this disgust with his own actions only forces him to develop ever
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more accurate communist justifications for these ‘injustices’, and finally he sees the 
necessity for his own death through the hands of the system, which he helped to 
justify. This novel is an allegory on the topic of a man struggling with his 
knowledge and the inadequacy of this knowledge, because of its systematic 
inertness in the Alltag. The institution of his (communist) position has set a 
process in motion, which, on the one hand, makes him ever more clear-sighted in 
adherence to this epistemological position, and, on the other hand, makes him 
sense ever more strongly the inadequacy of this position to transcend its own 
sphere. The (communist) meaning which he gives to his actions are only 
meaningful in themselves, yet clash with the great variety of possible meanings 
which he finds around him. Koestler finishes his novel by a staccato of actions 
which, detached from the struggle throughout the entire book, portray Rubachov 
at ease within his fate which leads to his execution. After having satisfied his urge 
to polish his knowledge of communist theory, he leaves the world of knowledge 
and enters the Alltag. Knowledge has become an empty promise like a snake’s 
shed skin.
Transposed into the world of information systems this metaphor highlights that 
even a complete commitment to an intellectual position can lead to its dismissal. 
Its absurdity is unveiled perhaps exactly because of the total commitment to its 
explanatory power. If a commitment to one way of treating ‘system’ is adhered to, 
whether consciously or unconsciously, then the commitment to a position with 
respect to ‘system’ can retain its stability only if an ideology patches up the gaps 
created by transcendental doubts. Otherwise an investigation into the notion of 
system is self-effacing. The smallest incident, or for that matter a lengthy process 
of development, which leads to the discovery of a working ideology can lead to its 
rejection, and to an acknowledgement of the futility of actions on the basis of 
ideologies. On the one hand, it is absurd to assume that it would be possible to 
know everything about system. On the other hand, even if it was possible it would 
not be enough. However strongly one argues from within a position that provides
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meaning, one cannot escape the possibility of the inappropriateness of one’s 
position. This position has to be abandoned like a snake’s skin, because of the 
ever changing circumstances. The knowledge a position renders is outliving its 
appropriateness. Indeed, the very existence of knowledge affords its ultimate 
inappropriateness.
In contrast to the issue of stabihty, there is also the other side of the coin; the 
resilience which is denied by the stability of knowledge. The more emphasis is put 
on knowledge, the more commitment is bound up with it. Commitment is required 
not only to attain that particular knowledge, but also to the environment that 
facilitates the attainment of that knowledge. Thus, the consequence of knowledge 
is a partial commitment to that knowledge, which precipitates a collapse of a 
position when a new environment renders that knowledge inappropriate.
In the case of thesis and antithesis the striving for a stable epistemological 
position creates the homeostatic intellectual perspective on system that forsakes 
resilience in the face of change. As powerful as these positions might be in a 
scientific debate, they entail the danger of falling into ‘ideology mode’, for the 
reasons given above, when a new approach would be appropriate. However, the 
appropriateness of a new approach for each situation is only visible to those who 
take every situation as new. For those who see one situation as a homologous 
variant of a previous one, the necessity of a new approach to it is not apparent.
With respect to the relevance of the concept of ideology to the study of IS the 
following picture emerges. The quest for knowledge, which is the driving force 
behind this thought experiment and other attempts to increase the understanding 
of the world, has led to the emergence of science. Scientific knowledge, with its 
widespread and manifest application, has secured for itself a status of power and 
authority. This status has led to charges that it has succumbed to an ideology, 
where the adherence to the procedure of ‘scientific practice’ is more important
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than the actual justification of science as a ‘profession’. Thus, a position has been 
established for science within society that is nothing short of the communist 
position in Koestler’s novel. The stability of this strong position necessitates the 
development of a theoretical framework which can accommodate and be 
accommodated within this position. A theoretical framework which puts emphasis 
on transcendence would destroy this powerful position of science, because it acts 
as a means to obliterate boundaries in any established epistemological position. 
Relativism as the ultimate expression of the scientific epistemology is, thus, the 
‘Great Inquisitor’ of current science, which in spite of a vague understanding of its 
precarious position with respect to its transcendental sincerity presses on to fortify 
the scientific position in society. This potentially dangerous undermining of 
scientific liberty diminishes the resilience of science. Wittgenstein’s remark that 
"we feel that even when all possible scientific questions have been answered the 
problems of life remain completely untouched" [1922, 6.52, p. 187] is all too often 
only considered as a token tribute to fundamental doubts. For those seriously 
reflecting on this sentence of Wittgenstein and other, personal experiences, 
scientific theories, such as the concept of ideology, are gradually losing their 
meaning since they become systemic in so far as they display a ‘life’ of their own 
as described in the antithesis and experienced by Rubachov. The lack of control 
over such systemic ‘lives’ introduces an element of randomness to the complex 
systems the scientific position produces. Expressed in systems terms, the study of 
IS is subject to positive feed-back. A general sense of scepticism or even cynism is 
the consequence for anybody who challenges the epistemological imperative of 
(scientific) knowledge [Sloterdijk, 1988].
"I mistrust all systematizers and I avoid them. The will to a system, shows a lack 
of honesty [integrity]" [as edited by Levy, 1911, vol. 16, p.5]. This quotation of 
Nietzsche is a strong assault on all those who try to systematise their subject 
matter. It is an even stronger assault on those who decrease systemic features in 
favour of systematic features in the study of IS. And it is an even stronger assault
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on those who are subject to an IS-ideology. Nietzsche’s statement captures the 
transitory nature of positions like the fragments in a constantly revolving 
kaleidoscope. Each fragment is a position with its own ‘colour’ and ‘shape’. 
Together they make up a mesmerising image, but the next minute the image is 
different, because of the motion of the kaleidoscope. This motion is beyond the 
reality of the single fragments. Any attempt to ‘explain and understand’ the image 
with one of the fragments as a point of reference is, therefore, a conscious 
surrender to an ideology. Explanatory knowledge is confined to the limited 
‘colour’ and ‘shape’ of the fragment. Explaining a system from within the position 
of one of the fragments, when it is obvious that everything is changing constantly, 
shows a lack of integrity.
This leads back to the central topic of the thought experiment: the attainment of 
knowledge within and about information systems as explained with the concept of 
ideology. The problem to know what knowledge is remains unresolved. The 
various approaches that put knowledge into the category of being or knowing or 
structuring [Grene, 1969; Furth, 1981] have not advanced our understanding, but 
merely transferred the puzzle of knowledge to the puzzle of ‘the knower’. One IS- 
method which acknowledges the former [Stamper, 1988] fails to address the latter 
puzzle. Is knowledge really a matter of knowledge, or better, is it for the knower 
to know other knowers?
It seems as if the idea of knowledge, knowing and the knower derive from a desire 
for stability and consequently control and authority. Just as argued above, where 
the stabilising side of a position was mentioned, knowledge is seen as the secure 
haven where it is good to be. Yet, as with many desires this haven offers only a 
precarious security which depends on a certain dose of self-deceit. The attempts to 
get away from this conservative notion of knowledge, with their more dynamic and 
vague appeal, show that this self-deceit is faltering. To face the grim prospect of 
abandoning all hope in a somehow invariant knowing is very difficult, though.
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Thinking about this thought experiment and about the issues raised, it seems 
necessary to dare. Acting accordingly is going to be the real test.
The question why thinking should make such a difference is easily challenged. 
After all, everybody thinks. Besides, it is widely granted that provided with sound 
knowledge any reasonable person should be able to make good decisions. This 
argument, though, is flawed. As this chapter demonstrated, sound knowledge is a 
mirage. It is an ideological statement par excellence. Consequences of decisions 
feed back into the Alltag in an unaccountable fashion. The ‘goal posts’ are shifting 
all the time. Thinking about this understanding compels the insight into the futility 
of arguing for the attainment of particular goals on the basis of a position.
Arguing about information systems without a chance of anticipating the particular 
consequences renders IS-thinking and -practice meaningless. That most arguments 
about information systems convey some sense of meaning is a consequence of the 
coincidence of ideology and IS-thinking and -practice. However, this synthesis 
argues that thinking about this understanding counsels nihilistic thinking as a 
necessary precaution.
Nihilistic thinking is not a method, it does not follow rules. The very essence of 
nihilistic thinking, as propounded by Nietzsche, is the readiness to ‘transvaluate’ in 
order to dispose of a "negation of life" [Reese, 1980, p.393]. Because the human 
predicament eclipses all attempts to come to terms with it, nihilistic thinking 
inserts transvaluation as a means to break up positions, that misguidedly build on 
a particular status quo, leading to assumptions of superior validity and ultimately 
to a misuse of authority. Transvaluation does not happen with the ambition of 
achieving a particular improvement, because the particular consequences of 
transvaluations are unknown. Yet, by breaking up positions nihilistic thinking 
denies conceptions of value and meaning to restrict thinking and practice, and, 
thus, leads to the ‘innocence of becoming’ that characterises the human 
predicament
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A consequence of nihilistic thinking is that not taking particular actions has 
consequences as well. Nihilistic thinking should, therefore, not be confounded with 
a negative attitude toward action. However, actions which are based on an 
intention to achieve particular goals are revealed to be naive, because they 
simplistically extrapolate premises into the future. Nihilistic thinking affords an 
evaluation of the expected consequences as transitory, because the expected 
consequences are always accompanied by unexpected consequences. Any action or 
the omission of action has the potential of influencing the future to such an extent 
that the achievement of particular goals becomes impossible. Thus, IS-thinking 
and -practice must take into account the ephemeral nature of achievements, when, 
for instance, the speeding-up of transactions means that human capabilities to 
check them are outpaced, or when multiple channels of communication are 
supplied, there is always the danger that messages do not get to the recipient 
because he used another channel of communication. Thus, the clearness of today 
becomes all too often the vagueness of tomorrow. In this process of change the 
human capabilities to reassess and to respond creatively become vital. The 
pretence of superior knowledge and effectiveness must not be sustained if 
information systems are not to degenerate into a systematic exploitation of the 
status quo with unexpected consequences for tomorrow.
As argued in chapter two, there is no single truth. To conduct the thought 
experiment with a conversational, that is dialectical, method, as outlined in 
chapter two, reflects the argument of the synthesis. Any knowledge which becomes 
totemised into an icon of stability prevents the development of a body of 
knowledge to retain its appropriateness in changing circumstances. The request to 
emphasise thinking rather than knowing is a consequence of the hollow nature of 
totemised knowledge and the necessity to retain abreast of the icons of science. 
The study of IS should embrace the opportunity of being a relatively young 
science, and the consequent chance to establish itself as the expression of a 
thinking rather than a knowing IS-community. The acknowledgement that we do
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not know what information and system are, can be accommodated in the study of 
IS if thinking about these phenomena is encouraged. It should be encouraged, 
because, despite the stability that one particular understanding renders, constantly 
changing circumstances necessitate a flexible response. Thinking about system, 
without the pretence of knowing about system, will lead to philosophical 
arguments like in this dissertation. Here lies the chance of the study of IS as a 
science to demonstrate that a scientific approach can be philosophical and 
practical at the same time.
It is highly questionable whether a perspective that is nurtured on the stability of 
one paradigm will allow for enough variety to innovate knowledge. As mentioned 
above, the stability of various positions within the study of IS has the purpose to 
generate the basis of resilience. Unfortunately, there is no shortage of misguided 
IS-enthusiasm, and the imminent dangers of a collective IS-ideology spell trouble 
to the future of information systems.
Such a conclusion to the thought experiment stresses the opening influence of 
communication over the stifling influences of control. Many scholars recognise the 
need to be cautious with the power a position of knowledge renders. Having found 
out, for instance, that computer networks follow the law of gravity, that is they 
tend to go down, is a good starting point for an investigation. It draws attention in 
a humorous fashion to the helplessness which is experienced in the management 
of computer networks. Humour serves here to compensate for a lack of 
understanding. It is also an appeal to a scholar’s responsibility to recognise the 
limitedness of his findings. The acknowledgement of this profound helplessness to 
design a better future shows the scope for the findings of this dissertation in 
current research. Three examples for the study of IS are given below.
Firstly, in the competitive field of expert systems, the emphasis on the knowledge 
side has to give way to an emphasis on why and how a particular result has been
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produced. The promise of expert systems to supply the informed "answers" 
[Whitley, 1990] with which to control a certain task has been seriously challenged 
by the social problems such an approach entails. Questions of responsibility and 
applicability remain in the human domain and stress the need to communicate to 
the appropriate user(s) the "process" [ibid.] that leads to an expert system’s output, 
in order to justify its use. The awareness that the richness and unpredictability of 
the Alltag bogs down attempts to obtain answers should prompt research in the 
direction of helping the user in the process of decision-making. The problems of 
life cannot be overcome by a print-out. As epistemologically sound as answers 
might be, they are utterly inert to transcendental challenges. Only the user can 
deal with them, and consequently there is a need for a technology that recognises 
this.
Secondly, in the case of information systems development methods, the choice of 
method has consequences which can only be considered from outside a particular 
perspective [Smithson, 1990]. Attempts to build the best method are put to rout by 
the constantly changing requirements of the volatile environment of information 
systems. The question of appropriateness and choice requires an informed 
treatment which is necessarily based on an ability to think through the issues in a 
way unimpaired by the vagaries of a particular task, meaning or value. Any 
attempt at epistemological soundness will lead to a profusion of theory that is 
eclipsed by a reality that does not play by the rules. Only if the human 
predicament could be described by a complex but exhaustive account, then would 
information systems development methods have a chance of success.
Thirdly, in the case of computer-based information systems in developing 
countries, the introduction of hi-tech equipment has not resulted in a parallel 
modernisation of services. Avgerou [1990] points out that only "within an extensive 
program of actions for administrative reform" [ibid.] that accompanies 
computerisation can the "snowball effect to requirements for other changes in the
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organization" [ibid.] be accommodated. In fact, "the intervention amounts to 
organizational transformation" [ibid.] in such a way that only a discerning 
assessment by an independent mind can hope to fathom the profundity of variety 
which is needed to manage such a tumultuous change. Knowledge derived from 
previous experience plays an important part in the successful response to such a 
transformation, but only the ability to transvaluate gives the clout to assess such 
experiences without adopting with it a framework of meaning and value that might 
have lost its appropriateness.
CONCLUSION
Thinking and acting are the cornerstones of this synthesis. The study of IS should 
not resign into a pursuit of knowledge. The belief that the accumulation of 
knowledge, or the ‘production’ of knowers, is its only task, falls short of a 
thorough assessment of the consequences. It has never been and it certainly is 
never going to be enough ‘to be in the know’. In our world of sophistication, the 
ability to transvaluate is going to retain its importance in order to sift all the 
knowers. DeMarco’s statement that his method is a ‘communication device’ hints 
at the understanding that nobody can come forward with the right answers. Only 
nihilistic thinking will keep people abreast in the jungle of res cogitans. Acting 
responsibly in the res extensa is a different issue. It is the real challenge and it 
needs different qualities. But at least thinking matters through in a nihilistic 
fashion, can prevent action based on a misguided claim of superior knowledge.
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"Those things for which we find words, are things we have already overcome" 
Friedrich Nietzsche, Gotzendammerung, 26
10. Epilogue and Further Research
The thought experiment is a representation of the result of my research in an 
argumentative form. With hindsight I can evaluate my research from the distance 
which I gained during writing up the dissertation. I have emerged again from 
academic work into the Alltag where all our actions have to stand up to the 
question: so what? This is especially valid in the case of a scientific treatise, which 
aims at contributing to the body of our knowledge. The question in this case is: 
what does the thought experiment tell us? I will try to give a personal account of 
what the thought experiment demonstrates. Therefore, the academic style of the 
previous two parts will be dropped in favour of a style which is more appropriate 
for such an evaluation.
A proposition recurring throughout this dissertation has been that it is impossible 
to reach an objective and universal meaning for ‘information system’. This raises 
the question whether that proposition is just an excuse for not coming to the 
point. Especially the critical stance towards the concept of knowledge seems to 
caricature the ethic of scientific research. Yet, the sceptical stance towards 
knowledge, that it is impossible to know what knowledge is, is not new. 
Consequently, this cannot be the contribution of my research.
Neither is it new that we do not really know what ‘system’, or for that matter 
‘information system’, is. The question of system and its juxtaposition to a system 
highlights the dilemma of the difference between ideal and reality which has
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characterised much of occidental thought since Plato formulated his theory of 
ideas. Evidently, I cannot claim to have made that contribution either.
Nevertheless, I think that there is some ‘news value’ in my research. The 
controversial debates that followed the seminars which I gave in November 1989 
and 1990 at the LSE as well as the discussions I had with staff and students there, 
were not just a consequence of an inability to communicate my ideas. There is an 
element of challenge in the ideas that is new to the study of IS. I will try to work 
out that element and suggest further research.
Further research is, as I hinted in chapter one, a tricky issue for a research that is 
so critical of scholarship. Again, the ideal of scholarship has to be seen in the light 
of real scholarship. There can be no question that all too human influences 
pervade scholarship. Pride, pressure and promotion impair the ideal of ‘pure’ 
research. Yet, I would be the last to lament the human conduct of human beings.
I believe (and I am afraid there is not much else to be done) that researchers will 
pursue knowledge in a ‘proper’ way, and that they will always strive for the ideal. 
How effective and relevant such research will be is another matter on which I 
shall comment upon later.
As explained in chapter two, this dissertation is not trying to impose a scientific 
fact, but to demonstrate an argument with the aim to communicate its relevance. 
The reader has to decide for himself whether ideology and information systems 
are indeed connected. Speaking for myself, I think the connection is quite fruitful.
I set out to approach it by means of sociology. From an initial understanding of 
sociological theory I gained in lectures on Organizational Theory and Behaviour 
and on Information which I took at the LSE, I started a more thorough study of 
basic principles of sociology and especially of the sociology of science, knowledge 
and religion. By doing this I neglected the opportunity to approach it by means of 
semiology, which was much closer to my previous experiences from the M.Sc.-
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course which I attended at the LSE prior to this research. The work of de 
Saussure, Barthes and others offers tremendous scope for building a bridge from 
semiology to the study of IS. This would be one direction of further research 
where sound scholarship can bring a vast body of literature into a relevant 
connection to the study of IS. However, during the course of my research, I got 
less interested in the possibility of interdisciplinary scholarship, and more in its 
effect and relevance. Therefore I pursued the argument of ideology and 
information systems along those lines.
Another direction of further research would be to look at power and authority. As 
the concept of ideology in its political sense suggests, there is a whole body of 
literature on how power and authority and its use affect our knowledge. The 
writings of scholars like Feyerabend who has written about "anarchic" [1975] 
approaches to the philosophy of science can be the starting point for such an 
investigation into the politics of knowledge. I see this as a consequence of a 
primary sociological investigation into the concepts of ideology and information 
systems. Not only does the sociological perspective of these two concepts afford a 
treatment of power and authority, as has been mentioned in the thought 
experiment, but this finding also demands an investigation into how power and 
authority are handled. The question of living with ideologies and the sources of 
power and authority that support them leads directly to literature of politics.
A third direction of further research is to investigate the ‘unphilosophical’ 
treatment of information systems. Why do people take information systems for 
granted and busy themselves with research programmes, prototypes, conferences, 
etc. when the signs are indicating that we do not even know what information 
systems are let alone what their consequences are going to be. I see this as the 
most interesting consequence of my research. The discussion I intended to set in 
motion with this dissertation leads directly to questions of cosmology. Information 
systems can be seen as today’s catalysts of many business problems. That many
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information systems have not solved them but rather created additional ones is 
indicative of the ideological nature of the persistent dynamic of computerisation. 
How this ideology exerts its momentum, what consequences this has and how 
these consequences can be managed are, in my opinion, the most interesting 
directions for future research.
In my opinion, those are the three most important areas of further research 
emanating from this dissertation. However, evaluating the thought experiment 
from within a scientific framework is not enough. The intense preoccupation with 
scientific questions has put me often in the position to my research that Rubachov 
took toward communist theory. The motto above this chapter has its meaning 
here, because the aseptic clarity of the results of scholarship has not satisfied my 
curiosity. The thought experiment was set up in order to communicate the 
learning curve* that resulted from my interest in the combination of ideology with 
information systems. The suspense which I experienced during the course of the 
research of never being able to find stable foundations for knowledge in the 
shifting ground of social reality is the message of its synthesis. In the thesis, the 
danger of ideological feed-back overriding experience was seen as a threat to 
knowledge. In the antithesis, the danger of a detachment of scholarship from the 
Alltag was seen as a threat to knowledge. The formulation of these two threats 
and the suspense that is attached to knowledge as a consequence of these threats 
is the ‘news value* of the dissertation. Keeping doubt at the forefront of one*s 
research, rather than in its background makes a big change to scientific activity. 
Not to start on a basis of simplistic assumptions, but on a basis of doubt is 
virtuous in this respect.
This exhortation is ever new and ever old at the same time. Its general 
‘philosophical* quality is as old as philosophy itself. That it emerges from a 
treatment of the subject of ‘information system* in the light of the current debate 
to ‘soften* the study of IS is its contemporary relevance. As such it has an
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unsettling power, because it links IS-thinking and -practice to general 
philosophical questions, and it shows that it is analogously unfathomable.
The three directions of further research that I indicated above seem to me to 
support that point. All three of them as well as this dissertation itself point to a 
wider framework, whether that is semiology, politics, the humanities or the Alltag. 
Moreover, even the confines of these domains are limited and a general appraisal 
of system where everything is of, potentially equal, importance has to be imagined. 
The effectiveness and relevance of this research converges then on a question of 
ethics, in the widest meaning possible of this word.
One way of approaching an ethical justification would be to say that the entire 
research has been tremendous fun. It has been really the fulfilment of an idea that 
was at the back of my mind for a long time. But is such a hedonistic argument 
enough? Not even Adam Smith sanctioned blind hedonism, despite his advocacy 
of personal achievement as the best way to overall benefit. Certainly I could argue 
that the development I underwent, intellectually and otherwise, is going to be 
reflected in my future life. Yet again, this is a very personal consequence which is 
not really satisfying scientific standards, even though it is enough for the Alltag.
The problem now is to avoid a scholarly discussion about what is a proper ethic. 
From a nihilistic point of view every ethic could be discarded as empty. However, 
taking rather a sceptical perspective on the matter allows to acknowledge a 
pluralistic scenario, without sacrificing the point of view that things are going to 
happen exactly the way they are going to happen. The question of ethics is, thus, 
not simply to be answered, but to be understood as a challenge of the human 
predicament.
The ‘so what’-question should be introduced to the thought experiment in the light 
of this sceptical perspective. The historicist and relativist perspective of the thesis
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falls short of offering a convincing answer. In its dependency on assumptions, 
frameworks, etc. it is too much bolstered by the value it attaches to its findings as 
to be flexible enough to take the charge of self-importance. From the point of 
view of the thesis the ‘so what’-question must seem a usurper. The realist 
perspective of the antithesis is not much more resilient in this respect. It has not 
the power to transcend its own basis of Alltag and scholarship, and the dualism 
that goes with it. Not even the nihilistic perspective of the synthesis has the power 
to come to terms with the challenge of the ‘so what’-question. While thesis and 
antithesis can be challenged on the basis of their assumptions, the synthesis can be 
challenged on the basis of its doubt and its suspense. Of course it is easier from 
the point of view of the synthesis to retort ‘what does it matter’, but then that 
would be a very narrow ethical path.
This path is made narrow by the necessity to rehnquish the hope for invariant 
knowledge. As mentioned in chapter nine, the stability of one’s perspective had to 
be abandoned entirely to be able to face the ‘so what’-question. The price would 
be a very high degree of resilience, because any position could serve as a 
perspective. The cost would be that any position had to be left as soon as doubt 
bites. From a theoretical point of view this ‘living on the edge’ is a possible 
solution. From a practical point of view it seems questionable to me whether it is 
possible to give up all stability and to enbosom oneself to resilience. As 
mentioned in chapter nine, it seems to me only because we have a certain basis of 
stability do we have the chance for resilience and vice versa. But then, this already 
becomes a game of words.
There is an inherent undercurrent of elitism in this thought of ‘living on the edge’. 
Not only is it supposed that one strives for an ideal, which sets one apart from 
those who do not, but also does the consequence of high resilience entail a 
determination to sacrifice stability which is not endearing. The preservation of the 
ego in a world of changing deceit, where knowledge is power and power is
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knowledge leads to a growing suspicion "that was a certainty in ancient cynism 
(Kynismus): that things must first be better before you can leam anything sensible" 
[Sloterdijk, 1988, p.xxix].
The question remains whether this dissertation is a contribution to the body of our 
knowledge. It is expected that what I have to say should contribute. This is a 
peculiar expectation, which is what Peter Sloterdijk meant when he wrote that "the 
inversion of the relation between life and learning is in the air" [ibid.]. Regardless 
what my intentions were, there could be no guarantee that I would succeed in 
providing a contribution to the body of our knowledge. The trials of life force 
what I have to say into the maelstrom of society. What the result of this will be is 
beyond my control, because "it must be admitted that the structure of our social 
environment is man-made in a certain sense; that its institutions and traditions are 
neither the work of God nor of nature, but the results of human actions and 
decisions, and are alterable by human actions and decisions. But this does not 
mean that they are all consciously designed and explicable in terms of needs, 
hopes, or motives. On the contrary, even those which arise as the result of 
conscious and intentional human actions are, as a rule, the indirect, the unintended 
and often the unwanted by-products o f such actions" [Popper, 1952, vol. 2, p.93]. 
Thus, only if we inverted the relationship between life and learning could there be 
a contention that a body of knowledge can be advanced by design. I am afraid, 
therefore, that the answer to the question whether or not my dissertation is a 
contribution to the body of our knowledge is: it depends!
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